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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS.

PART XII.

CLOSED
UNTIL

1974

JANUARY TO JUNE 1923.

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS.

PART XII.

JANUARY TO JUNE 1923.

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Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs.

PART XII.

[E 371/53/65]

No. 1.

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 8.)(No. 11.)
My Lord,

Rome, January 5, 1923.

I HAVE the honour to report that Dr. Weizman, who spent two days in Rome on his return from Palestine, came to see me on the 2nd January, and had an interview of over an hour's duration with the President of the Council on the 3rd.

Dr. Weizman subsequently called at the Embassy to inform me of the results of this conversation. Signor Mussolini, in reference to the unsympathetic attitude of Italy towards Zionism, stated that the Zionists wished him to "faire le jeu de l'Angleterre," and this he was determined not to do. He repeated this phrase more than once, and appeared to Dr. Weizman to speak with some bitterness. He made use of the well-worn argument of Great Britain's design to split the ring of Moslem States by a Jewish Palestine, and referred to the refusal of your Lordship and M. Poincaré to allow the mandate question to be reopened to enable him to insert one or two points of importance to Italy.

Dr. Weizman pointed out the unreasonableness of this last request in view of the fact that the approval of the previous Italian Government had been given to the present mandates. With regard to Signor Mussolini's contention that Zionism was a tool in the hands of His Majesty's Government to weaken the Moslem States for the benefit of the British Empire in the East, Dr. Weizman, whilst denying that this was in any way the case, said that, even if it were so, Italy stood to gain as much as Great Britain by a weakening of Moslem power. Signor Mussolini admitted that the Arabs had been giving him trouble in Cyrenaica and Tripoli, and implied that he had no confidence in them.

Signor Mussolini raised the question of Italy obtaining concessions in Palestine, and also securing an outlet there for emigration. Dr. Weizman was able to show that by the terms of the mandate itself there could be no policy of favouritism which would debar Italy or any other country from participating in the development of the country. To enable emigrants to live and to be absorbed, a considerable outlay of capital was necessary; the Zionist organisation provided funds for its own immigrants, but the Palestine Administration was short of funds, and any scheme for importing Italian labour would have to be backed with Italian funds.

Dr. Weizman was struck by the mediocre character of the arguments adduced by the President of the Council, and by his superficial acquaintance with the subject, although, in the circumstances, little else could be expected. In the end, Signor Mussolini consented to allow Dr. Weizman to announce to a meeting of Jews that evening that he would have no objection to the name of an Italian Jew being put forward for appointment as a member of the Jewish agency in Palestine—the body provided by the terms of the mandate as the official channel for bringing Jewish opinion before the British Administration. Dr. Weizman was very pleased with this concession, as being likely to have considerable influence over Italian Jews, who, like other

elements in Italy since the advent of the new régime, have been adopting a non-committal attitude.

Later in the evening, one of Signor Mussolini's secretaries informed Dr. Weizman that his Excellency had been much impressed with the conversation, and that he had ordered a memorandum on the subject to be prepared for him.

I have, &c.
R. GRAHAM.

[E 151/46/91]

No. 2.

Foreign Office to Emir Abdullah.

Your Highness,

Foreign Office, January 11, 1923.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 13th November reviewing the history of the movement for Arab independence, and suggesting that certain steps should be taken by His Majesty's Government in order to give effect to the principles which inspired that movement and to recognise the special position of King Hussein in Arab countries other than the Hedjaz.

2. It is observed that in paragraph 4 of your Highness's letter the claim is made that Great Britain promised to work for "the establishment of a great Arab Kingdom." I am to remind you that no such pledge was ever given to King Hussein by His Majesty's Government. The actual promise of His Majesty's Government made in Sir H. McMahon's letter to King Hussein of the 24th October, 1915, reads as follows:—

"The districts of Mersina and Alexandretta, and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo, cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the proposed limits and boundaries. With the above modifications, and without prejudice to our existing treaties with Arab chiefs, we accept these limits and boundaries; and in regard to those portions of the territories therein in which Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally, France, I am empowered in the name of the Government of Great Britain to give the following assurances, and make the following reply to your letter:—

"Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs within the territories included in the limits and boundaries proposed by the Shereef of Mecca."

Thus the promise to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs within certain territorial limits was qualified by specific reservations which have always been held by His Majesty's Government to exclude Palestine and West Syria from the scope of the undertaking.

3. From the outbreak of the Arab revolt in 1916 it has always been the aim of His Majesty's Government to co-operate, in the spirit of the above undertaking, with the Arab leaders in securing the freedom of their people from Turkish rule. His Majesty's Government have consistently pursued this policy to which they hope that full effect will be given in the treaty of peace to be concluded between the Allied Powers and Turkey.

4. Animated with these intentions and desiring to place their relations with the Hashimite Government on a satisfactory footing His Majesty's Government initiated negotiations last year for the conclusion of a treaty which was signed at Amman on the 8th December, 1921, by you, on behalf of King Hussein, and by Colonel Lawrence on behalf of His Majesty's Government.

5. This instrument, which up to the present remains unratified by the King of the Hedjaz, does not, in the view of His Majesty's Government, who are bound by similar agreements with other Arab rulers, in any way conflict with the realisation of Arab unity. But His Majesty's Government are convinced that the only sure basis on which such unity can be established is the mutual trust and friendship of the various Arab rulers who alone can fuse into one people the diverse element over which they exercise control.

6. His Majesty's Government viewed with benevolence the establishment in Iraq and Transjordan of rulers who, as members of the Shereefian family, enjoy an exceptional opportunity of promoting close intercourse between their respective

territories and the Hedjaz. Nor have His Majesty's Government failed to afford those rulers material and moral assistance in order to help them to consolidate their position. The ratification of the treaty referred to in the fourth paragraph of this letter would have enabled His Majesty's Government to furnish King Hussein also with a measure of financial support.

7. Pending the coming into force of that instrument, however, His Majesty's Government have necessarily confined themselves to using their influence to promote the cause of peace and neighbourly relations amongst the chieftains of Arabia, and the success of the recent pilgrimage season bears witness alike to the efficacy of their action and to the tact and prudence displayed on that occasion by the King of the Hedjaz.

I am, &c.
D. G. OSBORNE.

[E 531/531/89]

No. 3.

Consul Palmer to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 12, 1923.)

(No. 355.)

Damascus, December 30, 1922.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to give below an extract from the "Réveil" concerning the recent activities at Aleppo of the Council of the Syrian Confederation, which also gives the names of the various members of the sub-committees:—

"Le drapeau syrien fut arboré, blanc et vert, avec, au coin, les couleurs françaises.

"Après les discours prononcés par Soubhi Bey Barakat et M. de Caix, les membres du conseil pénétrèrent dans la salle des débats.

"Cette première séance fut consacrée à la formation de quatre commissions, constituées comme suit:

"Commission des Finances: Farès Khoury (Damas), Alexandre Salem (Alep), Nassri Ishac (Alaouites), Ibrahim-al-Ghendy (Alaouites).

"Commission de la Justice et des Wakoufs: Taher Atassi (Damas), Cheikh Ourfali (Alep), Ismail-el-Aouach (Alaouites).

"Commission des Travaux publics et de l'Agriculture: Amin Agha Iéghan (Alep), Djaber Abbas (Alaouites), Néjeb Barazzi (Damas), Mansour-al-Halki (Damas).

"Commission des Affaires civiles, du Commerce, de l'Instruction publique et de la Santé: Sami Pacha Mourdom Bey (Damas), Rachid Moudarrès (Alep), Abdul-Wahad Haroun (Alaouites)."

2. The federation voted that there should be no "Governors" of independent States, but only valis or mutessarifs responsible to the federation. Hakki Bey-el-Azm, Governor of Damascus, resigned two days ago, and it is believed the vali will be Ata Bey Ayoubi, the recent Mudir of the Interior.

It is further thought that Bedia Bey Moayad (cousin of the ex-Governor), Mudir of Justice here, who recently spent several months in Paris, and whose declarations there to the French Parliamentary Committee appear to have given satisfaction, will be appointed Mudir of Justice for the Syrian Federation. He resigned at the same time as his cousin the Governor, but in his case his resignation was not accepted by the French délégué. The Governor himself has never been popular.

3. If true, I regard the appointment of Ayoubi with some misgiving, as I rather expect he will prove to be an obstructionist. I fancy his nomination would be a proof that the French are really relaxing to a slight extent their grip on local departments, as I am not sure that he would be their own nominee.

4. The Medjliss Shura will probably be abolished.

5. It will be seen from the above that many economies will undoubtedly be effected.

6. The federation will move to Damascus, theoretically for one year only, and return to Aleppo the next year. My own belief is that, once here, they will try and stay here, with only occasional short sittings at Aleppo.

7. The remarks quoted below—also from the "Réveil"—show that the federation

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is now becoming a serious proposition and not a mere paper fiction, as it was long considered:—

"Les pensions de retraite."

"Par ordre de la Direction générale des Finances, les paiements des pensions de retraite et des allocations de mise en disponibilité seront suspendus à dater du 1^{er} janvier 1923. Ces sommes devront être portées, à partir de cette date, sur le budget de la fédération.

"Départ."

"M. Schoeffler, délégué du Haut-Commissaire par intérim, accompagné de M. Georges Aziz, Secrétaire général de la Direction des Finances, s'est rendu à Beyrouth pour assister à la conférence qui sera tenue prochainement au Haut-Commissariat sur les questions fédérales et à laquelle prendront part tous les délégués auprès des États syriens.

"Des mesures d'économies."

"Les postes de percepteurs en chef des impôts ont été supprimés dans les cazas de Hauran, Kuneitra, Nebek, Wadi Ajam. On prévoit également la suppression des postes des adjoints au Moudirmal dans les cazas de Mesmié, d'Ezraa et de Joub-el-Yarrah."

I have, &c.
C. E. S. PALMER.

[E 653/653/91]

No. 4.

Major Marshall to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 15, 1923.)

(No. 92. Secret.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, December 31, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith the Jeddah report for the period 1st to 31st December, 1922.

Copies of this report and despatch are being sent to Cairo, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Aden, Delhi, Damascus and Transjordan.

I have, &c.
W. E. MARSHALL,
Agent and Consul.

Enclosure in No. 4.

Jeddah Report, December 1 to 31, 1922.

Pilgrimage: Quarantine Dues.

THE Hedjaz Government have raised their quarantine dues for next season's pilgrimage from P.T. 37½ to P.T. 90. Of this sum, 40 piastres is for quarantine dues and the remaining 50 piastres for landing permit dues. These dues are charged at the fixed rate of exchange of P.T. 112 to 1l. gold and the Hashimite Government have asked that the shipping agents should, as in previous years, collect the dues in the price of the ticket and pay them to the Hashimite Government.

When we consider the dues at other quarantine stations one cannot object to this increase, but there is no doubt that the pilgrimage is becoming yearly more expensive and compares very unfavourably with the pilgrimage expenses in the time of the Turks. We have calculated that the minimum expenses in the Hedjaz for an Indian pilgrim are, approximately, 264 rupees: this does not include steamer ticket, customs dues, food and water and other necessities of life. It is calculated that the Hashimite Government receive in taxes about 78 rupees, or, approximately, 5l., per pilgrim, so the Government revenue from the pilgrimage must be considerable.

2. The Soudan Government have issued, in "Soudan Government Gazette," No. 404, of the 15th November, 1922, "regulations for the protection of Soudan pilgrims and native passengers travelling by steam vessels and native craft to and from the Hedjaz." I do not think these regulations will facilitate the passage of the Soudan pilgrims. Some of the regulations are vague and some, in my opinion, are too severe for such a short journey.

Regulation No. 4 says that sufficient boat accommodation shall be provided for all passengers and crew; this is a physical impossibility in the small steamers plying

between Sukkin and Jeddah with the number of pilgrims they are at present authorised to carry, and it is also impossible in the case of native dhows. Even on the Indian pilgrim steamers only a small number of boats, depending on the tonnage of the ship, are insisted on; sufficient life-belts only are compulsory.

No distinction is made in the regulations between steam vessels and native craft. This is unfortunate, because these two means of transport offer entirely different problems. Steam vessels take approximately eighteen hours on the journey; native craft, with an unfavourable wind, may take many days on the journey.

Slave Traffic.

Another batch of slaves, eighty in number, arrived in Jeddah on the 1st December. This batch came by the same route as the preceding caravan, viz., by sea from Midi to Kufuda and then overland from Kufuda to Jeddah. In consequence of the arrival of these caravans the price of slaves in Jeddah has fallen about 33 per cent.

H.M.S. "Cornflower" arrived on the 7th December after patrolling the coast south of Jeddah. The commander informed me that the Political Officer at Hodeida reports that the Idrisi is taking strong action in the slave question and that the receiving and distributing centre for the slave traffic has been changed from Midi to Taif, which is just beyond the Idrisian frontier.

King Hussein, to show his attitude towards the question of slavery in the Hedjaz, sent me the copy of a petition from a Tekruri slave woman whose master, to whom she had borne a child, wished to sell her and her child, contrary to religious law. The King, I presume, intends to take action against the master.

Emir Abdullah.

His Highness the Emir Abdullah arrived on the 5th December and left again on the 21st December. Emir Ali and Sheikh Fuad-el-Khatib, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, came to Jeddah to meet him, and he was given an enthusiastic reception.

The Emir was in excellent spirits and gave graphic descriptions of his visit to London, but during his brief stay in Jeddah he did not discuss politics to any extent, though he told me that he hoped to persuade his father to sign the Abdullah-Lawrence Treaty. In this, apparently, he failed, because in a letter written on the 9th December, King Hussein stated that his hesitation to sign this treaty and the Treaty of Versailles was not due to arrogance or pride, but because he was afraid that, by signing, he might irrevocably lose the trust of his country and the confidence of his people.

Turkish Notables.

Mustapha Gabri, the Sheikh-ul-Islam, Riza Tewfik Bey and other Turkish notables arrived on the 5th December along with Emir Abdullah, and all left for Mecca on the day after their arrival. Riza Tewfik Bey returned with Emir Abdullah and left for Egypt on the 21st December. His future movements were uncertain, but he said he thought he might go to America.

General.

1. Arif Bey Darwish has been released by the authorities in Syria and he arrived in Jeddah on the 26th December. He will proceed to Mecca.

2. Nabib Lotfallah has been appointed Hedjaz Ambassador at Rome and has been accepted by the Italian Government. The "Qibla" says that other Ambassadors will shortly be appointed in Europe and America and advertises for clerks for these Hashimite agencies. Candidates will require training in the office of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

3. It is reported from Medina that two more caravans have arrived there from Nejd. The last caravan was robbed by the Beni Ali a few miles from Medina, but word was sent to Ibn Saud who said that members of the Beni Ali tribe in Nejd would make good the loss, so all the stolen goods have been returned.

It is said that Ibn Saud has opened the caravan road purposely for three reasons. The first is that he wants to create good feelings between himself and the inhabitants of, and the tribes around, Medina. The second reason is that there is a large number of medjidies in Nejd and the caravans are changing the medjidies into gold at a very favourable rate of exchange. The third reason is that it is possible for these caravans

to purchase large quantities of rifles and ammunition and in the Awali village, two miles east of Medina, occupied by the Beni Ali, there is a large supply of stolen rifles and ammunition. Shereef Shahat is supposed to be deeply involved in this traffic.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.,
Agent and Consul.

Press Summary: The "Qibla."

No. 640, November 30.

The Sultan of Turkey: His telegram accepting gratefully King Hussein's invitation to Mecca, whither he will proceed when circumstances permit.

No. 641, December 4.

Publishes the appeal to the people of Palestine, issued by the Palestinian Committee in Cairo, to be true to the delegation and its aims.

Expresses sympathy with the objects of the Angora "Society for the Protection of Children."

Reproduces the views of the Constantinople correspondent of the "Ahram" on the question of the Caliphate, with the characteristic comment: "Here they are discussing the subject in the name of Islam, and yet they contradict themselves by calling for democracy and Western methods."

No. 642, December 7.

Arrival of the Emir Abdullah: Enthusiastic reception at Yembo and Jeddah of His Highness, accompanied by King Hussein's Turkish guests.

Our Doctors: Thabit Bey has come back from Bagdad.

Martyrs of the Fatherland: Commendation of a Syrian publication celebrating the patriotism of Arab notables killed by the Turks during the war.

No. 643, December 11.

Emir Abdullah: Description of his reception in Mecca, the prolonged manifestations of joy, &c.

Inconsistency in first principles: Condemnation of the Syrian publication referred to above for reproducing an open letter from Shekib Arslan to the Emir Ali, of objectionable tone. Sayed Ahmed El Senussi, also represented in this compilation, is asked what good he thinks he is doing at Diarbekir. Both the articles to which exception is taken date, I believe, from five years ago.

The Caliphate: Articles from the "Ahram" by Habib-ud-Din Khatib (late editor of the "Qibla"), the gist of which is that nothing remains of the Caliphate except the name. The "Qibla" finds no one fitted for the Caliphate who is not prepared to give a promise to act in strict accordance with the Koran, unqualified even by the "Iasha'iah" of Ali-ibn-Abu Talib.

No. 644, December 14.

Decorations: The 2nd Class of the Nahda for Tabbet Bey and for the Bair-ul-Baladiga of Amman.

"A reader in the capital" has another smack at Shekib Arslan and his open letter to the Emir Ali; the "Qibla," in its characteristically dignified way, makes an insulting pun on the author's name.

No. 645, December 18.

Decorations: The list includes the names of Sheikh Fuad-el-Khatib, the Emir Iah and members of his suite, and the editor of the "Qibla."

Official announcement: Recapitulating declarations by King Hussein indicative of his disinterestedness and submission to the will of the Arab people, for the benefit of an anonymous letter-writer in Haifa.

Syrian-Palestinian Conference in Cairo: A notice issued by the Executive Committee defers the discussion on policy until after the conclusion of negotiations at Lausanne.

The ex-Sheikh-ul-Islam of Turkey: His refutation of the charge that he was a tool of England, reproduced from the "Ahram."

No. 646, December 21.

The Emir Abdullah: Left for Transjordan via Egypt on the 21st December. Farewell!

No. 647, December 25

Official notice. Quarantine and passport dues: P.T. 90 (i.e., approximately E.P. 75) will be collected in respect of every individual arriving in the Hedjaz; P.T. 40 by way of quarantine dues and P.T. 50 for the local passport office.

Hashimite Ambassadors in Europe: Habib Lotfallah has been nominated Arab Hashimite Ambassador in Rome, and the Italian Government have telegraphed their *agrément*. Other appointments will be announced in due course.

Young men wishing to be employed as clerks in the Arab Hashimite agencies (to be established) in Islamic and other countries are invited to apply. A course of training in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Mecca will follow appointment.

No. 648, December 28.

Order of El Nahda: With jewels for His Majesty King Fuad of Egypt, and without for the Egyptian Prime Minister of Egypt and other notables. The Emir Abdullah invested King Fuad on his way to Transjordan.

Aref Bey Darwish gets a 3rd Class of the Order.

Officially communicated: A recapitulation of King Hussein's declaration of his constant ideal of Arab unity, as to which a mischievous section of the press professes to doubt.

The "Bark" of Syria explains King Hussein's invitation to the ex-Sultan of Turkey on grounds of mutual benefit from the protection of His Majesty's Government; the "Ba," on grounds of true sympathy and Moslem sentiment. The latter journal is commended, and the former reproved.

Arrival of a noble patriot: Syed Aref Darwish has returned from leave.

Shipping Intelligence to December 31, 1922.

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Cargo Discharged.
Mansourah ..	British	Port Soudan	Suez ..	Dec. 1, 1922	Dec. 3, 1922	Packets. 515
Dakahlieh ..	"	Suez ..	Port Soudan	" 5, "	" 6, "	771
Asmara ..	Italian	Massaua ..	Suez ..	" 7, "	" 7, "	1314
Dakahlieh ..	British	Port Soudan	" ..	" 11, "	" 12, "	245
Mansourah ..	"	Suez ..	Port Soudan	" 15, "	" 15, "	447
Asmara ..	Italian	" ..	Massaua ..	" 16, "	" 16, "	57
" ..	"	Massaua	Suez ..	" 21, "	" 21, "	83
Mansourah ..	British	Port Soudan	" ..	" 21, "	" 22, "	2172
Hedjaz ..	"	Bombay ..	" ..	" 28, "	" ..	12451
Dakahlieh ..	"	Port Soudan	" ..	" 31, "	" ..	3000

H.M.S. "Cornflower" arrived on the 7th December and left on the 9th December.

[E 867/867/89]

No. 5.

Consul-General Satow to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 7.)

My Lord,

Beirut, January 10, 1923.

THE year 1922 has ended with Syria and the Lebanon apparently quiet and with public security reasonably good.

I gather from the reports of His Majesty's consul at Aleppo that the district round Antioch is now less disturbed, while the brigandage which in the autumn made the roads to Baalbek and Damascus somewhat unsafe seems to have diminished.

The latter part of the year was marked by the disappearance of numerous French officials, who will not be replaced, and the Haut Commissariat is no longer the miniature Ministry that it was. The number of Frenchmen employed in Grand Liban has also diminished. The exact French representation there does not yet

appear to have been settled, but it seems likely that most, if not all, of the advisers in the districts will disappear, being replaced by a few inspectors. This does not, I fear, mean that the Lebanese are any more capable than they were of administering their country, but the calls of economy are imperative. The French naval officer who acts as Governor continues to hold that post. There was at one time a strong rumour that he was going, and there has undoubtedly been a good deal of intrigue on foot, to which some of his compatriots were not alien. However, intrigue and self-interest seem to be the guiding motives in the Lebanon. An attempt has been made to improve the judiciary, and something in that line may have been achieved, but even now the administration of justice leaves much to be desired. The police and gendarmerie is also a weak spot, the police being apparently both inefficient and underpaid, and therefore unreliable. Nothing has yet been made public as to the new judicial organisation which is to deal with foreign cases when the Capitulations are suspended, but the French appear to have decided, as, indeed, they had to, to disregard local protests and to impose French judges in at least the principal courts.

The main event of the year is, I suppose, the birth of the Syrian Federation. How this experiment will work remains to be seen, but it will not all be plain sailing. The venture is one in which M. de Caix is much interested, and he has since his return devoted much time to it, so much so that the Lebanese are now complaining that they are being neglected. According to him, considerable economies have already resulted, and it has been possible to get rid of 2,000 officials, petty employees, gendarmes, &c. It seems pretty certain that Damascus will be the Federal capital, but this is distasteful to Aleppo, and suggestions have been heard that it would be better to choose neutral ground, such as Homs. The Alawite State is none too enthusiastic at its inclusion in the Federation. Its inhabitants are politically less developed, and, being Shiah, do not desire any close communion with States where Sunnis predominate. The Alawites are, from all accounts, fairly satisfied, and appreciate the advantages of their new roads and schools. Though, from opposite reasons, neither Jebel Bruze nor the Grand Liban desire, or are likely to desire, inclusion in the Federation. The former prefers its special form of non-government, while the latter wishes to retain all its old privileges, with, if possible, a lion's share in the customs receipts. At the same time, there are signs of an agitation in the coast towns for annexation to the Federation. Mazbatas to this end have been circulated in Tripoli and, it is said, in Beirut also. Naturally, the Moslems would like to join up with an entity which is predominantly Mahomedan.

I do not think it can be said that the French are any more popular than they were, but, as almost every complaint, when examined, boils down to a matter affecting the pocket of the complainant, this is not surprising. Trade has undoubtedly been bad all through the year. No great relief is expected from the customs agreement with the Kemalists, the terms of which have not yet been made public; the uncertainty of the political situation keeps off such buyers as there are in the interior of the country itself, and the fall of the franc, which took with it the Syrian piastre, has not improved matters. We undoubtedly did an ill-service to the country in introducing a stable coinage in the shape of the Egyptian pound during our short occupation of Syria. If a depreciated franc had succeeded a much more depreciated Turkish piastre, most people would have felt that they had gained something. As it is, with a constantly fluctuating franc succeeding the practically stable Egyptian pound, everyone is displeased. Just now there is talk of an improving situation, but this may be only due to the optimism engendered by a new year.

The future is uncertain, and rumours are plentiful. When Muhieddin Pasha was here negotiating the commercial agreement, it was believed that he was really arranging for the cession of some parts of Syria to the Angora Government. The knowing ones could even indicate where the new frontier was to pass. The French may have had some idea of a rectification of frontier, even possibly a liberal one, but the Kemalists are in disgrace, and the present popular belief seems to be that the Emir Abdullah is to be Emir of Syria. The possibility of an Anglo-French mandate is even discussed. The Lebanon will, of course, remain outside, whatever happens. It is, in any case, surprising how widely the belief is held by many, including Europeans, that the French are not going to remain. Even the special message to the contrary recently sent by M. Poincaré and published in the local press has not availed to dispel this belief.

However this may be, there is no doubt that the local French military authorities are seriously perturbed as to what the spring will bring forth. They believe that the Kemalists have collected forces which are a threat to both Irak and Syria. They have, therefore, the mass of their troops assembled in the north of Syria, from

Alexandretta to Euphrates. The flattering belief that, whatever might happen to Mosul, Syria would escape no longer prevails. Only the other day M. de Caix stated to me that, if any attack was made on us in Irak, they would inevitably be embroiled too, here in Syria. If a civilian might venture an opinion as to the French troops in Syria, it would be that they are at present insufficient in number and, with certain exceptions, not of first-class quality.

How the Moslems would view a Turkish incursion into Syria is difficult to estimate. Undoubtedly they were both flattered and pleased at Mustapha Kemal's rout of the Greeks and subsequent defiance of the Western Powers, so that they were, while secretly somewhat perturbed, disposed to pass over his treatment of the Caliphate. But they can hardly quite have forgotten the past, and, above all, their obligatory military service with the thousands of Syrian soldiers sent to the Yemen never to return. Turkish agents constantly visit Syria, and some pass on to Palestine. This is easy with practically open frontiers.

I doubt whether much importance is attached locally to the goings on of the self-appointed Syrian delegation at Lausanne. These people, who claim to represent the country, never seem to visit Syria itself.

Both Syria and the Lebanon are sheltering large numbers of refugees, both Greeks and Armenians. Some of the Greeks have been shipped away, but they are still coming in. As regards Armenians, many are in the greatest want, and even without shelter. The French do what they can, and the American Near East Relief looks after orphans, but much remains to be done.

Nothing yet is known as to the future of General Gouraud, and the question of whether he will or will not return affords matter for discussion when other subjects fail.

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW.

[N 481/312/97]

No. 6.

Memorandum respecting Co-operation of Moslem Countries and Russia.

(Secret.)

ACCORDING to information from secret sources the Kemalist Government looks askance on attempts which have been recently made by Russia to organise a Moslem federation. The pan-Islamic policy in favour at Angora leads rather to a Turco-Afghan-Persian alliance without the participation of Russia, and efforts are being made towards this goal.

2. It appears that the Soviet Government originally proposed the formation of a bloc consisting of Russia, Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan and possibly other Moslem States, the object being to enable Russia to exercise an influence over Moslem Nationalist movements and to direct them into channels not detrimental to Russian interests. A conference of the four Powers was, as we know for certain from secret sources, to be held in Moscow for this purpose in the latter part of 1922. The proposal, however, fell to the ground owing to obstruction on the part of Mustafa Kemal, ostensibly on the grounds of the impossibility of carrying out such a project while the Lausanne Conference was in progress, and on account of difficulties connected with the entry of Afghanistan into the bloc. It would seem, however, that the real motive behind Mustafa Kemal's objections was a disinclination to allow Russian participation in pan-Islamic schemes, and a preference for developing the union of Islam on purely Moslem lines rather than in co-operation with Russia, the latter course being considered as certain to result in arousing the distrust and hostility of Europe, and, therefore, to be fraught with no little danger to Turkey.

3. The Angora Government appears, therefore, to have taken the initiative in approaching Afghanistan and Persia, with a view to a tripartite treaty. The reported intention to despatch Captain Ismet Bey, formerly aide-de-camp to the late Jemal Pasha, on a special Kemalist Mission to Afghanistan is perhaps to be connected with these negotiations. From secret sources we know certainly that proposals of this nature were made in November at a special conference at Angora attended by Mumtaz-ud-Dowleh (the Persian envoy), the Afghan envoy and Mustapha Kemal himself. The Persian attitude was at that time unfavourable, and the question was postponed.

It has been reported that the following provisions, which show a general resemblance

to the terms of the Turco-Afghan Treaty, are suggested as the basis of the new tripartite treaty:—

1. The purpose of the treaty is defined as the strengthening and development of the natural friendship already existing between the nations by virtue of their community of religion and their geographical position.
2. Each party will abstain from any action calculated to disturb security within the others' frontiers, or subversive of the others' independence. Each party will likewise make every effort to suppress all activities hostile to the interests and welfare of the other parties.
3. In the event of foreign aggression against any party the others will immediately afford every possible assistance.
4. If any party considers it necessary to wage war in the name of God, to safeguard the glory and welfare of a people of the Prophet, the other parties will co-operate by every possible means.
5. No party shall enter into any engagements with a third Power without first obtaining the consent of the other parties.
6. Agreements may, however, be concluded with other Moslem Powers without preliminary consultation to obtain the other parties' consent, provided the other parties are duly informed.
7. The duration of the treaty is limited to twenty-five years.

4. These negotiations have apparently become known to the Soviet Government, which regards them with strong disfavour; and on the 26th November, 1922, Aralof, acting upon instructions from Moscow, is reported to have made a strong protest on the subject to the Angora Government and to the Afghan and Persian envoys at Angora. In each case, however, he was informed that the countries in question considered the matter to be entirely the concern of their respective Governments, who intended to settle the question among themselves. It was explained that the proposed treaty referred solely to Islamic matters, and that, consequently, there was no necessity for any Russian protest.

5. Several reports have been received to the effect that the treaty has actually been concluded. That this is not the case, however, appears from a report that Muhieddin Pasha, the newly-appointed Kemalist envoy to Tehran, arrived in Constantinople early in January, bearing with him the draft of the proposed treaty for submission to the Persian Government. It is understood that arrangements have likewise been made to submit the draft at Kabul for approval. The departure of Muhieddin Pasha from Constantinople is reported to be delayed pending the receipt of further instructions from Angora.

6. The avowed aim of the pan-Islamic policy thus actively revived by Mustafa Kemal is said to be to secure the liberation of all Moslem countries from European domination, and to make the Caliphate the basis of a temporal and spiritual union among them. Each nation will, it is suggested, be completely independent, but will be bound to other Moslem countries by offensive and defensive alliances. The ultimate object of the policy is, however, stated to be to make the Caliphate the recognised guarantor of the independence of every Moslem country, with the final result of Turkish hegemony over the whole Islamic world. It seems probable that Angora, in abolishing the Sultanate, hoped to strengthen the religious appeal made to other Moslem countries in the name of the Caliphate, since it was thought that the appeal, if associated with the Sultanate, might arouse in those countries fears for their hard-won independence. At the same time, if European Governments complained against interference by Turkey in the affairs of other Moslem nations, the reply could be made that, while the Turkish Government would never so interfere, and had no desire for territorial acquisition of any kind, it was only natural for Moslem countries to aspire towards unity under their Caliph.

7. Another instrument of this policy is reported to be the Jemiet-ul-Islam, recently revived, it is understood, under the presidency of Akif Bey. This society is reported to have decided to convoke at an early date, in accordance with the wishes of Mustafa Kemal, a pan-Islamic congress, to which representatives of all Moslem countries will be invited. In addition to general Islamic affairs and to the Caliphate question, the congress is apparently to discuss the formation of a League of Moslem Nations, in opposition to the European League of Nations.

8. In view of these tendencies to purely Moslem co-operation, without the participation of Russia, the Third International is reported to have decided to intensify propaganda throughout Afghanistan, not only with the object of spreading Communist

doctrines in that country and in India, but also with a view to combating the impetus which would be given to pan-Islamic propaganda by the conclusion of a Turco-Persian-Afghan Treaty. In view of the heavy expenditure in foreign currency which would be involved, it is understood that a special meeting of the Third International is to be convoked early this month to discuss ways and means. It is also stated that, in view of the new tripartite treaty, the Soviet Government intended to concentrate considerable military forces in Turkestan, as a means of exercising pressure on the Afghan Government.

Foreign Office, January 26, 1923.

[E 1083/46/91]

No. 7.

Sir H. Rumbold to Dr. Naji-el-Assil.—(Communicated by British Delegation (No. 94); Received in Foreign Office January 29.)

Lausanne, January 26, 1923.

Sir,
I AM directed by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to refer to the letter from this delegation of the 6th January and to the telegram from His Majesty King Hussein to you of the 16th January, of which you were good enough to give a copy to this delegation, regarding the proposed Anglo-French declaration for a Moslem council to advise upon the upkeep and maintenance of the Hedjaz Railway.

2. Very careful consideration has been given to his Majesty's telegram both by the British and French Governments, but in view of the present delicate situation in the Moslem world, the British and French Governments think it preferable to leave the selection of the president of the council to the free choice of the Moslem members of that body. Clearly the selection of the Mashiakhat of Medina will not be excluded by that procedure.

3. A copy of the text of the declaration is enclosed herein.

I am, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD.

Enclosure in No. 7.

Proposed Anglo-French Declaration.

LES Gouvernements de France et de Grande-Bretagne, agissant au nom de la Syrie, de la Palestine et de la Transjordanie et désireux de reconnaître le caractère religieux du chemin de fer du Hedjaz, se déclarent prêts à accepter la constitution d'un conseil consultatif ayant qualité pour fournir à l'administration des différentes sections de ce chemin de fer situées en Syrie, en Palestine, en Transjordanie et dans le Royaume du Hedjaz, toutes recommandations tendant à assurer l'entretien de la ligne et à améliorer les conditions de transport de pèlerins. Ce conseil comprendra quatre membres musulmans, désignés respectivement par la Syrie, la Palestine, la Transjordanie et le Hedjaz, et désignera lui-même son président et deux autres membres parmi les ressortissants musulmans d'autres pays intéressés au pèlerinage. Il siégera à Médine.

Les recommandations de ce conseil ne devront pas être en opposition avec les stipulations des conventions sanitaires internationales. Les Gouvernements de France et de Grande-Bretagne déclarent qu'en ce qui concerne les sections de chemin de fer situées en Syrie, en Palestine et en Transjordanie, tous les bénéfices laissés par l'exploitation seront affectés à l'entretien et à l'amélioration de l'ensemble du chemin de fer. Toutes sommes que cet entretien et ces améliorations laisseraient disponibles seront affectées à l'assistance des pèlerins.

[E 1223/1223/89]

No. 8.

Consul-General Satow to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 31.)

(No. 17.)

My Lord,

Beirut, January 19, 1923.

I HAVE the honour to report that there is at present some tension between the Maronites and Druses in the Shouf district.

The trouble began on the 15th instant, on the evening of which a motor-car with four Maronites from Deir-el-Kamar on its way to Beirut found the road blocked by a cart near the village of Kafarhim. The passengers on alighting to remove the obstacle were greeted with a volley. Three of them and the chauffeur were killed outright; the fourth passenger was slightly wounded, but came on to Beirut and advised the authorities.

The latter sent up a force of police and gendarmes with a French officer, Captain Clair, and yesterday the Governor of the Grand Liban told me that he had applied to General de Lamoignon for French troops to be sent up both to restore confidence and prevent further trouble. Also that the Secretary-General and the Director of Public Instruction, a Druse, had been sent to exhort all parties to calm. The French troops have now been sent.

One of the local papers announces that a Druse was killed on the Deir-el-Kamar road near Maraba on the 17th, but it is believed in Beirut that several Druses have been killed in different villages. There is naturally a good deal of nervousness on the part of the Christians.

"La Syrie" attributes the trouble to outside influence, having its origin in Transjordan, and mentions in this connection the name of Rashid Bey Talii, a Druse. The Governor said something in the same sense, although he mentioned no names, so this is probably the official explanation. Ali Bey Joumlatt, the kaimakam of the Shouf kaza, has resigned.

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW.

[E 1292/1/44]

No. 9.

Dr. Naji-el-Assil to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Communicated by British Delegation, Lausanne (No. 107); Received in Foreign Office, February 2.)

My Lord,

January 29, 1923.

I HAVE been authorised by His Majesty King Hussein to send to the Peace Conference of Lausanne a letter, a copy of which I have the honour to enclose herewith to your Lordship.

I am, &c.

NAJI-EL-ASSIL.

Enclosure in No. 9.

Dr. Naji-el-Assil to the Secretary-General, Lausanne Conference.

Monsieur,

Le 29 janvier 1923.

AU moment où la conférence est en train d'aborder la discussion définitive de la frontière septentrionale de la Syrie et de l'Irak, Sa Majesté hachimite le Roi Hussein m'a autorisé d'exposer à votre Excellence ce qui suit :

Considérant que la Conférence de la Paix de Lausanne a été principalement convoquée dans le but de conclure la paix entre les Alliés et la Turquie, le Gouvernement hachimite arabe s'est abstenu à demander sa participation active aux débats de la conférence; mais il se taisait dans la conviction qu'aucune question affectant de près les intérêts du peuple arabe ne serait discutée à son insu ou sans son intervention. Une fois, cependant, que le Gouvernement turc revendique d'une manière audacieuse et inlassable sa souveraineté sur l'ex-Vilayet de Mossoul, lequel est sans doute une partie intégrale de l'Etat arabe de l'Irak, le Gouvernement hachimite se trouve forcé à soulever la protestation la plus énergique contre les prétentions sans fondement de la délégation turque à cet égard.

Les engagements solennels de la Grande-Bretagne et de ses Alliés donnés à Sa Majesté le Roi Hussein, comme chef suprême et porte-parole de la nation arabe tout entière, alliée des autres nations dans la grande guerre, garantissent l'indépendance des Arabes et l'établissement d'une confédération d'Etats arabes. Ces engagements restent, naturellement, la base de toutes revendications arabes.

L'attitude loyale du Ministre des Affaires étrangères britannique, appuyé par ses Alliés dans cette conférence, en ce qui concerne les promesses données par son Gouvernement et ses Alliés à Sa Majesté hachimite et aux Arabes, nous permet à croire à ce que nul arrangement d'une nature à nuire aux intérêts politiques et économiques des Arabes n'ait lieu dans le règlement définitif de la paix entre les Turcs et les Alliés.

Agréez, &c.

NAJI-EL-ASSIL,

*Ministre plénipotentiaire de**Sa Majesté hachimite.*

[E 1658/46/91]

No. 10.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople).

(No. 107.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, February 13, 1923.

DR. NAJI-EL-ASSIL, the representative of King Hussein, called at the Foreign Office on the 6th instant on his return from Lausanne. He said that on the afternoon of the 6th February, Ismet Pasha, having heard of his impending departure from Lausanne, had sent for him spontaneously. Ismet had begun the conversation by asking whether they should talk about Mosul. Dr. Naji had said he would prefer to talk about the relations between the Turks and the Arabs. Ismet then said that the Arabs had joined the enemies of the Turks and fought against them, but that all this was past and done with. Turkey recognised the independent rights of the Arabs. He was speaking, he added, officially and in the name of the Grand National Assembly; and he asked Dr. Naji to convey what he had said to "His Majesty King Hussein." He referred in the conversation to the separation of the Sultanate and the Caliphate, and spoke of the Caliph as being the head of the whole Moslem world.

2. Dr. Naji replied that he had no authority to speak about the Caliphate, but he noted with satisfaction and gratitude what Ismet Pasha had said about the attitude of Turkey towards the Arabs and King Hussein, observing that this was the first occasion on which it had been so defined.

3. Dr. Naji stated that nothing further passed in this conversation, but that he had previously had conversations with Colonel Tewfik Bey, a military member of the Turkish delegation, to whom he had spoken of the unfortunate impression created by certain statements of Riza Nour Bey describing the Arabs as traitors. Dr. Naji saw a strong contrast between the explicit statement made to him by Ismet and these earlier pronouncements of Riza Nour.

4. Dr. Naji was sounded as to whether Ismet had hinted in any way at a federation of Turkey and the Arab countries. He was quite positive that Ismet had said nothing beyond affirming Turkey's readiness to respect Arab independence and explaining the Turkish view regarding the position of the Caliphate.

5. Dr. Naji further stated that he considered Ismet Pasha's declaration as very significant because a few hours before he had seen two members of the "dissident" Syrian delegation at Lausanne, Sheikh Arzlan and Ihsan Sabri. The former had complained strongly to Ismet of King Hussein, as the person primarily responsible for bringing non-Moslem and European influence into the Arab countries. Ihsan Sabri, who disapproved of Arzlan's declaration to Ismet in this sense, had informed Dr. Naji afterwards.

6. Dr. Naji was asked how he regarded Ismet's declaration as differing from the first article of the National Pact. He said that the wording of that article had been specially designed to leave a loophole for the Arabs themselves to decide to come again into the Turkish sphere. That was the significance of the self-determination formula given in article 1 of the National Pact. On the other hand, Ismet's present declaration meant that Turkey disinterested herself in the Arab countries from a political point of view. Dr. Naji added that he regarded this declaration as the logical sequel of Turkey's practical composition of her difficulties with England. Turkey had realised at

Lausanne that the Arab countries, with England's help, had become definitely separated from Turkey.

7. Dr. Naji also stated that he had telegraphed Ismet's declaration to King Hussein, who had replied as follows:—

"Inform Ismet in the best possible manner that in future Turkey may regard us as neutrals. Inform our friends at the same time that this declaration and our answer will make no difference to our established relations."

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 1890/1890/89]

No. 11.

Consul-General Satow to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received February 16.)

(No. 24.)

My Lord,

Beirut, February 6, 1923.

WITH reference to the fourth paragraph of my despatch No. 7 of the 10th January, I have the honour to report that on the 24th January the Acting French High Commissioner and the Governor of the Grand Liban visited Tripoli to investigate local grievances.

These grievances appear to be numerous, but largely of an economical or financial character. Among the demands presented were the following:—

1. Permission for Tripoli to enter the Syrian Federation, or, failing that, to revert to its pre-war status as capital of a sanjak, or to enjoy fuller financial and budgetary autonomy in keeping with its present status as an autonomous township ("municipe autonome").
2. Reduction of rates on the D.H.P. Railway.
3. Reduction of lighterage charges. Improvements to quay and custom offices.
4. Re-establishment of a passport office at Tripoli.
5. Revision of the valuations made under the new law regarding the taxation of buildings.
6. Establishment of a daily postal service by motor car between Tripoli and Beirut.

Even the first demand, which at first sight appears to be primarily of a political nature, is probably based on the belief that, as Tripoli serves as a port of entry for towns in Syrian Federation, it would be financially more advantageous for the town to belong to that federation. Also, of course, it could only be pleasant for the Moslems of Tripoli, who are in a large majority, to be attached to a State which is predominantly Moslem. The other demands are, with the exception of No. 5, merely intended to favour the growth of Tripoli as a commercial centre, and they are quite natural. The question of railway rates, which are admittedly high, has for some time been under examination by a commission.

The grievance mentioned under No. 5 is not peculiar to Tripoli. It is general throughout the Grand Liban, but mainly voiced by the towns. The objection to the new system is that landlords now have to pay a low tax on the real rental value of their property instead of a high tax on an absurdly low assessment made in the time of the Turks.

I understand that, although on his arrival M. de Caix was, as the creator of the Syrian Federation, warmly received, the warmth soon wore off when he refused to accept various petitions on the ground that proper channels, such as the Governor of the Grand Liban or the Representative Council, already existed for the putting forward of the questions with which the petitions dealt.

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW.

[E 1891/1223/89]

No. 12.

Consul-General Satow to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received February 16.)

(No. 25)

My Lord,

Beirut, February 7, 1923.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 17 of the 19th January regarding threatened trouble between Druses and Maronites in the Shouf district, I have the honour to report that, as the result of the enquiry held by the procureur général of the Beirut Court of Appeal, it is believed that the murder at Kafarhim was the result of a mistake. On the day it took place two members of the band of Hassan Tabet, a brigand who has for a year been terrorising the Bekaa Sanjak, were due to be transferred from Baaklin to Sidon. An attempt was to be made to release these two men, but instead the band held up and killed a party of harmless travellers.

Things seem to have settled down, and any danger there may have been of real troubles between Druses and Maronites has, it may be hoped, passed.

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW.

[E 2256/206/65]

No. 13.

Question asked in the House of Commons, February 26.

Mr. Mosley asked the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether, in view of the fact that the mandate for Palestine has not been fully ratified, he will state from what source the present Government in that country draws its authority; and whether that authority empowers it to hold elections?

Answer.

Mr. Ormsby-Gore: The position is that the mandate for Palestine was conferred upon His Britannic Majesty by the principal Allied Powers at San Remo in April 1920. On the 3rd October, 1921, the president of the Council of the League of Nations communicated to the then Prime Minister a request that His Majesty's Government should continue to carry on the administration of Palestine in the spirit of the draft mandate, which had previously been submitted to the council, until such time as the position had been definitely regularised. On the 24th July, 1922, the Council of the League approved the terms of the mandates for Palestine and Syria, and passed a resolution that they would enter into force automatically and at the same time as soon as the Governments of France and Italy had notified the Council of the League that they had reached an agreement on certain particular points in regard to the Syrian mandate. It is true that agreement has not yet been reached, but this in no way affects the administration of Palestine. On the 10th August, 1922, a Palestine Order in Council, of which the draft had been officially communicated to the Council of the League on the 1st July, 1922, and which provided for the holding of the elections referred to by the honourable Member, was passed by the King in Council. This order took effect on the 11th September, 1922, when it was published and proclaimed in Palestine.

[E 2345/2204/89]

No. 14.

Consul Smart to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received March 2.)

(No. 16. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Aleppo, February 12, 1923.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 13, Secret, of the 1st instant, the British vice-consul at Alexandretta reports that the French military authorities, apprehending an attack by the Turks or "chetés" (bands) against Alexandretta, are digging trenches round the town and surrounding it with wire entanglements. They have also placed about thirty machine guns at commanding points, while the town entrances are closed to traffic from 8 P.M. to 6 A.M. Moreover, a gunboat of the "Liévin" class is now stationnaire at Alexandretta.

There is a general expectation of "cheté" trouble in the spring. There are symptoms of incipient insecurity on the Aleppo-Alexandretta road, where several drivers and travellers have recently been shot dead. A "cheté" raid on the village of Zirbeh, south of Aleppo, cost the lives of two villagers.

The Turkish troops along the Syrian frontier hardly seem sufficiently numerous at present to justify apprehensions of an attack in this quarter by Turkish troops. The Turkish plan would more probably be to instigate bands and generally encourage any anti-French activities on the part of the local population.

A few days ago a consignment of portraits of Mustafa Kemal appeared on the market and were rapidly bought by Moslem shopkeepers and others, who exposed them in their windows with apparent satisfaction. I gather from conversation with a French intelligence officer that the French authorities discreetly checked this undesirable advertisement of the Turkish national hero.

The new Turkish Mutessarrif of Nisibin recently passed through Aleppo on his way to take up his post. He expressed very friendly sentiments to the French and said that the Turks had definitely renounced Syria. My French informant told me that he appeared to be a superior type of official, well educated and active.

Mustafa Kemal is shortly expected at Adana, where, according to some American naval officers who recently came thence on a flying visit to Aleppo, great preparations are being made to receive him. The Senoussi is said to be still at Tarsous, where he is expected to accompany Mustafa Kemal to the Irak front.

Feeling in Aleppo is on the whole favourable to the Turks and anti-French. The Moslems favour the Turks, because they think that the native Christians, being more practical and better mentally equipped, are bound to prosper to their detriment under a European Power, which would maintain security and a certain degree of equal opportunity.

These Arab Moslems imagine no doubt that the Turks would be prepared to grant them a measure of autonomy more satisfying to their aspirations than the French mandatory régime. The Christians, however, are far from friendly to the French. Doubtless they are disappointed that the French do not show them undue favouritism but endeavour to work with the Moslem majority. But the main reason of Christian discontent is economic. The artificial separation of Aleppo from its Anatolian markets as a result of the war and the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement has brought Aleppo trade to a standstill. For a race of middlemen the present situation is almost intolerable. I am inclined to think that it is only apprehensions for their personal safety which restrain many Christians from desiring the return of the Turks and the restoration of that economic unity on which Aleppo prospered. Fortunately, the spectacle of the continual flow of Christian refugees from Anatolia into Aleppo is of a nature to strengthen those apprehensions.

I have, &c.

W. A. SMART.

[E 2441/600/89]

No. 15.

Consul-General Satow to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 32. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Beirut, February 20, 1923.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 17, Confidential, of the 19th January, the following particulars regarding Ihsan Bey-el-Jabri, with whom Mr. Pirie Gordon conversed on the 10th January, may be of interest. They are derived from what I believe to be a reliable source.

Ihsan Bey is a member of a well-known and influential Moslem family of Aleppo, and is himself of good reputation. Before the war, and up to the armistice, he was attached to the Palace at Constantinople. He was then invited to Damascus by the Emir Feisal and appointed to be one of his Chamberlains. He left Damascus with the Emir, and went with him to Europe, where he has since remained. He was at Lausanne with Michel Lutfallah, Emir Shekib Arslan and other members of the Syrian Union Party. He is for complete independence and the abolition of mandates.

I venture to disagree with much of Ihsan Bey's statements as recorded by Mr. Gordon. I cannot bear that any party bearing the name of the "Party of Action" exists in Syria, and I presume that it is merely intended to describe the more active of the opponents of the French mandate. I venture to doubt whether any party at

present exists which is capable of bringing off an "armed insurrection." The renewal of band ("cheteh") activity in Northern Syria, and especially round Antioch, is, as Mr. Smart has already reported, most likely, but the motive power will in that case once more, as in the past, be furnished from over the border. The country is already well supplied with arms.

Turkish propaganda is undoubtedly active in both Syria and Palestine, and finds its most suitable soil in Aleppo. It is practically impossible to close the frontier to Turkish agents.

The Emir Abdullah has for some time past been mentioned locally as a possibility for the throne of Syria, but there are no signs that the French desire to accept him as such or that he has become a *persona gratâ* to them. His visit of courtesy was of course paid to M. Gaillard, French representative in Cairo.

I do not see how the French can make a treaty with a united Syria on the lines of the Anglo-Irak Treaty. The Syrian Federation is but newly born and it is far from united. Aleppo is jealous of Damascus, and the Alaouites are suspicious of both. As for the Lebanon, it only desires to remain in isolation.

From whatever quarter an attack on Syria may come, it will be the French alone who will have to bear the brunt. The Syrians, if they got rid of the French, would fall an easy victim to the first comer. They would, I think, in case of attack, at once claim as a right French military assistance not only in arms, munitions and advice, but also in men and money, putting no faith in Anazeh sheikhs or in any other Bedouins. I imagine that the latter would be prepared to act as advance guards for anything in return for a suitable subsidy regularly paid.

The trouble with men like Ihsan Bey is that they will not face realities and that they are absentees from Syria. The fact is that the Syrians are not at present able to stand alone in any shape or form and that they must therefore rely on the French. They may not always have received as much help from the latter as they had the right to expect, but there can be now no question of a French "colonisation" of Syria. The French have largely reduced their officials and they cannot at present do much in the way of further reductions.

In one point Ihsan Bey is undoubtedly correct, and that is in regard to the badness of the present northern frontier of Syria; but that is the result of the Angora Agreement, which was, as is now largely recognised, bad business.

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW.

[E 2477/653/91]

No. 16.

Major Marshall to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received March 6.)

(No. 10. Secret.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, January 31, 1923.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith the Jeddah Report for the period the 1st-31st January, 1923.

Copies of this report and despatch have been sent to Cairo, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Aden, Delhi and Damascus.

I have, &c.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.,
Agent and Consul.

Enclosure in No. 16.

Jeddah Report, January 1-31, 1923.

Political.

HIS Majesty King Hussein arrived in Jeddah on the 13th January. He was accompanied by Emir Ali, many of his Ministers, many of the Ashraf and a large escort of Bedouin, irregular horsemen and a contingent of the mounted infantry from Taif.

His Majesty, who was suffering from a cold, looked ill and worn, and had aged considerably since his last visit to Jeddah in June 1922. I noticed also that, in discussing political questions, he had not the same power of concentration, and had a tendency to change the subject without having come to any decision on the former question under discussion.

[10594]

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Apart from the usual ceremonial visits and a visit by the King to H.M.S. "Cornflower," King Hussein called here on the 15th, and for two hours, without any satisfactory result, we discussed the Hedjaz Railway, the question of the Indian, Ibrahim Abdul Hakim (my despatch No. 76 of the 13th October, 1922), and the question of the receipt for subsidy payments. King Hussein said he felt that His Majesty's Government had changed their policy towards him, and are now treating him as an enemy and not as a friend. He did not know what offence he had committed to deserve this treatment. If it was because he had not ratified the treaty, he was ready to make a treaty with Great Britain which would last for ever, but that we do not want him to do so, and we will not take his advice on Arab and other Eastern affairs.

2. The ex-Sultan of Turkey arrived on the steamship "Mansourah" on the 15th. King Hussein and Emir Ali met him on board, while the Ashraf and other notables met him on the quay. The streets were lined with infantry, camel corps and cavalry, and the procession was an imposing one. The ex-Sultan was given a house, one of the best in Jeddah, for himself and his staff. I called on him officially on the afternoon of the 16th. The French consul-general also called on the same day. He left for Mecca with King Hussein on the morning of the 20th, and arrived safely in Mecca on the 21st. Mecca was decorated in his honour.

3. Mr. Crane, the American, arrived on the same steamer as the ex-Sultan. He returned to Egypt by the steamer which left Jeddah on the 22nd. During his stay he was a royal guest, and every opportunity was afforded him to see Jeddah and to study native conditions. A Bedouin feast and dance was arranged on his behalf in the neighbouring village of Beni Malik, about 3 miles from Jeddah.

Pilgrimage.

The first pilgrim boat for 1923 arrived from the Dutch East Indies on the 27th. The second pilgrim boat has reached Kamaran and will arrive here on the 1st February.

It is said that Nemazi has chartered five steamers for conveying Javanese pilgrims to Jeddah. As a result of this competition the fares have been reduced from 360 guilders per return ticket, with food, to 200 guilders, and again further reduced to 180 guilders. The authorities in Java have, for the first time, allowed the issue of single tickets, and the Dutch consul in Jeddah has protested strongly to his Government against this. A large number of steamers are ready to bring the Javanese pilgrims, but it is still uncertain if, as it was at one time anticipated, the Javanese pilgrimage will be phenomenally large. The attitude of the native press in Java is anti-Arab and does not encourage the pilgrimage.

The pilgrims who arrived on the 27th were quarantined for twenty-four hours in Jeddah, even though the boat had been to Kamaran, and not a single case of sickness occurred during the voyage.

The price of the health certificate for all passengers and pilgrims leaving the Hedjaz has been raised from 20 Turkish piastres (1 mejidie) to 40 Turkish piastres (2 mejidies). This has not yet been officially notified in the "Kibla."

Aviation.

Five new Russians, one pilot and four mechanics, have arrived in Jeddah during the month. Constantine Yanni went to Egypt, nominally to meet a relative but really to obtain more mechanics and pilots. The total strength of the Russian personnel in the flying corps is now two pilots and five mechanics.

Turkish Refugees.

The first batch of Turkish refugees, thirty-one in number, arrived from Egypt on the 26th. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in Mecca telephoned to me before their arrival to say that one of these refugees, called Mowser Bey, is suspected to be an Angora spy, and that he will be kept under strict surveillance. King Hussein has intimated his willingness to accept more of these refugees, provided that they will accept the same conditions as accepted by these thirty-one, and that no people of doubtful character should be included. He asked me to inform the High Commissioner in Egypt that two Turks, called Mahmoud Pasha Nahir and Ragab Bey, should not be allowed to proceed to the Hedjaz. I understand from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that they consult the ex-Sultan of Turkey in these matters and accede to his wishes.

General.

1. Mr. MacAndrew arrived on his motor yacht "Harpado" on the 19th and left for the Soudan coast on the 26th. He informed me that he has been very well treated during his sojourn on the Arabian coast. He was able to call on the King and thank him personally for the courtesy extended to him during his stay in Hedjaz waters.

2. It appears that the Shereefian steamer "Tawil" has been detained in Suez because of a claim for arrears of pay raised in the Egyptian Courts against the Arab agent by two Italian engineers previously on that boat. The King protested to me against the action of the Egyptian Government in not informing him officially on the matter, but I understand that he has forwarded money to Egypt to meet the claim of the two engineers.

3. Dr. Granville, the president of the International Quarantine Board in Alexandria, is expected here on the 1st or 2nd February to discuss quarantine matters with us and with the Hashimite Government. King Hussein, during his recent visit to Jeddah, said he would endeavour to return to Jeddah to meet Dr. Granville, but since then he has nominated Dr. Thabit to represent him in any discussions which may ensue. He has also instructed the kaimakam to give Dr. Granville every facility to inspect the quarantine arrangements at Jeddah.

4. Recent reports received from Medina show little improvement in the conditions there, and still a lack of public security on the roads leading to that town. Sir Afsur-ul-Mulk, K.C.I.E., M.V.O., A.D.C., who is still there, arrived safely in December without any trouble, but an Indian who followed him about ten days later was robbed of everything, and has been unable to obtain redress.

Mulla Abbas, a prominent member of the Jeddah Indian community, has recently returned from Medina. He had to wait three weeks there for permission to visit the tomb of Syedna Hamza, about 2½ miles from Medina. When permission was obtained, fifty soldiers were sent to occupy the road, but these were promptly fired on by Bedouin and had to retreat. Mulla Abbas finally visited the tomb by going to the Bedouin and obtaining permission from them.

Another Indian, who was proceeding with his wife and family to settle in Medina, was robbed of everything at Bir Ali. He said that only the Indians in the caravans were robbed.

It is rumoured that some of the Mograbis, recently imprisoned in Medina for participation in the explosions at the Medina Arsenal, have escaped, and that the Government have offered a reward of 10*l.* per head for any information which might lead to their recapture.

Jamil Pasha, the commandant of the Medina garrison, has arrived in Jeddah, and has proceeded to Mecca. It is said that he has been dismissed because of some irregularities in the pay sheets of the soldiers under his command.

As no further caravans have arrived in Medina, the prices of foodstuffs have again risen.

5. All Arabic newspapers coming to the Hedjaz by mail to private individuals are now confiscated by the Government and are not delivered. People visiting the mail boats are carefully searched on their return to the shore. This has given rise to all kinds of rumours in Jeddah, as it is thought that the Government are trying to hide unfavourable news about the conditions in Mesopotamia and in Turkey.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.,
Agent and Consul.

Press: "Al Kibla."

No. 649, January 1, 1923.

Rain.—Heavy rain fell in Mecca and the neighbourhood on the 31st December, and the prospects for agriculture are good.

Good Tidings.—We learn that King Hussein has ordered the Hedjaz Railway to be repaired at his personal expense. It is expected that it will be available for pilgrim traffic during the coming season.

The Newspaper "Alif Ba" of Damascus.—Commendation of this journal's independent Arab spirit in its polemics with "Al Ra'i-ul-'Am," of Beirut; extract from its pages of an article from an American review, flattering to King Hussein.

The Hashimite Government's Position.—On the one hand, we have the violent criticisms of our present policy; on the other, our respect for our plighted word and

our conviction that present kaleidoscopic conditions are not propitious to a change. In this context "Al Kibla" reproduces the Duke of Manchester's letter to the "Daily News" of the 21st November, 1922, and an appeal by the (?) "Political League of Peoples," signed by Mesdames Harrison and Broadhurst, both strongly advocating the redemption of British pledges to King Hussein.

No. 650, January 4, 1923.

Official Notice.—The public is reminded that stringent penalties are enforced against those exporting gold from the Hedjaz.

Kemalists and the Ashraf.—A Turkish paper has published details of the ex-Sultan's expenses in supporting the Ashraf and other "leeches," and congratulates Turkey on having ensured an economy by cutting out these expenses. "Al Kibla" raises the question of Haramein Wakfs, and gives King Hussein's genealogy to the Prophet's daughter and on to Abraham, to show that the leeches in question are of holy lineage.

An Important Message.—The "Sunday Times" of the 26th November, 1922, publishes an article—reproduced—urging that British interests would be best served by the formation of an Arab State from Suez to Basra under a single ruler, with the "Caliph of all the Moslems" in Mecca. His Majesty's Government would thus keep their promise of 1915. "Al Kibla" applauds this sentiment, but adds: "The Caliphate is, however, and has been for centuries, no more than a name and a word, devoid of real meaning. But we do not hold that there is no place in which it could be revived."

The "Executive Committee of the First Conference of the (Arabian) Peninsula in Mecca" registers its gratitude to those British sympathisers with the cause of Arab independence whose letters and articles "Al Kibla" now publishes.

No. 651, January 8, 1923.

Our Exalted Guest.—Sultan Mohammed Wahid-ud-Din has left Malta for Jeddah.

The Caliphate.—Four columns of a letter from an anonymous contributor to "Al Hakika," of Beirut (No. 1759), criticising the action of Angora in depriving the new Caliph of temporal power. His artistic prowess, emphasised in an Egyptian paper, does not strike the "Kibla" as a Caliphian quality of tradition.

The Indian Press.—The declaration of the Afghan Minister in London that Afghanistan would not recognise a Caliph deprived of temporal power, and the statement made to the "Times" by Dr. Naji-al-Assil, King Hussein's representative in London, that the Kemalists' action was contrary to the principles of Islam, are quoted from the "Wakil Rozaneh," of Amritsar, of the 2nd December, 1922.

"Al Kibla" endorses the opinion expressed by King Hussein: "The Caliphate is dead. May God comfort Moslems for its loss. But should the world of Islam agree to consider anyone, whoever it be, as Caliph, we will recognise him on condition that he acts in accordance with the Book of God and the teaching of His Prophet."

The "Sahifeh Hozaneh," of Hyderabad (Deccan), speaks of the *entente* between Syrians and the Arabs and the Kemalists, and doubts whether King Hussein and Ibn Saud will accept Turkish control again.

"Al Kibla" shares this doubt, quotes King Hussein's telegram to the Lausanne Conference, and reaffirms the Arab aim of complete independence within neutral boundaries.

The "Mashrik," of Gorakhpore, of the 2nd November, 1922, foresees a visit by Mustafa Kemal to Mecca, to discuss matters with King Hussein. The King's statement: "The English tricked us; Islam must awake and unite," provides ground for such discussion.

"Al Kibla" says that if Mustafa Kemal should come to the Hedjaz, he would be made welcome to the Holy Places.

No. 652, January 11, 1923.

His Highness the Emir Ali.—His arrival in Mecca from Taif.

Sultan Wahid-ud-Din.—Has reached Port Said. He will be met by King Hussein at Jeddah.

Egyptian Pilgrims.—Their complaints to the Ministry of the Interior as to the high cost of pilgrim passages to Jeddah, and the delay in refund of their quarantine deposits, are referred to "Al Ahram" as fitter subjects for investigation than the Hashimite quarantine system.

No. 653, January 15, 1923.

Arrival of Sultan Wahid-ud-Din.—A full description of his reception by King Hussein. The Jeddah correspondent confesses himself unable to do justice to the magnificence of the arrangements.

Arrival of Mr. Crane.—Welcome to the helper of humanity, and, in his person, to America. The public are reminded who Mr. Crane is and what he has done.

The Caliphate.—Article from "Al Mokattam" of the 2nd December praising the new Caliph's artistic and social qualities.

No. 654, January 18, 1923.

Nothing of interest.

No. 655, January 22, 1923.

A description of the arrival in Mecca of Sultan Wahid-ud-Din in "Ihram." Brilliant spectacle; troops martial and impressive; townspeople orderly and respectful; Sultan performs the ceremonies of "Tawwaf" and "Sa'i," under police escort, before proceeding to King Hussein's palace, vacated in his honour. The note of the article is unbounded adulation of King Hussein. Even the Holy City of Mecca is referred to as "the legacy of Providence to His Majesty our Lord, the Great Saviour," the beauty of whose gesture in offering hospitality to the ex-Sultan is loudly extolled.

APPENDIX.

Shipping Intelligence.

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Pilgrims Disembarked.	Cargo Discharged.
				1923	1923		
Hejaz ..	British	Calcutta	Jan. 1	..	119 packages.
Dakahlieh ..	British	Suez	" 1	..	3,154 "
Keneh ..	British ..	Suez ..	Port Soudan ..	Jan. 5	" 5	..	2,052 "
Asmara ..	Italian ..	Suez ..	Massowa ..	" 6	" 6	..	111 "
Borulos ..	British ..	Port Soudan ..	Suez ..	" 11	" 12	..	12 tons.
Massawa ..	Italian ..	Suez ..	Massowa ..	" 13	" 13	..	1,002 packages.
Mansourah ..	British ..	Suez ..	Port Soudan ..	" 15	" 15	..	24 tons.
Massawa ..	Italian ..	Massowa ..	Suez ..	" 18	" 18	..	337 packages.
Asmara ..	Italian ..	Suez ..	Massowa ..	" 20	" 20	..	173 "
Mansourah ..	British ..	Port Soudan ..	Suez ..	" 21	" 22	..	1,702 "
Borulos ..	British ..	Suez ..	Aden ..	" 26	" 27	..	1,022 packages and 1,500 cases of kerosene.
Gorontalo ..	Dutch ..	Batavia ..	Rotterdam ..	" 27	" 27	117	..
Keneh ..	British ..	Aden ..	Suez ..	" 29	" 30	..	5,443 packages.

The French sloop "Algol" arrived on the 6th January and left on the 7th.
H.M.S. "Cornflower" arrived on the 16th January and left on the 17th.

[E 2478/120/91]

No. 17

Major Marshall to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston,—(Received March 6.)

(No. 11.)

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith my pilgrimage report for 1922.

Copies of this despatch and report are being addressed to Cairo, Jerusalem, Bagdad, Aden, Delhi, Singapore and Khartoum.

I have, &c.

W. E. MARSHALL, R.A.M.C.,
Agent and Consul.

Jeddah, January 31, 1923.

Enclosure 1 in No. 17.

*Pilgrimage Report, 1922.**Pilgrimage.*

DURING the pilgrimage of 1922, 56,319 pilgrims came by sea and disembarked at Jeddah. The first pilgrim boat arrived on the 21st February and the last on the 28th July. As usual, the majority of the Javanese and Singapore pilgrims arrived early and proceeded to Medina before the pilgrimage, while the Indians, Egyptians, Persians and Mesopotamians arrived during the months of June and July and proceeded to Medina after the pilgrimage.

The following table shows the number of pilgrims who embarked at different ports:—

Straits Settlements	6,550
Dutch East Indies	19,506
India	12,849
Soudan	4,850
Egypt	7,545
Basra	3,082
Beirut	1,575
Massaua	216
Aden	146

The number of pilgrims who arrived by sea was only 936 less than the number last year, and during the pilgrimages of 1920, 1921 and 1922 the numbers have been approximately the same. A feature of this year's pilgrimage has been the marked increase in the number of northern pilgrims, while the Javanese and Malay pilgrims were about 5,000 less than during the 1921 pilgrimage.

For the first time since the war an official pilgrimage, under the charge of Musaad-bin-Suweilim, came from Nejd. The pilgrims numbered about 2,000, and they were for the most part villagers from Boreidah and Anaizah districts. These pilgrims behaved well and there was no trouble of any kind between them and the Hedjaz Arabs. They did not go to Medina, but returned to Nejd after the Arafat pilgrimage.

Pilgrimage day was on the 3rd August, and the Id on the 4th, 5th and 6th.

The weather was favourable, the health conditions good, and reports received say it was a most successful pilgrimage. The number of pilgrims present at Arafat including local people, was estimated at about 65,000.

The first returning pilgrims left Jeddah on the 12th August, and by the end of August approximately 36,000 pilgrims had left the country. Owing to a lack of Indian pilgrim boats, the last pilgrim boat for Bombay did not leave Jeddah until the 22nd November.

The "Mahmal" arrived on the steamship "Dakahlieh" from Suez on the 24th July, and left for Mecca on the 27th July.

The disembarkation and embarkation of pilgrims was, as a rule, carried out expeditiously and reflects a good deal of credit on the local authorities. There was also plenty of camel transport, and the pilgrims were able to proceed to Mecca soon after landing in Jeddah.

Public Health.

The health conditions throughout the pilgrimage were good. With the exception of smallpox, which has been endemic in the country since the pilgrimage of 1921, and which has remained of a mild clinical type, no infectious disease occurred. Throughout the summer the weather was much cooler than during the two preceding pilgrimages. The death returns have not yet been received, but I think the death rate for this year's pilgrimage will be low. It is said that only twelve deaths occurred at Arafat and thirty-four at Mona. So far the deaths of fifty-one Indians and fourteen Egyptians who have left property have been reported to us by the Hashimite authorities. The number of Javanese pilgrims who died during this year's pilgrimage is given as 1,454, but some of the caravans of Javanese pilgrims who went to Medina before the Hadj were caught in a "simoom" (dust storm) and a good many deaths (from heat exhaustion and fatigue) occurred in consequence. More than 1,000 Javanese pilgrims have remained in Mecca until the end of next year's pilgrimage.

Though the health conditions of the pilgrimage have been good, the sanitary conditions in the Hedjaz have not improved. Three Turkish doctors arrived for service under the Hashimite Government, but the hospital accommodation has remained as it was before, and all reports show that there is still a great lack of ordinary medicines.

Dr. Munir-ud-Din, the Indian vice-consul, reports as follows on the sanitary conditions of Mecca, Arafat and Mona:—

"In Mecca the streets are generally dirty, as there are few scavengers and no public latrines. There are no dustbins, hence the night soil, sweepings and all other rubbish are thrown into the streets and from there they are only partially removed by scavengers. The meat, fish, sweet-meats, fruits and other prepared foods are exposed to dust and flies. The system for the disposal of excreta is a cesspool under each house, and this cesspool is emptied after the lapse of years. The smells which enter the houses from these cesspools are occasionally very offensive.

"At Arafat the water channel of the Zubeida Canal runs underground through the camping area, but it is open at some places where the water is received in tanks for the use of the public. As all the people and the animals have access to these tanks, the water soon becomes muddy and contaminated. There were few flies and few mosquitoes, but owing to the absence of latrines, human and animal excreta was so abundant that it was almost impossible to avoid soiling the feet or shoes.

"At Mona the water is protected. There were few flies and few mosquitoes. The slaughtering ground was kept in a fairly sanitary state, as the blood and offal were buried soon after the animals were slaughtered. The lack of latrines again led to extensive soiling of the ground. The death rate was low and the causes of death were exhaustion, debility and terminal diarrhoea in old people, dysentery and chronic lung diseases. There was no epidemic."

Public Security.

The public security in Jeddah and Mecca and on the Jeddah-Mecca and Mecca-Arafat roads was excellent, and we have received no reports of anyone molested or maltreated during the journey from Jeddah to Arafat. There were a certain number of robberies at Arafat, but the robbers were summarily dealt with according to Sharia Law.

On the Medina road, on the other hand, the public security was very bad, and the experiences of the pilgrims who proceeded to Medina has confirmed the fact that King Hussein has little or no control over the tribes who occupy the pilgrim routes to Medina, and that a tax levied by these tribes on the pilgrim caravans is an additional charge paid by the pilgrims. Unfortunately robbery, with and without violence, by the Bedouin attached to the caravans, was very common, and indiscriminate firing on the caravans by the Bedouin in the hills was the cause of many innocent pilgrims being ruthlessly shot.

Two caravans returned to Mecca without having reached Medina. In one case it was officially announced that the caravan returned because the pilgrims were afraid they would be late for the pilgrimage. The other caravan was stopped by Bedouin and forbidden to proceed.

One cannot get a better idea of the conditions than by quoting extracts from the reports of the pilgrims. An Indian pilgrim from Calcutta reports:—

"Above all, it is the state of insecurity which harasses the mind of the Hajjis and makes them most uneasy in the Hedjaz. From Mecca to Medina and back from Medina to Jeddah we have nowhere felt the existence of any Government outside the town areas. Bedouin killed the Hajjis and beat them with impunity and fought amongst themselves, causing loss of life and property to the Hajjis. Hostile tribes fired on the caravans, wounding and killing Hajjis, looted their property and killed their camels. No Government official was with the caravans, and no one appeared at the halting-places to enquire about its safety. No action was taken by the Government when Hajjis were murdered, robbed or oppressed. It is a pity that the Hedjaz Government should appropriate so much of the money which the Hajjis have to pay and should not depute a single responsible officer with the caravans, and do other.

necessary things to secure and ensure the safety of life and property on these journeys of the Hajjis. It is intolerable that there should be no one to receive or enquire into the complaints for murder and other wrongs."

The report of Mohammed Beg, an Indian pilgrim from Lahore, gives such a graphic account of his journey to Medina and of his experiences on the Shereefian steamer "Tawil" that I attach it in full at the end of this report.

Making an allowance for some exaggeration in the various reports received, there is no doubt that the public security of the Medina road is very bad and there is no improvement from the conditions which prevailed last year. The Hashimite Government do nothing to redress these wrongs. An Indian pilgrim arrived in Jeddah with a gunshot wound of the thigh and pelvis received on the return journey from Medina. He died two days after his arrival in Jeddah. I at once reported the matter to Mecca, and asked that steps should be taken to punish those guilty of the murder. The Hashimite Government made all kinds of excuses, said they had not received a report from one of their doctors, said that the Mutawwif had reported that all the pilgrims had returned safely, and that, therefore, the hostages had been released and that I must give them the name of the Mutawwif, even though I had already told them the house in which he died. I sent them a medical report by Dr. Munir-ud-Din, gave them the name of the Mutawwif, and insisted on an investigation. This they reluctantly agreed to, but since then I have heard nothing, and I do not expect to hear anything further on the matter.

Pilgrims are encouraged through Mutawwifin and others to make no complaint, as it is contrary to their religion, and that these hardships and dangers are a necessary adjunct to the pilgrimage. Only those who appeal direct to the King have a chance of redress; any complaint through a consul is almost universally useless.

Only two things appear to appeal to the conscience of King Hussein. One is the fear of what pilgrims may say on their return home, and the other is the fear of the press. As an example of the former, when Mirza Mohammed Beg, the Indian pilgrim, whose report is attached, returned from Medina every effort was made to pacify him when the authorities knew that he was writing a report for publication. His fare on the "Tawil" (*vide infra*) was refunded, the chief Muallim called on him, assured him that things would be made easier, and obtained his signature to a document saying that on these assurances he had satisfaction and thanked the King. He was also sent for by the Kaïmakam, who treated him with great deference and repeated the assurances of the Muallim.

A good example of the second was the case of a Javanese pilgrim who appealed to the Dutch consul for medical assistance as his wife was ill. The Javanese doctor was sick, so, at the request of the Dutch consul, I sent Dr. Munir-ud-Din. The Mutawwif would not allow him to enter the house. The Dutch consul took immediate steps to notify the local Government that he had found three Javanese journalists, and that he proposed to report the matter to them so that they might publish it in the Javanese press. The result was that in a very short time the Mutawwif was sent to make a most abject apology to the Dutch consul, and the local authorities expressed regret at the occurrence.

Jeddah Customs.

Customs dues on pilgrims' effects were instituted for the first time, and at the beginning of the pilgrimage extortionate charges were made. The very clothes the pilgrims were wearing, if they were adjudged new by the customs authorities, were taxed, and on occasions the tax charged was 50 per cent. of the cost of the article. One Javanese pilgrim paid customs dues amounting to 29% on his personal belongings.

As the pilgrims were complaining bitterly about these customs charges, I made representations to the Hashimite Government that customs dues on pilgrims' personal effects should be waived or moderated. In their reply the Hashimite Government notified me that the following articles brought by pilgrims would be exempt from customs dues:—

1. Rice, if not a full sack.
2. Oil, petroleum and sugar, if not a full tin.
3. Bread, called "Kajib," syrups and cocoanuts in any quantity.
4. Ihram clothes, all used towels and five new ones for each person.
5. All perfumes for private use.
6. Flour, lentils and wheat, not more than one sack per person.
7. All ladies' ornaments, silks, &c.

Though the Hashimite Government did not in all particulars, especially with regard to foodstuffs, carry out these regulations strictly, conditions were greatly improved.

A further hardship imposed on pilgrims was the customs dues of 50 per cent. levied on the import of Turkish Medjidies. No previous warning was given, and pilgrims from Bahrein and Mesopotamia, who had brought Medjidies, suffered considerable loss. A further order for the confiscation of all Maria Theresa dollars was given to the customs authorities, and some pilgrims from the Yemen, who arrived with no other currency, were penniless. The matter was referred to King Hussein, who said that the money should be kept in the customs and returned to the pilgrims on their return journey. In the meantime these pilgrims were left in the country without any means of support.

Some Afghan pilgrims arrived with a sack of rosaries in order to trade during the pilgrimage, as is allowed in the Koran. The cost of these was 800 rupees. The customs charge was 38% gold.

Quarantine.

1. *Jeddah Quarantine.*—As in previous years, the Hashimite quarantine authorities followed no definite rules. All boats from the south arrived from Kamaran with a clean bill of health, but almost without exception the pilgrims were sent to the quarantine islands at Jeddah for twenty-four hours. Pilgrims from the north were also, as a rule, quarantined for twenty-four hours. This, in my opinion, owing to the prevalence of plague in Egypt, was justified, especially as the boats from Egypt did not call at Tor, as, in my opinion, they ought to have done (article 128, International Sanitary Convention).

Not only were the pilgrims sent to the quarantine islands, but the steamers from the south were kept in quarantine, and the agents, pilot and coolies treated accordingly. The Dutch consul and I protested strongly against this, and Dr. Thabit, in his reply to the Dutch consul, said that he would not accept the word of any ship's doctor as to the presence of any disease on board.

Unfortunately these rules were not universally applied, and distinctions were made between different shipping companies. A new line of pilgrim steamers belonging to Nemazee, of Hong Kong, with Haji Zainal Ali Reza, the Kaïmakam's firm, as agents, were treated much more leniently than the Dutch and Blue Funnel boats. The ships' officers were allowed to disembark without disinfection, and the ships allowed *libre pratique* after the pilgrims had disembarked and left for the quarantine islands. On the arrival of the steamship "Jeddah" (Arab Steamers (Limited))—agents, Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co.—the ship was put in quarantine for twenty-four hours and the captain was forbidden to come ashore. Nevertheless, one first-class pilgrim, Dr. Mohammed Hussein, at one time Indian vice-consul in Jeddah, was allowed, with his family, to disembark direct without going to the quarantine island. On the same day the Italian consul, Dr. Torrè, who is also a medical man, went on board an Italian boat which was in quarantine. On the following morning the Minister for Foreign Affairs at Mecca sent a telegram to all foreign representatives stating that the Government intended to take action in the matter, and that they would not recognise the qualifications of any representative of any Government who interfered in such important questions. In my reply I referred to the case of Dr. Mohammed Hussein, and presumed that he was allowed to disembark because he was a medical man, and that I could not understand why the same courtesies *re* quarantine should not be extended to Dr. Torrè. In their reply the Government said that Dr. Mohammed Hussein was allowed to disembark because he was a first-class passenger, and therefore exempt. When I sent them a list of the first-class pilgrims from the same ship who had gone to the quarantine island they had no reply to give. King Hussein, on discussing the matter later, said that we must remember they were a young country, and had still much to learn.

Two more examples may be quoted to show the arbitrariness of the Jeddah quarantine. An Italian boat arrived from Suez and was put in quarantine. A few minutes later Dr. Thabit found that three Turkish doctors, travelling third-class, had arrived for work with the Hashimite Government, and the quarantine was at once abolished and the steamer given *libre pratique*. The second was the steamer "Borulos," on which I returned from leave early in April. At Yembo there was no quarantine, and people from the shore flocked on board. On arrival at Jeddah twenty-four hours later the steamer was kept in quarantine during her stay in Jeddah harbour.

Owing to the repeated demands of the Dutch consul and ourselves to know what regulations the Hashimite Government were following in their application of quarantine laws, the Hashimite Government notified us in May that they would follow the "Dispositions applicables aux pèlerins et aux navires à pèlerins pendant le pèlerinage du Hedjaz de 1913," published by l'Administration sanitaire de l'Empire ottoman. They asked us to notify them if these regulations were not carried out by the local quarantine authorities.

I pointed out to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that these regulations were issued annually by the Sanitary Administration of Constantinople and that the latest publication was 1914. I further pointed out that Turkey had signed the International Convention of 1912, and that these regulations were published in accordance with that convention.

2. *Kamaran Quarantine.*—All pilgrim boats from the south called at Kamaran for the disinfection and quarantine of pilgrims, and all arrived here with a clean bill of health. On the return journey boats for the Dutch East Indies and Singapore proceeded direct, while up to the 30th August all boats for India and the Persian Gulf called at Kamaran for medical inspection. We had, however, been in telegraphic communication with Aden and India on the subject, and, as the pilgrimage was clean, the call at Kamaran was abolished after that date.

3. *Egyptian Quarantine.*—With regard to the official Egyptian pilgrimage, carried on three steamers, and those Syrian pilgrims who came on special steamers from Beirut, there was little or no difficulty, but we had again great difficulties with regard to pilgrims and passengers travelling to Egypt on the ordinary mail steamers—non-pilgrim boats—the Khedivial Mail Steamship Company and Marittima Italiana Company. On the 18th August the local agents of the Khedivial Mail Line received from their managing agents in Alexandria the following telegram:—

"Quarantine have decided until further notice all passengers class and deck Egypt, yours and Yembo, will be considered pilgrims and disembarked Tor till following mail steamer; only passengers on board before arrival of steamer yours considered passengers."

As I considered this decision to be not only unjust in its discrimination against passengers embarking in the Hedjaz, not all of whom are pilgrims or even Mussulmans, but also illogical in its exemption of passengers embarking in the Soudan, since these are compelled to share with Hedjaz suspects the promiscuity of deck passage, I telegraphed to the Foreign Office and to his Excellency the High Commissioner for Egypt, protesting against the ten days' quarantine, which would be thereby imposed at Tor on all passengers embarking on mail boats at Jeddah, pointing out that such was contrary to International Convention, and justified by nothing in the health conditions of the pilgrimage. The Quarantine Board replied that it was three and not ten days' quarantine, but, as the mail steamers call at Tor every ten days, it meant ten days' detention at that place.

Under the International Convention in force there is no regulation which makes it compulsory for a non-pilgrim ship to call at Tor. The Egyptian Quarantine Board, Alexandria, in their session of the 21st September, 1920, decided that:—

"Les navires ayant à bord des pèlerins de la dernière classe en proportion moindre d'un pèlerin par cent tonneaux de jauge brute, ne sont pas considérés comme navires à pèlerins; mais les pèlerins de toutes les classes amenés par lesdits navires subiront les mesures générales imposées aux pèlerins."

"Les bateaux en question qui ne font pas escale à Tor débarqueront leurs pèlerins à Suez, au lieu de Tor, pour subir les mesures réglementaires."

The Khedivial Mail Line makes Tor a port of call, the Marittima Italiana does not. Yet in spite of this circumstance the Italian mail steamship, "Massaua," which left Jeddah on the 17th August was ordered back from Suez to Tor by the Egyptian authorities. The Italian company then refused to carry any more passengers from Jeddah, and the only means of communication with Egypt was a Khedivial mail steamer every ten days, and as these boats only carried 1 per cent. deck passengers, one can appreciate the hardship involved to merchants and others wishing to proceed to Egypt, Syria and Palestine in the ordinary course of business.

I submit that the quarantine measures imposed by the Egyptian Quarantine Board upon passengers from the Hedjaz to Egypt are as unreasonably severe as their neglect to impose quarantine measures at Tor upon Egyptian pilgrims southward bound was incomprehensible. From the 1st January, 1922, to the 6th July, 1922, the number of cases of plague reported in Egypt was 314, and yet not only were pilgrims not detained at Tor on their way to the Hedjaz, as required by article 128 of the International Convention, but the Quarantine Board telegraphed to me on the 6th July last expostulating against the imposition of twenty-four hours' quarantine at Jeddah upon these pilgrims, a measure for which the Hashimite Government had every justification, not least in their memory that plague occurred in Suakim in June 1921, the infection of which was almost certainly brought from Suez. The neglect of article 128 of the International Convention by the Egyptian authorities threatened more seriously than any other single circumstance the health of this year's pilgrimage.

On the other hand, the extension of Egyptian quarantine measures involving detention at Tor, first to pilgrims travelling by non-pilgrim ships, and now to all travellers from the Hedjaz, whether pilgrims or not, finds little justification in the health of recent pilgrimages. Were the pilgrimage infected one could understand the Egyptian authorities taking every precaution, and we would give them every assistance in our power, but when the pilgrimage is clean I can see no necessity for these elaborate, and, I think, unjustifiable steps.

We again had considerable difficulty about the passage of non-Egyptian pilgrims through Egypt. While many Syrian pilgrims came on special boats, and many Palestinians came with the official Egyptian pilgrimage, a large number of pilgrims, Palestinian, Syrian, Tunisian, Algerian and Moroccan came as ordinary passengers via Egypt. There was also a certain number of West Africans who came via England and Egypt. The agents of the Khedivial Mail Line received the following letter from the company:—

"Return pilgrims."

"In reply to your remarks we beg to inform you that the Egyptian authorities will not allow any foreign pilgrims to land in Egypt under any circumstances, and you must therefore absolutely refuse to book any by our steamers."

I telegraphed to his Excellency the High Commissioner, Cairo, and received a reply that the Egyptian Government had not refused permission for transit through Egypt to non-Egyptian pilgrims, though they adhered in principle to articles 131 and 137, Sanitary Convention.

These two different interpretations did not help us much in our difficulties, nor did it facilitate the passage of these pilgrims, because the Khedivial agents had to obey the orders from the company. Some of the pilgrims went by the French boat to Beirut, and some went on the Shereefian steamer, "Tawil," to Akaba. The West Africans, who had ample means, and who had booked a return passage from Egypt, went via Port Soudan.

I do not think the new regulations, No. 131, proposed by the Commission of the League of Nations will be of much assistance unless the Egyptian authorities agree that all pilgrims who come via Egypt as ordinary passengers are allowed to return by that route, and their passports stamped accordingly. If we have to get permission for individual cases or groups of cases, there will be considerable delay, and, if telegraphic communication is used, considerable expense.

Until something is done to lessen these severe quarantine measures for north-bound pilgrims and passengers we will have no improvement in the quarantine conditions at Jeddah. The liberty to observe or not to observe the International Convention, as it suits them, which the Hashimite Government exercise to the general discomfiture is justified by them with the argument, repeated *ad nauseam*, that, since the authorities in Egypt can by such a decision as that taken by the Quarantine Board at their session of the 21st September, 1920, impose a local and not universally acceptable interpretation of an article of the convention (article 89) similar license to make and to impose "local" rules must be allowed to the quarantine authorities in Jeddah.

Shipping.

As in previous years, the shipping arrangements for the Javanese and Malay pilgrims were excellent. The vast majority of the pilgrims came early and visited Medina before the Hadj. Immediately after the pilgrimage there was a steady stream of Blue Funnel and Dutch boats to take returning pilgrims, and early in September the majority had gone. After the Medina pilgrimage boats called for the small number of Javanese and Singapore pilgrims, who went to Medina after the Hadj, and for the stragglers. The last boat left on the 6th October. Even for a small party of stragglers these companies will always send a steamer.

Four different shipping companies carried the pilgrims from Indian ports. The Bombay-Persia Steam Navigation Company (Mogul and Arab Lines), the Persian Gulf Steam Navigation Company, Mr. Nemazee and Mr. Dada Mia Khandwani. Nine hundred and sixty-five return tickets were issued, and these were all issued by the Bombay-Persia Steam Navigation Company; the remaining companies issued single tickets only.

Owing to the competition, the pilgrim fares were low, but this is a doubtful blessing, as, by the issue of single tickets many poor people are tempted to make the pilgrimage and are destitute in Jeddah at the end of the pilgrimage. The Indian shipping arrangements worked smoothly this year, and the only drawback was the lack of shipping after the Medina pilgrimage. This is probably due to the fact that (1) the number of pilgrims after the Hadj, reported by the Hashimite Government as having gone to Medina, was greatly below the actual numbers; (2) many of these pilgrims are destitute, and it does not pay the company to take them at a low fare; and (3) owing to the fact that return tickets were not issued by three of these companies they were under no obligation to take the pilgrims back. There are still, in January 1923, forty-two Indian pilgrims awaiting passage to India.

The Egyptian pilgrims came in three steamers, the "Dakahlieh," "Mahmoudieh" and the "Keneh." After the pilgrimage the first named took the Mahmal party to Tor, and then carried the pilgrims from Tor to Suez, while the other two steamers carried pilgrims from Jeddah. This was a most excellent arrangement. There were, however, two drawbacks. One was that the Egyptian official sent, as in former years, to superintend the embarkation of Egyptian pilgrims had no idea of the number of pilgrims who had embarked, and apparently sent out pilgrims until the steamer refused to take any more, with the result that the steamers were, on two occasions, overcrowded, and the "Mahmoudieh," on her last trip, carried less than ten pilgrims. The second is the fact that a good many Egyptian pilgrims, who came with the official Egyptian pilgrimage, went to Medina after the Hadj, and no shipping arrangements were made by the Egyptian Government for their return. These numbered at least 300, and if the Egyptian official in charge of the embarkation had done his work properly, he would have cancelled the last trip of the "Mahmoudieh," when she took less than ten pilgrims, and arranged for her to come after the Medina pilgrimage. It is true that the Egyptian Government offered to send a boat after they were sure that all the pilgrims had returned from Medina, but, in the meantime, the Egyptian pilgrims at Yembo, short of funds and stranded in a town where there are few conveniences for pilgrims, petitioned King Hussein, who sent them on the Shereefian steamer, "Tawil." All those who could not pay were taken free of charge.

The purchase of two steamers, the "Tawil" and the "Rushdi," by the Hashimite Government, and the entry of these steamers into the pilgrim traffic, showed the Hashimite Government quite incapable of running these steamers, and in consequence great hardships were inflicted on the pilgrims who travelled in these small steamers. The "Tawil" is a boat of about 250 tons and the "Rushdi" about 50 tons. The "Tawil," in August, took 640 pilgrims to Hodeida and arrived in Kamaran on the 20th August (despatch No. 136 from Political Resident, Aden). The pilgrims, owing to overcrowding, were in a most deplorable condition, and there was not a single drop of fresh water on board when the steamer reached Kamaran. Five died at Kamaran as the result of starvation during the voyage. There was no medical officer on board.

The same steamer then proceeded to Suakim with Soudanese and Takruri pilgrims and arrived there on the 31st August with 701 pilgrims and without a doctor on board. The Quarantine Board decided that the captain should pay the penalty for the contravention of the rules of the International Sanitary Convention. It seems a pity that, before this step should be taken, warning was not sent to the Shereefian Government, because it was pointed out that the same boat, under the Italian flag

and called the "Paolo," carried, during the 1921 pilgrimage, 570 pilgrims to Suakim without a doctor, and even smaller Italian steamers, the "Serpentara" and the "G.-38," carried 419 and 520 pilgrims to Suakim, also without a doctor, and no action had been taken. Also the "Keneh" and "Mahmoudieh," owing to the reason given above, carried an excess number of pilgrims to Tor, and again no action had been taken. I am glad that the Quarantine Board decided to take no action this year, but decided to apply these regulations strictly next year. The whole question of the transport of pilgrims to Suakim wants looking into. Unfortunately, the regulations published by the Soudan Government in "Gazette No. 404" of the 15th November, 1922, does not promise much assistance because, though the regulations are for the "protection of Soudan pilgrims and native passengers travelling by steam vessels and native craft to and from the Hedjaz," the regulations appear to apply to steam vessels only, and can have little or no reference to native craft. These regulations for steam vessels are in some cases vague and in some cases—such as that each steamer must carry sufficient lifeboat accommodation for passengers and crew—too severe for a journey of eighteen hours. Some native dhows carry a large number of pilgrims to Suakim, and I cannot see how the conditions can be anything but very unsatisfactory from the overcrowding, lack of proper latrine accommodation, &c. One dhow, the "Elelaoui," arrived at Suakim on the 14th December with 279 pilgrims, the "Moubachir" on the 2nd November with 212 pilgrims, "Elmanchial" on the 17th October with 287 pilgrims, "Elmagraba" on the 23rd October with 224 pilgrims, "Elabbas" on the 13th October with 244 pilgrims, and altogether after this pilgrimage 1,677 pilgrims, including 151 infants, were carried in eight dhows to Suakim.

The "Tawil" made two more journeys to Suakim, arriving there on the 8th September with 599 pilgrims and on the 20th September with 627 pilgrims. On each occasion the boat carried a doctor.

The next trip of the "Tawil," and the worst, was the transport of not less than 800 pilgrims from Yembo to Jeddah in September. The conditions, due to overcrowding, lack of water and lack of sufficient latrine accommodation, were very trying for the pilgrims. They were so crowded that they could not move from their original position, could not reach the latrines nor the water tanks, and the conditions, with both male and female pilgrims crowded so close together and using basins and cooking articles for latrines, can better be imagined than described. The steamer spent thirty-six hours on the journey and it was said that six pilgrims died during the voyage. The other Shereefian steamer, the "Rushdi," also brought 360 pilgrims from Yembo to Jeddah, and the conditions on that boat were equally bad. The pilgrims complained very bitterly, and I wrote to the Hashimite Government drawing their attention to the terrible conditions on these boats and asking what steps had been taken to deal with those responsible for such a state of affairs, and to prevent a repetition of these atrocities. The reply was entirely irrelevant, but at the same time word must have been received at Mecca that the pilgrims were writing reports, because the mutawwifin were ordered to pay back to the pilgrims the cost of the passage, and assurances were given that things would be looked into and put right. This was done, and on the subsequent voyages of these steamers no complaints were received.

The last voyage of the "Tawil" for this season was when she embarked 183 Egyptian pilgrims and 50 Syrians at Yembo, disembarked the latter at Akaba and the Egyptian pilgrims at Suez. The quarantine authorities at Suez found the conditions on board very bad, and that the steamer was quite unsuited for the transport of pilgrims.

For the first time since the war three special steamers ran between Beirut and Jeddah for the transport of Syrian pilgrims. Owing to the difficulty of transit of foreign pilgrims through Egypt we can only hope that this plan will also be followed in the future in the case of North African, Palestinian and Turkish pilgrims.

Pilgrim Expenses.

Inspector Hakim Said Hassan, M.B.E., Indian police officer, has worked out in rupees the minimum expenses incurred by a pilgrim during the Mecca and Medina pilgrimages after he reaches Jeddah harbour.

The same officer has also worked out the taxes from pilgrims which go to the Hashimite Government, and the results are shown in the following tables:—

I. Minimum expenses per pilgrim:—

	Rs.	a.	p.
1. Porterage of luggage from steamer to sambuk ...	0	8	0
2. Bakhshish to quarantine people (Jeddah Islands) ...	0	4	0
3. Bakhshish to boatman ...	0	8	0
4. Sambuk hire ...	2	0	0
5. Porterage of luggage from sambuk to house ...	0	9	0
6. House rent at Jeddah, one night ...	0	4	0
7. Wakil's fee at Jeddah ...	2	8	0
8. Camel hire to Mecca, half-camel ...	7	0	0
*9. Shughdof hire to Mecca or price of shibri ...	2	0	0
10. Municipal dues on shughdof at Jeddah ...	0	4	0
11. Stamps for passport at Jeddah ...	0	2	6
12. Wages of servant to Mecca ...	0	4	0
13. Bakhshish to servant ...	0	4	0
14. For halt at Bahra ...	0	4	0
15. Bakhshish to camelman to Mecca ...	0	8	0
16. Moallim's fee at Mecca ...	12	0	0
17. Zamzami's fee at Mecca ...	2	0	0
18. House rent at Mecca ...	10	0	0
19. Bakhshish to Haram people at Mecca ...	0	4	0
20. Camel hire to Arafat and back to Mecca, half-camel ...	12	0	0
21. Shughdof hire to Arafat and back to Mecca, half-camel ...	3	0	0
22. Tent hire for Arafat ...	2	0	0
23. House rent at Mona ...	1	0	0
24. Camel hire to Medina and back, half-camel ...	116	8	0
25. Shughdof hire to Medina and back, half-camel ...	6	0	0
26. Wages of servant to Medina ...	5	0	0
27. Charges for lighting on Medina way ...	5	0	0
28. Bakhshish to camelman, both ways ...	30	0	0
29. Bakhshish to camelman, both ways, guard duty ...	13	0	0
30. Muzawwir's fee at Medina ...	6	0	0
31. House rent at Medina ...	4	0	0
32. Koshan from Medina, half-camel ...	2	8	0
33. Camel hire from Mecca to Jeddah ...	6	0	0
34. Shughdof hire to Jeddah ...	4	0	0
35. House rent at Jeddah, one night ...	0	4	0
36. Medical certificate at Jeddah ...	2	8	0
37. Porterage of luggage from house to sambuk ...	0	6	0
38. Sambuk hire to steamer ...	1	0	0
	261	9	6

II. Taxes paid to the Hashimite Government:—

	Rs.	a.	p.
1. From sambuk hire (Nos. 4 and 38) 2½ per cent. ...	—	—	—
2. From camel hire (No. 8) as Koshan ...	2	8	0
3. Municipal dues (No. 10) per shughdof ...	0	2	0
4. For stamps for passports (No. 11) ...	0	2	6
†5. Moallim's fee (No. 16) ...	12	0	0
6. From camel hire (No. 20.) as Koshan ...	2	8	0
7. From camel hire (No. 24) ...	44	0	0
8. Koshan per camel from Medina (No. 32) ...	2	8	0
9. Fee for medical certificate (No. 36) ...	2	8	0
	66	4	6

* Owing to the shortage of shughdofs the hire in the end had gone up to 10 rupees per pilgrim.

† The whole of the moallim's fee is taken by the Government, and the moallim thus uses other means to get enough out of the pilgrim to suffice him for the whole year.

Inspector Hassan works out the minimum expenses at approximately 260 rupees per pilgrim and this does not include food and water, nor does it include the cost of transport from and to India.

The amount which goes to the Government in taxes works out at 66 rs. 4 a. 6 p. per pilgrim, plus 2½ per cent. of the sambuk hire, and plus the quarantine and entrance tax, now 90 Turkish piastres, making a total of not less than 78 rupees per pilgrim, or approximately 5l. per pilgrim.

The quarantine dues for next season's pilgrimage have been raised by the Hedjaz quarantine authorities from 37½ Turkish piastres to 90 Turkish piastres. Of this sum 40 Turkish piastres is for quarantine dues, and the remaining 50 Turkish piastres for landing permit dues. These dues are charged at the fixed rate of 112 Turkish piastres to the gold pound sterling, and, as in previous years, is charged in the pilgrim's ticket and paid by the shipping agents in Jeddah.

There is no doubt the pilgrimage is becoming yearly more expensive, and compares very unfavourably with the pilgrimage expenses in the time of the Turks.

Indian Pilgrimage.

This year we began the registration of Indian pilgrims. Four thousand, eight hundred and seventy-seven Indian passports, containing the names of 8,583 Indian pilgrims were registered at the agency, and was a very useful record for future reference. Two hundred and sixty-eight pilgrims deposited at the agency money totalling 58l. and 84,917 rs. 15 a. The amounts were kept by Inspector Hakim Said Hassan. Depositors Nos. 32, 65, 127, 137, 157, 159 and 216 died, and the money was paid to the heirs of the depositors whom they had nominated at the time of making the deposit. Depositor No. 158 and his heir both died, so the money was sent to the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khan. Depositors No. 156 (120 rupees) and No. 252 (140 rupees) have not yet turned up to claim their money.

Pilgrims holding return tickets deposited 713 coupons at the agency for safe custody. They were given receipts on their passports. Seven hundred and eight coupons have been withdrawn, while five are still unclaimed.

As in past years the Beit-ul-Mal at Mecca and at Jeddah collected the effects of the deceased pilgrims. No passports were collected, no efforts were made to find out the full address of deceased pilgrims, the names were not taken down correctly, and, as in previous years, the work of these departments was entirely unsatisfactory.

This year the number of destitute Indian pilgrims was greater than in past years. The reason for this was threefold:—

1. The majority of the pilgrims came on single tickets, and had not sufficient money to keep them in the Hedjaz or to purchase a ticket for the return journey.
2. Owing to the competition between the different shipping companies it was possible to obtain single tickets at a very low rate—35 rupees a head—and many pilgrims were tempted to make the journey without preparing for future needs.
3. It is now a well-known fact among the pilgrims that they will be repatriated, and they take no precautions to save money for the return journey.

This year the destitute pilgrims were repatriated at the expense of the Central Hadj Committee of India. One thousand and fifty-four pilgrims were repatriated at the rate of 25 rupees per pilgrim, making a total of 26,350 rupees. The cost of food put on board for these pilgrims was 3,389 rs. 8 a., making a grand total of 29,739 rs. 8 a. The amount originally voted by the Central Hadj Committee was 24,000 rupees, but this was found not to be sufficient, and they wired authority to spend an additional 7,500 rupees. The work of repatriation and of administering this fund was in the hands of a local committee of Indians, with His Majesty's agent and consul as president and the Indian vice-consul as secretary.

As we still had a certain amount of money in the old destitute fund (subscribed some years ago by local people) I tried this year the experiment of issuing money on loan. Receipts were taken and forwarded to the district authorities concerned. Also 182 repatriated pilgrims promised to repay the cost of the ticket to the Central Hadj Committee, and lists, with receipts, were sent to that committee for necessary action.

Conclusions.

The pilgrimage for 1922 was, so far as the pilgrimage to Mecca and Arafat was concerned, a success. The health of the pilgrimage also was good, and the death rate low. The public security on the Medina road, however, shows no improvement, and the pilgrims are being more and more exploited as a source of revenue both by the Hashimite Government and by the people of the Hedjaz. The ordinary passenger service to Suez after the pilgrimage was completely disorganised as the Italian steamers refused to take passengers, and the Khedivial Mail Line, so as to avoid quarantine of their steamers, could only take a very small number. The large number of Indian destitute pilgrims, increased from 500 in 1921 to 1,054 in 1922, is a disgrace to our Indian administration, and has still further lessened the prestige of the Indian pilgrim in the eyes of the local inhabitants. The entrance of the Hashimite Government into the pilgrim shipping traffic was a tragedy, and so far as the coastal traffic on the Arabian coast is concerned, a difficult thing to remedy. The Egyptian pilgrimage was well organised, but the failure of the steamers to call at Tor on the southward journey was greatly to be deprecated.

With regard to the pilgrimage for 1923, it would appear useless to reiterate recommendations which so far, in regard to the Indian pilgrimage, have borne no results. Nevertheless, a scheme for the better control of Indian pilgrims will be submitted, in a separate despatch, by Mr. Vice-Consul Graffitey-Smith. I am more than ever convinced that the only way to deal with the question of destitute Indian pilgrims is to institute compulsory return tickets. The pilgrims knew about the repatriation fund when they left India, and quite early in the pilgrimage two destitute Indians came to the agency and demanded to be sent back at the cost of that fund. Inspector Hassan informs me that some Indian pilgrims have done two pilgrimages in the last four years, and have been repatriated on each occasion. The local committee found it extremely difficult to find out who were really destitute, but there is no doubt that the majority are destitute, because on arrival in Jeddah after the pilgrimage they camp in the streets and they have not the wherewithal to pay for a lodging.

The Indian Government have demanded the return to India of Inspector Hakim Said Hassan, M.B.E., and he will leave Jeddah by the first boat for Bombay. He will be a great loss to this agency, where, for more than five years, he has been invaluable and indefatigable in pilgrim work. His knowledge of the language, the country, and the people is a great asset, and if he is not replaced by a suitable man the work of registration of Indian pilgrims, which was begun this year, and which is a step in the direction of that pilgrim control which we consider essential, will undoubtedly suffer. I envy the Dutch in their control of the pilgrimage. They have more pilgrims than any other country. They have no destitutes. They have little or no trouble with shipping. The pilgrims are well disciplined and well behaved. The prestige of the Javanese pilgrims is higher than that of other foreign pilgrims.

It seems a pity that the Commission of the League of Nations on Quarantine did not visit Jeddah while they were in the Near East. They could have interviewed the foreign representatives and the local authorities and conceived an idea of our difficulties with regard to quarantine before putting forward recommendations for the amending of the International Convention.

If the pilgrimage is clean I think the call at Kamaran for returning pilgrim boats should be abolished, and, also, any steamer proceeding to the Hedjaz from the south with less than 1 per cent. sick pilgrims on board need not call at Kamaran on the northern journey.

I again submit that the quarantine measures imposed on ordinary passengers proceeding north after the pilgrimage are unjustified. Also, I must protest against the breaking of article 128 of the International Convention in that Egyptian pilgrim boats did not call at Tor on the southward journey. What would have happened if the local authorities, instead of imposing twenty-four hours' quarantine at Jeddah, had ordered the boats back to Tor? It was perhaps fortunate, in this case, that the Hashimite Government did not recognise the International Convention. As I have previously stated, if the pilgrimage were infected, we would be only too ready to assist the International Quarantine Board and the Egyptian Government in their endeavours to prevent the infection reaching Egypt, but when the pilgrimage is clean I can see no necessity for these elaborate precautions. Our intelligence on the health of the pilgrimage is, I think, trustworthy. Dr. Munir-ud-Din, the Indian vice-consul, was present with the pilgrimage, there are two Egyptian doctors with the Mahmal, there was a doctor with the official Palestine pilgrimage and Dr. Mohammed

Husseini, the Egyptian doctor in Mecca, keeps me informed of the health conditions and always reports if any infectious disease occurs. In addition two of our staff, Inspector Hassan and Ismail Effendi, our chief translator, were on the pilgrimage. The latter is *persona grata* with the King, and was allowed to talk to me on the telephone whenever he wished to do so. The French consul, Captain Ibrahim Depui, telephoned to me from Mona purely to report on the health conditions.

I expect that, with the advent of the Shereefian steamers into the pilgrim traffic, the Akaba route will be more used than formerly for Syrian and Palestinian pilgrims. In the "Kibla," No. 649, of the 1st January, 1923, the Hashimite Government announces that the Hedjaz Railway is being repaired at the expense of King Hussein, and that they hope it will be running for the pilgrimage of 1923. In my opinion, this is a forlorn hope, but in this connection I must point out with regard to future quarantine arrangements, that Maan is now administered by the Hashimite Government and not by Transjordan. We have no reason to hope that any quarantine station at Maan under the direction of the Hashimite Government will be a success.

I think the Egyptian Government, whose shipping arrangements were excellent, should arrange for a steamer to call for the pilgrims remaining after the Medina pilgrimage. Also, I consider that, for the present, the Egyptian official in charge of the embarkation of the pilgrims should work at this agency under our supervision instead of independently. The officials who did this work in 1920 and 1921 were retired Egyptian army officers, and always worked in close co-operation with this agency. The official who did the work this year, and who had apparently no idea of administrative work, remained in the customs and did not even report at this agency until I sent for him. He also made a very bad impression on the local authorities as, before his departure, he did not call on the Kaïmakam to thank him for the office and other facilities which were placed at his disposal by the local authorities.

In a despatch written on the 24th October, the Governor of the Straits Settlements has drafted a scheme for the protection and control of the Malay pilgrimage. With the recommendations contained therein, we are in complete accord, and so far as the Jeddah part is concerned, we are ready to assist in what promises to be a great help to the Malay pilgrims. Briefly, the scheme is the purchase of compulsory return tickets, full registration of names and addresses, names and addresses of next-of-kin, affixed photographs, pilgrims to report at the British agency, Jeddah, within twenty-four hours after disembarkation, deposit of return tickets and a written agreement signed by each pilgrim.

These recommendations are very closely allied to the scheme adopted by the Dutch in their supervision of the Javanese pilgrimage, and offers, in my opinion, the same prospect of success.

In conclusion, I beg to express our thanks to the Persian Gulf Steam Navigation Company, Bombay, who, through their local agent, Sheikh Suleiman Gabil, carried all the destitute Indian pilgrims at the low rate of 25 rupees per head.

W. E. MARSHALL, R.A.M.C.,
Agent and Consul.

Jeddah, January 15, 1923.

Enclosure 2 in No. 17.

Mahommed Beg to Major Marshall.

Sir,

I MOST respectfully beg to lay down the following facts to your benign notice, hoping you would kindly take such steps as would ensure the safety, both of life and money, of the Indian pilgrims in Arabia.

The caravan started on the 20th August, 1922, for Medina, and we were told by our muallim that 230 rupees per camel was the rate of fare (per camel) fixed by the Shereef of Mecca, who had arranged with the hostile tribes, and that there was no danger on the way. Another sum equal to 30 rupees was to be paid for the shughdufs, muallim and zamzami charges. On this assurance that 230 rupees was the fare from Mecca to Medina and back to Jeddah we, or myself, took 125 rupees with me and 367 rupees was sent through the Delhi shop at Jeddah. On the way we had to feed the jammal or the camel-keepers with plenty of ghee and had to pay them 1 rupee daily besides the backshish for tea and tobacco, and yet we were not allowed as little ration as would take us to Rabik, whence we bought more.

We reached Asfan, when we heard that several foot passengers were looted and killed by the Bedouin. We stopped at this place for the whole day and the

night, in the latter part of which an Egyptian lady was attacked by the Bedouin, but on a hue and cry being raised, one of her relatives got a wound on his head, but there was no loss. The Bedouin were firing from the hills, and we could see them moving about.

We went on till we left Gadima on the 25th August, and were proceeding in our shughdufs when all at once the camel train stopped and a great noise in the front was heard, and we could see the Bedouin and the camel-keepers firing at each other. We were all thunderstruck, as bullets were passing over our heads like showers of rain. One bullet came in my shughduf, but by a miracle, after tearing some clothes, remained stuck in the bag tied to the side of the shughduf. I produce it to show it to you. Our muallim cut off the train of his caravan and took a side bye-path to avoid the scene of trouble, but still the caravan suffered at the hands of the Bedouin, as two women were shot and died the following night and were buried in Rabik the next day.

We left Rabik on the 28th at about 12 noon and were proceeding when there was trouble again and shots were fired from the surrounding hills, but we were passing hastily through danger. I cannot say whether there were deaths or not, as the train of camels was too long and I could not see what happened in the front or rear.

We reached Beir Hassan on the 30th and were detained for two days. We heard several shots during the night and the day following, and the result was that we had to pay 2 mejidis per camel.

On our way from Khalas to Bir Abbas on the 2nd September we were again surrounded by the Bedouin and shots were profoundly poured on us, but we did not stop and nothing can be said what loss of life occurred here again. At this place we were detained for six days and consumed our rations. We suffered a deal from suspense, heat, exposure, and at last were asked to pay a guinea each camel, but again it was found that the sum thus collected would not meet the demand of the Ahmadi tribe. The camel-keepers had also gone to their homes, which were in the vicinity of this camp. The traders were also of the same tribe as that of the chief of the jammals (Solomon) and were to be given a chance to earn money and thus benefit themselves by our stay. People were in great distress and ran this way and that to get release. I went to see the chief jammal, but found him in the middle of a crowd of Hajis of all caste and country. He could not stand this, and got up and went away. The Hajis then held a meeting, and it was agreed that a further sum of 2 mejidis should be collected and given. Thus we had in all to pay the chief (Solomon) a total sum of 13,300 mejidis. The sum had to be sent to the Ahmadi tribe on a camel and we had to wait till next day the return of the carrier with permission of the Ahmadi tribe to let us proceed and the return of jammals from their homes. There were several deaths here as well.

We left this place on the 6th September, but I am not sure of exact dates, as we had lost clue of dates and days, and after two hours of our departure from this camp we were again stopped by the Bedouin and shots were being fired on us, but we went on, and to my belief nothing occurred. During the night, which was dark, as we were going along cries of women were heard and one of the women passed us running and crying she was made to get down, and the jammal took away the camel. No one could help her. Another woman of our caravan died, and a man complained that he had lost 900 rupees during the night journey.

We reached Medina on the 15th September, 1922, where after four days we were told that Shereef's orders were to send us to Yembo instead of Jeddah and that we should pay the jammals 2 mejidis for detention over three days, and we had to pay it along with the backshish to the jammals, who forced us to pay them.

I asked the muallim to take me to the kaïmakam, and I went with him and four other men. The kaïmakam, after hearing me, said that he had orders from Shereef to send us to Yembo, and he was not responsible for what fare we paid and what promises were given by the Shereef at Mecca; we should pay 2 mejidis to the jammals and leave Medina or we would be turned out by force.

We were ordered to leave Medina soon after Friday prayers, and brought out our belongings to where our shughdufs were standing, but we were again made to wait for two days as it was said that the Shereef had not paid some money as an allowance to a tribe and told the tribe to get from us. I cannot prove the veracity of this statement, but we had to wait there exposed to the sun and dew in an open place after leaving the houses we had hired in the town.

On our leaving Bir Derweish in the afternoon of the 16th September at about 10 o'clock in the night we were again attacked very severely by the Bedouins. Shots

were poured like showers of rain on us and the bullets passed our heads. It was a severe attack, but we hurried on. I saw a camel dropping and an Egyptian lady shot.

We arrived at Turrah on the 18th September, and the Egyptian woman was buried here. I am not aware of any other loss of life, but it was said that four men died. A foot passenger who met us the next day said that he was left behind and came at daybreak from where he had slept and saw a shughduf without riders and with beds and utensils lying about and a heap of mud, seemingly the grave of the occupants.

We arrived at Yembo in the morning of the 23rd September, 1922. Here I and several others had no money left, and we had been without rations and managed by borrowing from each other. I had to borrow money from my muallim. We hired a house; water was very dear, so sparingly, 2 rs. 8 a. was the daily expense. When I and others went to buy tickets for the steamer we were not allowed by the menials to go above without paying money, and each and every one had to pay 4 a. or more at the entrance and similarly on the next storey. I shouted from below to the kaïmakam, who looked down, and I told him that no one can go up without payment. He muttered something and went away. I was allowed to go up by the gatemen without paying, but the officer who was issuing tickets closed and went away. One of my friends who was there since two hours told me that one of the menials had taken a rupee with the promise of getting him the ticket, and which he had not complied. I went to the kaïmakam, who at first waved me off, but I persisted, and he sent for the menial and got the rupee from him, not even reprimanding the man. Bribery was common and openly asked, and we had to pay in all 25 rupees, each man for one ticket, including quarantine charges, and bribery at each step.

On the 29th September, 1922, at about 2 P.M., we were ordered to bring our luggage to the sea-side, which we did, and remained sitting in the sun till evening, when we were turned out, and we passed the night exposed to the wet climate. Next morning we had to take our luggage again to the sea-side, and hungry and thirsty we had to wait in the sun, but the gate-keepers would not let anyone go in until he paid some money, and allowed one man only through a partly opened gate. We had to throw our luggage over 8-ft.-high railing, and our utensils, &c., were damaged. At last, after paying different sums to the officials, we were made to take our seats in the boat and taken to the steamer. We were hoisted up by our arms and thrown by our arm-pits in the second-floor of the steamer, without being allowed to take a drop of water or food. No pen can describe the misery men and women suffered in this black hole; men and women cried for water, and it was horribly hot, and both up and down floors were cram full, so that no one could move about, while sitting, even, was difficult. There was no accommodation for making water and w.c., and it was impossible to go up. Men were falling on each other. I, with great difficulty, crawled up and trampled several to go to the captain, but he did not hear me. People now saw the difference between British rule and the rule of a Mahomedan Government. The thirty hours of misery over, with one or two deaths on board, we came to Jeddah, where our luggage was thrown in boats, which came on shore at dusk, and here, fainting, hungry, thirsty, without going to w.c. for thirty hours, we had to face another difficulty of picking our luggage, as there was no light in the boat to enable us to find our things. God only can fathom the misery and trouble we went through in the night.

Now my request, by taking all this trouble and taking your time, is to beg you, please, to ask the Arab Government—

1. Why fare from Mecca to Medina and back to Jeddah was taken from us when we were to come back through Yembo?
2. Why the Government took the monopoly of sending its own small steamers for 2,000 (or near) men to be taken by the steamer when it had accommodation for 400 or 500?
3. Why no consideration was given to the comforts of men, but they were packed like sheep and fowls? It is quite evident that the Government had its own profit in view by not sending one of the company's steamers which were standing at Jeddah.
4. Why an assurance was given us that our journey and our lives will be safe on the way, and why no arrangements were made against these tribes?

I am, &c.

MOHAMAD BEG,
Resident of Lahore.

P.S.—The muallim came to me this morning and paid me 7½ mejidis as Yembo to Jeddah fare, and asked me to state in writing that I had no claim or complaint against him, which is a fact, as he treated us nicely. My complaint is against the Government of Arabia, and not against him.

MOHD. BEG.

[E 2829/231/65]

No. 18.

The Marquess of Crewe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. — (Received March 16.)

[WITH THREE MAPS.]

(No. 655.)

My Lord,

Paris, March 14, 1923.

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 118 of the 12th March and previous correspondence regarding the Syria and Palestine Boundary Convention, I have the honour to transmit herewith the note from the French Government communicating an original French copy of the report of the Boundary Commission, signed by Colonel Paulet at Beirut on the 3rd February, 1922, as well as the original maps annexed thereto, and signed by that officer on behalf of the French Government.

I have the honour at the same time to transmit to your Lordship one of the three original copies of the report in English signed by Colonel Newcombe, of which one was enclosed in a private communication on the 8th March to the Eastern Department, and one transmitted to the French Government along with the maps signed by Colonel Newcombe, in the note from this Embassy of the 7th March, copy of which is also enclosed herein.

As explained in the above-mentioned communication of the 8th March, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, notwithstanding an arrangement to the effect that the exchange of notes should only take place on a date to be fixed between the Embassy and them, sent in their note to me under date of the 7th March. In these circumstances the note which was addressed to them by this Embassy on the receipt of your Lordship's telegram No. 118 was likewise dated the 7th March, and the exchange of notes should therefore be regarded as having taken place on that date.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs have been informed verbally that your Lordship will probably communicate the convention to the League of Nations towards the end of this month, and have expressed their intention of making the communication for their part about the same time.

With regard to the date of entry into force of the convention, this is given in the notes exchanged on the 10th March (please see draft note to French Government enclosed in the letter of the 8th March to the Eastern Department). The Ministry for Foreign Affairs informed a Secretary of this Embassy this morning that they would now immediately inform the French High Commissioner in Syria that the convention had come into force on the 10th March.

I beg leave to call your Lordship's attention to the fact that it will be necessary to make in that copy of the report signed by Colonel Newcombe, which was enclosed in the letter to the Eastern Department of the 8th March, the corrections noted in your telegram No. 118, paragraph 4, sub-paragraph 2. The word "small" was allowed to stand in the copy of the report communicated to the French Government.

I have, &c.

(For the Ambassador),

ERIC PHIPPS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 18.

Note communicated by French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, March 7.

LES membres de la Commission de Délimitation désignés, conformément aux stipulations de l'article 2 de la Convention du 23 décembre 1920, pour fixer le tracé de la frontière syro-palestinienne, entre la mer et El Hammé, ont terminé leurs travaux et rédigé un rapport de clôture à Beyrouth le 3 février 1922. A ce rapport sont annexées trois cartes au 1 : 50,000^e, sur lesquelles a été reporté le tracé proposé par la commission.

Le Ministère des Affaires étrangères, en adressant à son Excellence l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Paris un exemplaire du rapport et des cartes annexées signé par le Lieutenant-Colonel Paulet, délégué français, dont la signature engage également l'État sous mandat, a l'honneur de lui faire savoir que le Gouvernement de la République accepte de ratifier les propositions de la commission et considère la présente note comme valant ratification.

Les instructions nécessaires seront adressées au Haut-Commissaire de la République en Syrie pour que le présent accord produise effet à dater du 10 mars prochain.

Un exemplaire du rapport de la commission daté du 3 février 1922 signé par le Lieutenant-Colonel Paulet, ainsi qu'une copie du présent échange de notes, seront remis par le Gouvernement français à la Société des Nations.

Enclosure 2 in No. 18.

Rapport de Clôture de la Fixation de la Frontière entre le Grand Liban et la Syrie, d'une part, et la Palestine, d'autre part, de la Mer Méditerranée à El Hammé (Vallée du Yarmouk inférieur), en Exécution des Prescriptions des Articles 1^{er} et 2 de la Convention de Paris du 23 Décembre 1920.

IL est convenu entre les soussignés, régulièrement désignés, conformément aux prescriptions de l'article 2 de la convention, que la frontière entre la Méditerranée et El Hammé sera la suivante :

La frontière part de la mer Méditerranée, du point appelé Ras-el-Nakura, et suit la ligne de crête de cet éperon jusqu'au

Signal 1, situé à 50 mètres au nord du poste de police palestinien de Ras-el-Nakura, puis elle continue à suivre la ligne de crête et passe au

Signal 2, situé au lieu dit Khirbet Danian, et, suivant toujours la même ligne de crête, elle passe au

Signal 3, qui est un point de triangulation ancienne situé à 400 mètres au sud-ouest du village de Labuna, continuant à suivre la crête, la frontière atteint le

Signal 4, situé à 1 kilom. est-sud-est du village de Labuna, elle suit alors le thalweg, se dirigeant vers le sud, d'un ouadi sans nom jusqu'à son confluent avec l'Ouadi Kutayeh, elle remonte, en le suivant, l'Ouadi Kutayeh, en direction est-nord-est, pendant 2 kilom., elle remonte ensuite le thalweg d'un petit affluent de gauche du Ouadi Kutayeh, venant de l'est, jusqu'au

Signal 5, situé à la limite sud-est des terrains de culture de cette vallée, ensuite, la frontière se dirige en ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 6, situé sur la crête entre l'Ouadi Kutayeh et l'Ouadi El Delem, elle suit ensuite une ligne droite de 700 mètres en direction sud-sud-est jusqu'au

Signal 7, situé au confluent du Ouadi El Delem avec un petit thalweg venant du nord, elle remonte l'Ouadi El Delem pendant 1 kilom. 300, en direction est-nord-est, puis en direction nord pendant 400 mètres, puis en direction ouest-nord-ouest pendant 600 mètres et enfin en direction nord-nord-est pendant 1 kilom. jusqu'au

Signal 8, situé sur la piste d'Alma-el-Shaub à Yurdeth et à 2 kilom. 500 à l'est du village d'Alma-el-Shaub, puis la frontière suit la piste passant au nord et à quelques mètres du village de Yurdeth, au sud, et à quelques mètres de Birket-el-Rishe, jusqu'au

Signal 9, situé à 700 mètres au sud-est de Kh. Belat à la bifurcation des pistes de Ramia à Alma-el-Shaub et de Ramia à Terbihah, ensuite une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 10, situé à 600 mètres sud-sud-est du signal 9, puis la frontière suit la ligne de crête entre l'Ouadi Terbihah au sud et la cuvette de Ramia, au nord, jusqu'au

Signal 11, situé à 1 kilom. au sud-est du village de Ramia, elle suit ensuite une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 12, situé sur le piton à 700 mètres ouest du village d'Aita-el-Shaub, puis la frontière suit la ligne de crête en direction générale sud jusqu'au

Signal 13, situé sur le Tell Rahib, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au confluent du Ouadi Waul avec un ouadi sans nom, à 300 mètres au nord-est du Tell Abu Babein, puis elle suit l'ouadi sans nom qui passe entre Mansurah à l'ouest et Semuklieh à l'est jusqu'au

Signal 14, situé à 600 mètres à l'ouest d'Ain Katamun, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 15, situé dans la vallée du Ouadi Bediyeh, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 16, situé au confluent du Ouadi Bediyeh avec l'Ouadi Khelal, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 17, situé sur le piton ouest du Djebel Haramun; la frontière suit ensuite une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 18, situé sur le piton est du Djebel Haramun, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 19, situé sur une colline, à 2,100 mètres au sud-est du village d'Yarun, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 20, situé sur un éperon à 2 kilom. à l'est du village d'Yarun, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 21, situé sur le sommet du Djebel-el-Asy, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 22, situé sur la berge d'un ouadi à 600 mètres au nord de Kh. Auba et à environ 1 kilom. au sud de Birket, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 23, situé sur le sommet du Djebel-el-Ghabieh et à 600 mètres au sud de Deir-el-Ghabieh, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 24, situé sur l'éperon à l'est du Djebel-el-Ghabieh, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 25, situé dans la vallée, au bord est d'un thalweg, à 600 mètres au nord-ouest du village d'El-Malkiyeh, puis elle suit le cours du thalweg, en direction sensiblement nord jusqu'au

Signal 26, situé à l'endroit où le thalweg est coupé par la piste de Kades à Aitherun, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 27, situé à 700 mètres ouest-nord-ouest du village de Kades et à proximité de l'arbre de Kh.-el-Menafir, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 28, situé au croisement de la piste de Kades à Meis avec l'Ouadi Atabah, puis elle suit le thalweg du Ouadi Atabah jusqu'au

Signal 29, situé au confluent du Ouadi Atabah avec le Khamlet Ghuzeleh, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 30, situé sur la crête à l'est du Merj Tufeh, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 31, situé sur un petit éperon à 800 mètres à l'est du village le plus oriental de Meis, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 32, situé à 300 mètres au nord-ouest de Kh.-el-Menarah et au croisement des pistes de Meis à Hunin et de Kh.-el-Menarah à El Hala, puis elle suit la ligne de crête en direction sensiblement nord-nord-ouest jusqu'au

Signal 33, qui est le point de triangulation ancienne dénommé Sheikh Abbad, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 34, situé dans la vallée de Hunin et à 1 kilom. au nord-nord-ouest du village de Hunin, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 35, situé sur la ligne de partage des eaux entre le Litani et le Houle et à 1 kilom. 300 au nord du village de Hunin; puis la frontière suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 36, situé sur le sommet du Djebel-el-Meruj, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 37, situé au col d'Odeissa, à 300 mètres à l'est des dernières maisons du village et au sud de la piste d'Odeissa à Metallah, puis la frontière suit la piste partant du col d'Odeissa et passant à 1,400 mètres au nord-ouest et au nord du Djebel Ariak, elle tourne ensuite vers le sud-est à la croisée des pistes qui vont vers Jdeida de Merj Ayoun, vers El Khiam et vers El Kaleia, ensuite elle passe sur le pont à 200 mètres au nord-est du village de Metallah, puis elle suit la piste de Metallah à Banias, en direction générale nord-sud, jusqu'au

Signal 38, situé sur la colline à 900 mètres au nord-nord-est du village d'Abi.

Du signal 38 à Tell-el-Kady, qui reste en territoire palestinien, la frontière est constituée par une parallèle, à 100 mètres au sud de la piste de Metallah à Banias passant par l'ancien pont romain sur la rivière Hasbani. A partir de Tell-el-Kady la frontière suit la piste de Metallah à Banias jusqu'au

Signal 39, situé au sud de la piste et à sa jonction avec un canal d'irrigation, à 1,000 mètres à l'ouest du village de Banias. Toute la piste entre le col d'Odeissa et Banias reste en entier sur le territoire syrien.

Du signal 39, la frontière suit le canal d'irrigation jusqu'au

Signal 40, situé au sud et à proximité de Tell Alla; puis la frontière suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 41, situé sur la berge gauche du Nahr Banias et à environ 900 mètres au

sud-ouest de Banias, puis elle suit le sommet de la berge gauche du Nahr Banias jusqu'au

Signal 42, situé à 700 mètres au nord-nord-est de Tell Aziziat, sur la piste longeant la berge gauche du Nahr Banias, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 43, situé au sommet du Tell Aziziat, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 44, situé à l'intersection de la piste de Mudahad à Banias avec le thalweg de Ain-Fit à Seid Huda-bin-Yakub,

A partir de ce point, par lequel passe la courbe de niveau 180 qui doit rester en Palestine pour permettre la construction d'un canal, des lignes droites et successives, de signal en signal, avec signaux érigés savoir:

Signal 45, situé à 1,400 mètres à l'est de Tell-el-Sakhni, sur la ligne de crête au nord du thalweg du Ouadi El Zatir.

Signal 46, situé immédiatement à l'ouest de la maison isolée dite El Bergiat.

Signal 47, situé au changement de pente à 1,800 mètres à l'est d'Ain Sheikh Mahmud et au nord du thalweg Ouadi Hamarlula.

Signal 48, situé à l'arbre dit Kherbet Dheiatein.

Signal 49, situé immédiatement à l'ouest du moulin de Seida.

Signal 50, situé à 600 mètres à l'est de l'arbre qui est à l'embouchure du Ouadi Fajir.

Signal 51, situé immédiatement à l'ouest du moulin d'Yalubina.

Signal 52, situé immédiatement à l'ouest de la maison située elle-même à 1,200 mètres au nord du pont de Benat Yakub.

Signal 53, situé à 20 mètres à l'ouest du poste de gendarmerie syrienne de Benat Yakub.

Signal 54, situé à 350 mètres à l'est du moulin en ruines qui se trouve à 900 mètres au sud du pont de Benat Yakub.

Signal 55, situé à 20 mètres à l'ouest du lieu dit El Min.

Signal 56, situé à l'est et au-dessus de la chute du Ouadi Sheikh.

Signal 57, situé à 400 mètres au nord-est du lieu dit El Rafit.

Signal 58, situé à 20 mètres à l'ouest du lieu dit El Rafit.

Signal 59, situé à 2,300 mètres au sud du lieu dit El Rafit et à environ 400 mètres à l'est du Jourdain, sur un petit sommet.

Signal 60, situé à 20 mètres à l'ouest de Kalaat-el-Kassab. Après le signal 60, la frontière passe parallèlement et à 50 mètres à l'est du bras oriental du Jourdain jusqu'à l'embouchure, dans le lac de Tibériade, du bras est du Jourdain. De ce point aux sources thermales de Messifer, la frontière suit, sur la terre, une ligne parallèle et à 10 mètres de la rive du lac de Tibériade suivant les fluctuations résultant de l'exhaussement des eaux, par suite de l'établissement d'un barrage sur le Jourdain au sud du lac de Tibériade.

Signal 61, situé aux sources de Messifer, à partir de ce signal, la frontière suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 62, situé à 1,200 mètres à l'est du signal 61, sur un éperon, puis la frontière suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 63, situé au sommet du Djebel Kurei Jerada, au sud-ouest de Bir Shekum, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 64, situé à l'est des ruines sur le sommet du piton de Kalaat-el-Husn, à l'ouest de Fik, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 65, situé au sommet du Tell Khallis, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 66, situé à 200 mètres au-dessous et à l'ouest de la source d'Ain Rajel, à l'ouest du village de Kefr-Harib; ensuite la frontière suit une ligne déterminée par les escarpements blancs sur les pentes occidentales du plateau de Djoulan jusqu'au

Signal 67, situé à 250 mètres au sud-est d'Ain Shereira, puis la frontière suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 68, situé à 750 mètres au sud-ouest d'Ain Shereira, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 69, situé immédiatement à l'est de Kh. Tawafik, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 70, situé dans un col à 500 mètres au nord-nord-ouest du kilomètre 91,750 de la voie ferrée Deraa-Haïffa, puis elle suit une ligne droite jusqu'au

Signal 71, situé à 50 mètres au nord du kilomètre 91,750 de la voie ferrée, puis la frontière suit une ligne parallèle à 50 mètres au nord de la voie ferrée jusqu'à la piste de Semak à El Hammé. Elle suit cette piste jusqu'au point où la piste traverse les escarpements à 100 mètres au nord-ouest de la station d'El Hammé, elle suit alors le bord supérieur des escarpements au nord de la voie ferrée, jusqu'au pont situé à 500 mètres à l'est de la station d'El Hammé.

Le Gouvernement de Palestine ou les personnes autorisées par ce Gouvernement auront le droit de bâtir une digue destinée à élever le niveau des eaux sur les lacs Houlé et Tibériade au-dessus de leur niveau normal, à condition de payer une juste indemnité aux propriétaires et aux occupants des terrains qui seront ainsi inondés.

Toutes contestations survenant entre ledit Gouvernement ou les personnes par lui autorisées, d'une part, et les propriétaires ou occupants du terrain, d'autre part, seront définitivement réglées par une commission composée de quatre membres, chacune des Puissances mandataires désignant deux des membres de cette commission.

Tous droits acquis à l'usage des eaux du Jourdain par les habitants de la Syrie seront intégralement maintenus.

Il est entendu que le report de la frontière de Syrie vers le nord, entre Semakh et El Hammé, laisse à la Syrie le chemin de fer jusqu'à Semakh où la gare sera utilisée en commun par les deux pays, dans les conditions qui pourront être déterminées par la commission prévue à l'article 5 de la convention du 23 décembre.

Le Gouvernement de Syrie aura le droit de construire un nouvel appontement à Semakh sur le lac de Tibériade ou d'avoir l'usage commun de l'appontement existant dans les conditions qui pourront être déterminées par la commission susvisée.

L'extraterritorialité de ladite section du chemin de fer (jusqu'à la gare de Semakh exclusivement) qui, par suite de la rectification de frontière, se trouve en Palestine, et les droits du Gouvernement syrien ou de ses agents techniques au plein et libre accès pour toutes les questions de chemin de fer, y compris la police de cette section, sont reconnus.

Les personnes ou les marchandises passant du débarcadère ou des débarcadères futurs sur le lac de Tibériade, et allant à la gare de Semakh ou inversement, ne seront pas, au point de vue des règlements douaniers ou autres, réputées personnes ou marchandises entrant en Palestine, pour la seule raison qu'elles doivent traverser le territoire de Palestine, et le droit du Gouvernement syrien et de ses agents d'accéder à ces débarcadères est reconnu.

Les habitants de Syrie et du Liban auront les mêmes droits de pêche et de navigation que les habitants de la Palestine sur les lacs de Houlé et de Tibériade et dans le Jourdain, entre lesdits lacs, mais la responsabilité de la police des lacs incombera au Gouvernement de Palestine.

Il est entendu que le rapport ci-dessus, résultat final des travaux de la commission, ne concerne que la frontière entre la Méditerranée et El Hammé, et que le Gouvernement britannique aura la possibilité de poser la question d'une rectification de frontière entre Banias et Metallah, sous les conditions qui pourront être convenues entre les deux Puissances mandataires, en vue de faire de la route nord qui unit les deux villages la frontière définitive.

Il est entendu que la frontière, telle qu'elle a été déterminée sur le terrain par la commission, est indiquée en rouge sur les cartes ci-jointes revêtues de la signature des membres de la commission.

Fait à Beyrouth, le 3 février 1922.

Pour le Gouvernement français :

Le Lieutenant-Colonel,
N. PAULET.

Enclosure 3 in No. 18.

Note from Embassy (Paris).

THE members of the Boundary Commission designated, in accordance with the terms of article 2 of the convention of the 23rd December, 1920, for the purpose of fixing the line of the Syro-Palestinian frontier, between the sea and El Hammé, concluded their labours and drew up a final report at Beyrouth on the 3rd February, 1922. Three maps, on a scale of 1 : 50,000, on which the line proposed by the Commission has been traced, are annexed to this report.

His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador, in addressing to his Excellency the President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, a copy of the report and of the maps annexed thereto, signed by Lieutenant-Colonel Newcombe, the British delegate, whose signature equally binds the State under mandate, has the honour to inform him that His Britannic Majesty's Government agree to ratify the proposals of the commission, and consider the present note as being equivalent to ratification.

The necessary instructions will be sent to His Britannic Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine, in order that the present agreement may take effect from the 10th March next.

A copy of the report of the commission, dated the 3rd February, 1922, signed by Lieutenant-Colonel Newcombe, together with a copy of the present exchange of notes, will be communicated by His Britannic Majesty's Government to the League of Nations.

Paris, March 7, 1923.

Enclosure 4 in No. 18.

The Final Report on the Demarcation of the Frontier between the Great Lebanon and Syria on the one Side, and Palestine on the other Side, from the Mediterranean Sea to El Hammé (in the Lower Valley of the Yarmuk) in Pursuance of Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention of Paris of December 23, 1920.

IT is agreed between the undersigned, being the commission duly constituted in accordance with article 2 of the said convention, that the boundary between the Mediterranean and El Hammé shall be as follows:—

The frontier leaves the Mediterranean Sea at the point called Ras-el-Nakurah, and follows the crest of the spur to cairn 1, situated 50 metres north of the Palestinian police post of Ras-el-Nakurah.

Thence the frontier follows the same crest to cairn 2 at Khirbet Danian.

Thence it follows the same crest to cairn 3, which is an old point of triangulation 400 metres south-west of Labuna village.

Thence it follows the same crest to cairn 4, 1 kilom. east-south-east of the village of Labuna.

Thence, running southwards, it follows the thalweg of an unnamed wadi to its confluence with the Wadi Kutayeh; runs up the thalweg of Wadi Kutayeh east-north-east for 2 kilom.; thence runs up the thalweg of a small tributary on the left of the Wadi Kutayeh, coming from the east up to cairn 5, which is situated at the south-east limit of the cultivated lands of this valley. Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 6, which is situated on the crest between the Wadis Kutayeh and El Dalem. From cairn 6 it follows a straight line of 700 metres in a south-south-east direction to cairn 7, which is situated at the confluence of Wadi Dalem with a small thalweg running from the north; it continues up the Wadi Dalem 1,300 metres in an east-north-east direction, then 400 metres in a northerly direction, then 600 metres in a west-north-west direction and 1 kilom. again in a north-north-east direction up to cairn 8, situated on the road from Alma-el-Shaub to Yurdeth, and 2,500 metres east of the village of Ala-el-Shaub.

Thence it follows the road passing a few metres to the north of Yurdeth, and thence a few metres to the south of Birket-el-Rishe to cairn 9, situated 700 metres south-east of Khirbet Balat at the junction of the road from Ramia to Terbikha with the road from Ramia to Alma-el-Shaub.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 10, situated at 600 metres south-south-east of cairn 9, thence along the crest between Wadi Terbikha to the south and the basin of Ramia to the north to cairn 11, situated 1 kilom. south-east of the village of Ramia.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 12, situated on the peak 700 metres west of the village of Aita-el-Shaub.

Thence it follows the crest in a generally southern direction to cairn 13 on Tel Rahib.

Thence running in a straight line to the confluence of Wadi-el-Waul with an unnamed wadi 300 metres to the north-east of Tel Abu Babein, it follows this unnamed wadi which passes east of Mansurah and west of Samuklieh as far as cairn 14, situated at 600 metres west of Ain Katamun.

Thence it runs in a straight line in an easterly direction to cairn 15, situated in the valley of Wadi Bediyeh.

Thence it runs in a straight line to cairn 16, situated at the confluence of Wadi Bediyeh with Wadi Khelal.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 17, situated on the west peak of Jebel Haramun.

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Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 18, situated on the east peak of Jebel Haramun.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 19, situated on a hill 2,100 metres south-east of the village of Yarun.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 20, situated on a spur 2 kilom. east of the village of Yarun.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 21, situated on the top of Jebel-el-Asy.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 22, situated on the bank of a wadi, and 600 metres to the north of Khirbet Auba and about 1 kilom. to the south of the Birket.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 23, situated on the top of Jebel Ghabieh and at 600 metres to the south of Deir-el-Ghabieh.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 24, situated on the spur east of Jebel Ghabieh.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 25, situated in the valley, on the east bank of a thalweg 600 metres north-west of the village of El Malkiyeh.

Thence it follows the thalweg in a generally northern direction to cairn 26, situated where the thalweg is cut by the path from Kades to Aitherun.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 27, situated 700 metres west-north-west of the village of Kades, near the large tree of Khirbet Kenafir.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 28, situated at the crossing of the path from Kades to Meis with the Wadi Atabeh.

Thence it follows the thalweg of Wadi Atabeh to cairn 29, situated at the confluence of Wadi Atabeh with the Khallet Ghuzeleh.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 30, situated on the crest east of Merj Tufeh.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 31, situated on a small spur 800 metres to the east of the eastern village of Meis.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 32, situated at 300 metres to the north-west of Khirbet-el-Menarah, at the junction of the paths from Meis to Hunin and from Khirbet-el-Menarah to El Hala.

Thence it follows the crest in a generally north-north-western direction to cairn 33, which is the old triangulation point called Sheikh Abbad.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 34, situated in the valley of Hunin, and 1 kilom. north-north-west of the village of Hunin.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 35, situated on the watershed between the Litani and the Huleh and 1,300 metres north of Hunin village.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 36, situated on the summit of Jebel-el-Meruj.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 37, situated on the col of Odeissa 300 metres to the east of the last houses of the village and south of the path Odeissa to Metallah.

Thence it follows the path from the col of Odeissa, and passing 1,400 metres to north-west and to north of Jebel Ariak, turns to the south-east at the junction of the paths leading to Jedeida of Merj Ayoun, Khiam and Kaleia; thence it passes over the bridge 300 metres north-east of the village of Metallah, then it follows the path from Metallah to Banias in a generally southern direction to cairn 38, situated on a hill 900 metres north-north-east of the village Abl.

Thence it follows a line parallel to and 100 metres to the south of the path from Metallah to Banias, passing by the old Roman bridge over the River Hesbani, as far as Tel-el-Kadi, which remains in Palestine.

Thence it follows the path from Metallah to Banias to cairn 39, situated to the south of the path and at its junction with an irrigation canal 1,000 metres west of the village of Banias. The whole of the path from the col of Odeissa to Banias is entirely in Syrian territory.

Thence it follows the irrigation canal to cairn 40, situated to the south of and near Tel Alla.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 41, situated on the left bank of Nahr Banias and about 900 metres to the south-west of Banias.

Thence it follows the top of the left bank of Nahr Banias to cairn 42, situated 700 metres to north-north-east of Tel-Aziziat on the path along the left bank of the Nahr Banias.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 43, situated on the top of Tel-Aziziat.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 44, situated at the junction of the path from Muddahad to Banias with the thalweg from Ain Fit to Seid Huda-bin-Yakub.

From this point where the contour 180 metres passes (this contour must remain entirely in Palestine to permit of the construction of a canal), the frontier follows a succession of straight lines from cairn to cairn with cairns erected as follows:—

Cairn 45, at 1,400 metres east of Tel-el-Sakhni, on the crest to the north of the thalweg of Wadi-el-Zatir.

Cairn 46, immediately west of the isolated house called El Bergiat.

Cairn 47, at the change of slope 1,800 metres east of Ain Sheikh Mahmud, and to the north of the thalweg of Wadi Hamarlula.

Cairn 48, at the tree called Khurbet Dheiatein.

Cairn 49, immediately to the west of the mill Seiada.

Cairn 50, 600 metres east of the tree which is close to the mouth of Wadi Fajir.

Cairn 51, immediately west of the mill Jalubina.

Cairn 52, immediately west of the house which stands 1,200 metres to the north of the bridge Benat Yakub.

Cairn 53, 20 metres to west of the Syrian gendarmerie post at Benat Yakub.

Cairn 54, 350 metres to the east of the ruined mill which is 900 metres to the south of the bridge Benat Yakub.

Cairn 55, 20 metres to west of the place called El Min.

Cairn 56, to the east of and above the falls of Wadi Sheikh.

Cairn 57, 400 metres to the north-east of the place called El Rafit.

Cairn 58, 20 metres to the west of the place called El Rafit.

Cairn 59, 2,300 metres south of the place called El Rafit, and about 400 metres to the east of the Jordan on a small peak.

Cairn 60, at 20 metres to west of Kalaat-el-Qassab.

After cairn 60 the frontier follows a line parallel to and 50 metres east of the eastern branch of the Jordan to the mouth of that branch in Lake Tiberias. From the mouth of the Jordan to the sulphur springs at Messifer, where is placed cairn 61, the frontier follows a line on the shore parallel to and at 10 metres from the edge of Lake Tiberias, following any alteration of level consequent on the raising of its waters owing to the construction of a dam on the Jordan south of Lake Tiberias.

From cairn 61 it follows a straight line to cairn 62, situated 1,200 metres to the east of cairn 61 on a spur.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 63, situated on the top of Jebel Kurein Jerada to the south-west of Bir Shakum.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 64, situated to the east of the ruins on the top of the peak Kalaat-el-Husn to the west of Fik.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 65, situated on the top of Tel Khallis.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 66, situated at 200 metres below and west of the spring of Ain Rajil to the west of the village of Kefr Harib.

Thence the frontier follows a line marked by the white cliffs on the western slopes of the plateau of the Jaulan to cairn 67, situated at 250 metres to the south-east of Ain Shereira.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 68, situated at 750 metres to the south-west of Ain Shereira.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 69, situated immediately to the east of Khirbet Tawafik.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 70, situated on the col 500 metres to the north-north-west of kilometre 91750 on the Daraa-Haifa Railway.

Thence it follows a straight line to cairn 71, situated 50 metres to the north of kilometre 91750 on the railway.

Thence the frontier follows a line 50 metres to the north of and parallel to the railway, as far as the path from Semakh to El Hammé. It follows this path up to the point where the path crosses the cliffs 100 metres north-west of the station of El Hammé. Thence it follows the upper edge of the cliffs north of the railway to the bridge which stands 500 metres to the east of El Hammé Station.

The Government of Palestine or persons authorised by the said Government shall have the right to build a dam to raise the level of the waters of Lakes Huleh and Tiberias above their normal level, on condition that they pay fair compensation to the owners and occupiers of the lands which will thus be flooded.

Any existing rights over the use of the waters of the Jordan by the inhabitants of Syria shall be maintained unimpaired.

The Government of Syria shall have the right to erect a new pier at Semakh on Lake Tiberias or to have joint use of the existing pier, subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by the above-mentioned commission.

Persons or goods passing between the existing landing-stage or any future landing-stages on the Lake of Tiberias and Semakh Station shall not by reason of the mere fact that they must cross the territory of Palestine be deemed persons or goods entering Palestine for the purpose of customs or other regulations, and the right of the Syrian Government and their agents to access to the said landing-stages is recognised.

It is merely agreed that the above is the final report of the commission in respect of the frontier from the Mediterranean to El Hammé only, and that the British Government shall be free to reopen the question of readjusting the frontier between Banias and Metallah on such terms as may be agreed between the two mandatory Powers with a view of making the north road between these two villages the final frontier.

Signed on behalf of His Britannic Majesty's Government :

February 3, 1922.

No. 19.

(No. 19. Secret.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, February 28, 1923.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith the Jeddah report for the period 1st-28th February, 1923.

Copies of this report and despatch have been sent to Cairo, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Aden, Delhi and Damascus.


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L. B. GRAFFTEY-SMITH

Enclosure in No. 19.

Jeddah Report, February 1-28, 1923.

MAJOR W. E. MARSHALL, M.C., R.A.M.C., His Britannic Majesty's agent and consul, left for the United Kingdom on the 16th February. King Hussein sent the Emir Ali to Jeddah to bid him farewell. As usual, a personal and friendly visit was officially explained as having been made in the service of specific Arab interests, and "Al Kibla" announced that His Highness travelled from Mecca in



Eastern (Syria) Mar. 16. Sec. 1.


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MAP SHOWING BOUNDARY BETWEEN SYRIA AND PALESTINE.

SHEET I.



Produced by the Survey of Egypt 21/677/1.


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Scale 1 : 100,000.


Kilometres 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Kilometres.
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Only to indicate position
of Trig Point.





MAP SHOWING BOUNDARY BETWEEN SYRIA AND PALESTINE.



order to inspect the progress of the new Jeddah machine-shops and the new Jeddah dry-dock. Neither of these undertakings has yet advanced beyond the stage of selection of site.

The Emir Ali has now been detailed to accompany the ex-Sultan of Turkey, who left Mecca for Ta'if on the 26th February, having found the climate of Mecca rather too much for him. Since his arrival, the ex-Sultan has kept very much to his house, only occasionally visiting King Hussein, but regularly attending, under escort and in His Majesty's company, the Friday prayers. He there hears King Hussein's name, and not his own, pronounced in the "Khutba": a new experience for the ex-Caliph.

King Hussein recently informed this agency in confidence, that the ex-Sultan had expressed a wish to proceed to Haifa or Cyprus, but had been overborne by the King's amiable protests, his offer of accommodation at Ta'if and a promise that the arrival of the Sultanic family from Constantinople would be expedited. King Hussein seemed to be sceptical of the plea of ill-health and separation from his kin on which the ex-Sultan's departure was mooted, and he attributed to his distinguished guest other vague and less innocent motives. Local opinion firmly holds that His Majesty's Government have sent the ex-Sultan to join his fellow-traitor to Islam in Mecca, and that the reported abolition of Sultan Abdul Mejid's temporal authority is a British rumour only. All seem agreed that King Hussein intends somehow to wrest from Sultan Mohammed Wahid-ud-Din the title of Caliph.

King Hussein's own propaganda, at present, is limited to a reiterated comparison of the Caliphate in these latter evil days with that stern orthodoxy of early tradition by which his own acts and the Arab administration are alleged to be inspired. He appeals for a return from modern laxity and European influence to strict apostolic simplicity, and holds that the Commander of the Faithful should be distinguished, not by a knack for painting or for poetry, but by strict observance of the dogma laid down by God and His prophet. It is left to his audience to divine where such a paragon is to be found.

His Majesty appeared to be genuinely nervous at learning that the Emir Zeid was making himself useful to his brother in the neighbourhood of Mosul. Later, on hearing from his representative at Lausanne that Ismet Pasha had, in conversation, emphasised Kemalist respect for the integrity of Arab territories, King Hussein wrote to Major Marshall, urging that the British should at once evacuate Mosul, to ensure that this district might be saved, quâ Arab territory, from Turkish aggression.

News that the Nejd Pilgrimage would this year be unrestricted has been received with despair by the King, who bitterly resents the acquiescence of His Majesty's Government in the steady spread of Riyadh influence through the peninsula. He thinks that British policy should long since have checked the tide which has now engulfed Jaufr, Ebha and Taraba and which laps the walls of Khaibar and Kunfuda, upsetting all balance of power in Arabia.

He states that he has good reason to believe that Ibn Saud is about to make an attack on Transjordan. He has also sent me a telegram from the Emir of the Juhaina, reporting the defeat of a raiding-party of seven "standards" of Wahhabis, at a distance of six hours from El 'Ula. This raiding-party, which is said to have previously put to flight Ibrahim-bin-Rifada and 400 camel-men of the Billi, was repulsed with machine guns. One of the "standards" belonged to Farhan-al-Aida, another to Awaji. It is unsafe to remind King Hussein that desert raids are likely to outlive any political settlement in Arabia, and idle to represent that Ibn Saud cannot easily control events on the fringes of his vast dominions. His Majesty sees only the swell and spread of the Wahhabi tide, and the erosion of his own territories. "You will excuse us," he telegraphs, "if we say that this is British hostility. We do not say anything except that: 'The beloved knows he is loved, so he begins coquetting.'"

To any negotiations with Ibn Saud, while the latter remains in occupation of his newly won territory, King Hussein refuses to consent.

His bitterness against the Power subsidising Ibn Saud is allowed practical expression. An Indian, registered at this consulate before the war and holding a British passport issued here, has been for two years refused Hashimite Government permission to leave this country for his home in India, unless he travels on a Hashimite Government passport. The matter has been the subject of the strongest representations, and at last, when in Jeddah in January, King Hussein agreed that if the man was given a certified copy of his pre-war (1908) registration certificate, his right to travel on a British passport would be recognised. The formality was complied with; but the Indian is still debarred from leaving Jeddah.

Quarantine.

All the pilgrims who have as yet arrived—from the Netherlands East Indies and Singapore—have been sent to the quarantine islands for twenty-four hours, although in many cases no single death or illness had occurred on the voyage. The Dutch consul has, I think wisely, refrained from re-echoing last year's protests, and I have followed his example of silence in the case of British Malayan pilgrims. Thabet Bey, the Director-General of Quarantine, is assured of King Hussein's sympathy and support in his anti-European attitude and he waxes fat and thrives on consular opposition and protests. Experience has proved that no amount of words will induce the Hashimite Government not to put pilgrims into quarantine here, and the interpretation of some clauses of the International Convention by the International Quarantine Board in Alexandria has certainly encouraged the local authorities in their imposition of "local rules." Unless and until it be decided to support protests, if disregarded, by some sort of action, I am convinced that it is better to leave Thabet Bey to his devices rather than to rumble with empty thunder, since this only stiffens the arrogance of opposition and leads, eventually, to the greater discomfort of the pilgrims.

I was interested to see in a Malay vernacular journal of reading for the masses, subsidised by the Dutch Colonial Government, that Kamaran Island is described as an overflow quarantine station from the Hedjaz Islands of Abu Saad, &c.

Dr. Granville, President of the International Quarantine Board, Alexandria, visited Jeddah from the 1st to the 4th February on the Egyptian Government yacht "Aida," for the purpose of conveying to King Hussein a warning of the penalties in store for the steamship "Tawil" and the steamship "Rushdi" if these Hashimite Government vessels again carried pilgrims in excess of the numbers permitted by convention. The King delegated Thabet Bey to represent him in these conversations.

Advantage was taken of Dr. Granville's presence to discuss certain difficulties which arose last season, and various shipping agents were invited with the Dutch, French and Italian consuls to meet him.

In the course of discussion Dr. Granville explained the omission of Egyptian pilgrim ships to call at Tor (on the southward journey), on the ground that Tor quarantine station was not at the time ready to receive these pilgrims. He explained the return of the Italian steamship "Massaua" from Suez to Tor (on the northward journey), on the ground that the quarantine station at Moses' Wells (Suez) was not at the time in repair. He agreed that ships carrying not more than one 3rd class pilgrim per 100 tons gross register, and not calling by itinerary at Tor, should disembark their pilgrims at Suez, for quarantine at Moses' Wells. This leaves pilgrims travelling by the line Marittima Italiana free to proceed direct to Suez, while pilgrim passengers by Khedivial Mail Line must pass their quarantine period at Tor and thence proceed to Suez by ferry steamer. In case of plague, &c., being discovered among the Italian steamers' passengers at Suez, these would be returned to Tor.

Dr. Granville stated that he saw no objection to non-Egyptian pilgrims in transit for the Mediterranean or Palestine being allowed to land in Egypt on their way home, provided they can prove that their passage, or railway fare, to their ultimate destination has been paid, *e.g.*, by a system of through booking from Jeddah. The hardship is, that having transited Egypt on their way to Jeddah, these pilgrims may be refused permission to return by the same route. Dr. Granville stated that it had never been the intention to apply strictly the prohibition on the landing or transshipment of non-Egyptian pilgrims. But so long as the risk exists, the shipping companies will refuse them passages, if only in order to be on the safe side.

Non-pilgrims from the Hedjaz, if they could satisfy the quarantine authorities (*e.g.* by certificate from this agency given with the visa) that they were not pilgrims, would be exempted from quarantine at Tor or Suez. The observation was made that it was illogical to discriminate between pilgrims and the non-pilgrims who had shared with them rooms in Jeddah and the promiscuity of deck-passage on board ship. Dr. Granville admitted this, but stated that, so long as the pilgrimage was clean, it did not much matter what happened to non-pilgrims. The Egyptian Public Health authorities could supervise them in Egypt. That consideration should not stop pilgrims, after a clean pilgrimage, from being quarantined at Tor.

Dr. Granville admitted that cholera inoculation had had excellent results, but he opposed the insertion of an article in the convention making such inoculation compulsory, on sentimental grounds.

Dr. Granville emphasised the fact that his personal inclinations and the decisions of his Board did not necessarily coincide.

The King conferred upon Dr. Granville the second class of the Order of El Nahda.

Pilgrimage.

Tariffs of pilgrims' dues, identical with those published last year (see my report for the period ending the 28th February, 1922) have again been issued. As before, Javanese and Malay pilgrims pay more than Indians and others. These charges represent a hypothetical minimum, not fact.

Economic.

Financial transactions in the Hedjaz become daily more chaotic. Not only is the export of gold from the country prohibited, but gold sent from town to town is liable to confiscation. Merchants in Mecca can no longer settle their bills *i.* Jeddah except by draft, for which they have to pay 3 or 4 Turkish piastres per £ premium. Where commodities like flour are in question, this extra charge cuts deep into the narrow margin of profit.

A Government order prohibits the import of "halalas" (Turkish piastres and fractions) under penalty of confiscation, and "mejidis" (Turkish dollars of 20 Turkish piastres) and fractions are liable to a 50 per cent. import tax. All pilgrims from ex-Turkish territories should be warned not to attempt to profit by the rate of exchange of these coins. Their local rates to the pound sterling have been set swinging by the merchants' fear of the King's spies who are sent from Mecca to enforce the "official" rate of 7 mejidis to the £ (at which the Government sell their mejidis), by their fear of a "call-in" for the Kashimite mint, and by their anxiety to sell to the Director-General of Customs, who recently bought a large consignment from Yembo at the rate of 10 mejidis to the £. Shopkeepers do not know where they are: still less where they will be two months hence.

The minting machine referred to in my reports for the periods ending the 31st December, 1921, and the 10th March, 1922, arrived on the 15th February. It is not yet certain what coins it is going to mint: probably nickel piastres and fractions to replace the "halalas," which are not current outside the Hedjaz; possibly silver dollars and fractions to replace the "mejidis." It is not impossible that pilgrims and others arriving in the country will be compelled to exchange their Indian or Egyptian currency for the new Hashimite coinage, at an arbitrary rate, with the option of re-changing on departure; but for the present King Hussein's intentions are known only to himself. He has a fair stock of confiscated "halalas," "medijis," Maria Theresa dollars and Napoleon III 5-franc pieces on which to start minting operations.

It is worth noting that the King has asked that, for the procedure now followed at his request, by which all dhows leaving the Soudan coast for Hedjaz ports are required to call first at Jeddah, there should be substituted a system of control permitting dhows to leave the Soudan coast for any Hedjaz port, on condition that they produce, on their return to the Soudan, a certificate of duly discharged cargo to be issued by the Hedjaz authorities at the ports for which they loaded. By this concession King Hussein would appear to be relinquishing his power to ration the tribes round Rabegh and other northern ports. Whether he has provided for strict octroi control in the different harbour towns, or whether he wishes to give the tribes on the Medina road one grievance the less this year, I cannot yet say. Local opinion, always disposed to accept the tortuous, sees in the measure an elaborate royal scheme for getting "halalas" into the country, while forbidding their importation, by giving facilities for their smuggling from the Soudan to Yembo. Certainly the request for this change in dhow-control procedure, the arrival of the mint, and the removal of the long-standing prohibition on the shipment of "halalas" from Yembo to Jeddah, all occurred within the space of seven days.

The octroi in Mecca is being very strictly applied. Bedouin require official permission to take any foodstuffs or cloth out of the town.

Medina.

I understand that there was a fight in Manakha, the market of Medina, on the 29th January last, between citizens and Masruh tribesmen, in which two men were killed and many wounded.

Three small "rukabs" (see my report for the period ending the 28th February, 1922) arrived in Jeddah from Mecca during the month and proceeded along the

coast *en route* for Medina. Their normal road, through Ispahan, is impracticable owing to Bisha hostility.

An Arab who worked last year on the repair of the Hedjaz Railway at Buair, under His Highness the Emir Ali, informs me that all the repair work accomplished by the Emir Ali was destroyed by Wahhabi raiders within a week after His Highness's departure. All bridges between Buair and Medina have been washed away by floods.

King Hussein's alternative to the British and French Government's suggestions for railway administration is referred to in the attached notes on the press. On the 9th February, between 150 and 200 troops and Bedouin left Jeddah on the steamship "Tawil" for El Wejh, *en route* for El 'Ula, to repair the line. They took two machine guns and one field gun. Their use of the machine guns has been noted above. Fifty of these irregulars are said to have deserted between Mecca and Jeddah. They were kept under police supervision while in Jeddah. Army salaries are many months in arrears.

General.

The Indian police officer attached to this agency for duties as pilgrimage officer, Khan Sahib Hakim Said Hasan, M.B.E., left for India on the 21st February, having been recalled by the Government of India. The equipment of the Indian Pilgrimage Hospital (1921) was returned to India at the same time.

Mr. T. F. Critchley, Egyptian manager of the Imperial Ottoman Bank, spent a few days in Jeddah during the month. The Jeddah branch of this bank, to the title of which King Hussein strongly objects, has not been allowed to function since the revolt, and Mr. Critchley may recommend to his principals that they should cease to keep a manager here doing nothing.

An American yacht, "Wisdom II" of Los Angeles, owned and sailed by a Mr. Salisbury and a party of journalists, cinematograph men, and a scratch Kanaka crew, called and stayed some time in Jeddah harbour on her way round the world. Cinematograph pictures were taken on land and from the air. These visitors, who endeavoured to supplement their very scanty knowledge of things Arabian by interviewing all the Europeans in Jeddah, were made much of by the local authorities. "Al Kibla" refers to them as the "first American mission to the Hedjaz." Their version of life in Jeddah, as given to the American press, will be entertaining, if not veracious.

H.M.S. "Clematis" arrived on the 4th February and left on the 7th February.

Press Summary ("Al Kibla").

No. 656. January 25, 1923.

Decorations.—M. Krajewski, French consul-general in Jeddah, his son, and officers of the French sloop "Algol" receive the Order of El Nahda.

Official Notice.—The Government notifies all travellers to the Hedjaz that any "metal money" they may bring of higher value than 10 Turkish piastres will be confiscated. Further, that Turkish mejidi dollars, or fractions thereof, above 5 dollars, are liable to 50 per cent. import duty, but these may be deposited with the Customs Administration and recovered without charge on the traveller's departure from the Hedjaz.

(By "metal money," nickel coin is meant, and by nickel coin, only Turkish nickels ("halalas") are subject to confiscation. As the notice stands, Indian, Egyptian and all other coins are liable to be confiscated, so the Government were therefore asked to define more precisely their intentions.)

The Caliphate.—Articles on the separation of the Sultanate from the Caliphate are reproduced from "Mashrak" of Gorahpore (No. 50 of the 13th December, 1922), and "Al Akhbar" of Cairo (No. 867 of the 28th December, 1922). "Al Kibla," after endorsing these journals' criticism of Kemalist action, contrasts the Caliphate to-day with the Caliphate of early Moslem tradition, and says that none of the charges so often made against King Hussein by his enemies are a patch on the decision of the Angora Assembly.

No. 657. January 29, 1923.

"The Curse of Haste."—Articles are reproduced from "Al Mokattam" (of the 10th January), from "Alif Ba," of Damascus (No. 714), and from "Al Ahram" (No. 13950), criticising the Kemalists' decision regarding the divorce of the temporal

and spiritual powers of the Caliphate. "Al Kibla" remarks on the growing note of criticism in these and similar articles, and regrets that the press in general should have been originally so hasty to applaud, and should now have to reconsider its first enthusiasms.

Sultan Mohammed Wahid-ud-Din.—Has been privileged to enter the Ka'aba, where he put up such prayers as God desired him to pray in all meekness and humility. We congratulate him on a privilege enjoyed by none of his ancestors.

Arrivals.—Sheikh 'Atwa-el-Majali, Sheikh-ul-Mashaikh of El Karak, and Sheikh Ismail Kazzaz, Kaïmakam of El 'Ala, have been made welcome in Mecca. Also another batch of Turkish refugees from Constantinople via Suez.

(The Arab notables came to discuss Hedjaz railway business.)

No. 658. February 1, 1923.

Official Notice.—The Hedjaz Railway. Repairs will be undertaken at the expense of the Hashimite Government. There will be formed an Administration for all permanent and fundamental matters connected with the line, and a temporary board of repairs. General superintendence over all administrative matters is vested in King Hussein. The board, of residents and notables and technically qualified persons of the country, is to sit at Medina, under the Sheikh-ul-Haram, to administer the line. The Emir Abdullah is to be general director of repairs; El Sayed Mohammed Shauki is engineer-in-chief of repairs and other works, and the Rais-ul-Baladiyyah of Amman is to be in charge of contracts, &c.

"Al Kibla" is informed that repairs have begun, and that the first instalment of the Arab Government's contribution has been paid to the "Board of Administration."

"Leave the Imposters in their Deceit."—This, and an article on Syrian attachment to King Hussein, are pro-Arab, anti-Kemalist articles, vigorously applauded by "Al Kibla," copied from "Alif Ba."

Lausanne.—The Arab delegate's efforts, and his compliance with the instructions laid down for him, are said to have led to a good presentation of the Arab question to the conference.

No. 659. February 5, 1923.

Decorations.—Dr. Granville, president of the International Quarantine Board, Alexandria, receives the second class of the Order of El Nahda.

Sheikh Atwa-bin-Saleh-el-Majali and two other notables of El Kerak are also decorated.

Official Notice.—Persons arriving in the Hedjaz from countries in which there is an Arab agent, who have not had their passports endorsed by the Arab agent, will not be allowed to land.

Angora and the Caliphate.—Reproduction of an article contributed by "A real Arab" to "Alif Ba" of Damascus, of a tone hostile to Turanian ambitions and heresy, friendly to Arab orthodoxy and Arab national sentiment.

Sultan Mohammed Wahid-ud-Din.—Attended the Friday prayer, with His Majesty King Hussein, strongly escorted by soldiers and police.

Break-up of the Lausanne Conference.—The Hashimite delegate has asked permission to leave Lausanne.

Seismic Phenomenon in Nejd.—A district called "As-Salli," between the (?) Makhbat road to Hasa and Abu Jafan has been swallowed up (?) in a landslide or earthquake).

No. 660. February 8, 1923.

Angora.—The newspaper "Yeni Gun" of Angora having declared that: "Disaffection is rife in the Hedjaz, and the inhabitants are driven to extremes by the tyranny of the Government," "Al Kibla" reproduces, verbatim, a stormy debate in the Angora National Assembly, as reported in "Al Ahram." Cat-calls, mud-slinging and rowdy abuse; how can an Assembly so devoid of decency be considered the arbiters of Islam and the source of a thousand journalistic hopes?

Poetry.—A Bedouin Kazidah in honour of King Hussein.

"Political Hysteria."—(From "Al Siyaca" of Cairo.)

No. 661. February 12, 1923.

Notice issued by the High Hashimite Divan.—The writer of an anonymous letter signed "Egyptian Witness," abusing King Hussein, is notified that this letter has been received.

Hashimite Agents' Visas.—As there are no Hashimite agents except the one in Egypt, the public are instructed to read the notice in No. 659 as applying to passengers from Suez only.

The "Khasf" in Nejd.—"A reader in Mecca" (an old friend) soliloquises on the selection of Nejd for a manifestation of divine wrath unparalleled since the days of Korah, Dathan and Abiram.

Mosul.—"Al Mokattam" states that King Feisal has sent his brother, the Emir Zeid, to Mosul, to examine the situation, with Arab and British troops. "Al Kibla" replies that as Zeid only went to Irak to visit his brother after appendicitis, orders have now been issued to him from the Royal Divan, forbidding him to engage in any administrative, political or military activities.

Separate Peace with Turkey.—His Majesty's Government have refused to make peace with Turkey behind the back of France. But the Arab Government refused to do so years ago, during the war. Britain has not the monopoly of loyalty.

No. 662. February 15, 1923.

Decorations.—The wireless operators at Ma'an, El Wejh, Yambo, Kurfuda and Akaba receive the fifth class of El Nahda.

England's Policy in Arabia.—"Al Ahram" states that England has arranged for a confederation of Arab chiefs under one leader. "Al Kibla" knows nothing about any such arrangement, mocks at the Egyptian paper's apparent confusion of Asir with Libya, and recommends people not to discuss things they do not understand.

"They seek to blow out the Light of God."—The anonymous letter-writer, "Egyptian Witness," is overwhelmed with five columns of a eulogistic speech, with two Kazidabs, which was delivered to the saviour, King Hussein, last year.

Matter supplied by "One of the Readers" (another old friend).

His Highness the Emir Ali.—His journey to Jeddah.

Jeddah Machine-shops and Dry Docks.—Admirable enterprise of the Hashimite Government in constructing, with purely Arab materials, these fine marks of progress.

First American Mission to the Hedjaz.—Welcome!

(This refers to the Los Angeles journalists whose yacht put into Jeddah for keel repairs.)

No. 663. February 19, 1923.

Nothing of interest.

No. 664. February 22, 1923.

Pilgrim Tariffs.—The official tariffs of pilgrim charges in Arabic, Urdu and Malay.

Rain at Medina.—The recent heavy rains at Medina destroyed the conduit of Ain Zurka. This has now been repaired at King Hussein's expense. Bumper crops expected.

The Rajab "Rukaba."—Three parties have left for the usual Rajab journey to Medina for the ceremonies of Syedna Hanza.

No. 665. February 26, 1923.

His Majesty the Sultan.—An account of his departure, with his son and suite and his Highness the Emir Ali, for Ta'if.

Official Notice by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.—The Hashimite Government telegraphed to Angora to thank the Kemalists for their guarantee of Arab independence, but their cable was stopped (by Greek censors) at Syra.

Hedjaz Railway.—The contribution of the Hedjaz and of Transjordan to its repair.

The Mint.—Blessings on the Arab Government for having procured a minting machine, which will answer the needs (unspecified) of the country.

L. B. GRAFFTEY-SMITH.

APPENDIX.

Shipping Intelligence for Period February 1-28, 1923.

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Pilgrims Disembarked.	Cargo Discharged.
				1923. Feb. 1	1923. Feb. 1		Packages.
Stentor ...	Dutch ...	Batavia ...	Amsterdam ...	5	5	213	...
Mansourah ...	British ...	Suez ...	Port Soudan ...	8	8	...	600
Massaua ...	Italian ...	Suez ...	Massaua ...	10	14	...	867
Firooz ...	British ...	Bombay ...	Bombay ...	11	11	...	18,091
Asmara ...	Italian ...	Massaua ...	Suez ...	11	12	...	698
Mansourah ...	British ...	Suakin ...	Port Soudan ...	15	15	...	4,752
Mansourah ...	British ...	Port Soudan ...	Suez ...	15	15	...	1,136
Keneh ...	British ...	Suez ...	Aden ...	16	16	...	1,371
Elpenor ...	British ...	Singapore ...	London ...	16	16	197	...
Bahrein ...	British ...	Karachi ...	Bombay ...	18	21	...	12,006
Borulos ...	British ...	Aden ...	Suez ...	18	18	...	2,183
Idomneus ...	British ...	Batavia ...	Liverpool ...	18	19	612	...
Karimata ...	Dutch ...	Batavia ...	New York ...	21	21	467	...
Mansourah ...	British ...	Suez ...	Suakin ...	25	25	...	2,586
Ternate ...	Dutch ...	Batavia ...	Rotterdam ...	26	26	1,000	...
Haresfield ...	British ...	Calcutta	26	83,346
Diomed ...	British ...	Singapore ...	London ...	27	27	314	500 planks.
Kangean ...	Dutch ...	Batavia	28	...	856	...
Jason ...	British ...	Batavia	28	...	449	...

H.M.S. "Clematis" arrived on the 4th and left on the 7th.

[E 3100/987/65]

No. 20.

Memorandum respecting the coming into force of Mandates for Palestine and Syria.

ON the 1st June, 1922, we telegraphed (No. 200) to Sir Auckland Geddes E. 5624. instructing him to urge the United States Government to expedite their agreement with the French in regard to the Syrian mandate in order that both it and the Palestine mandate might be passed by the Council of the League of Nations at the forthcoming meeting on the 11th July.

On the 2nd June, a similar telegram (No. 193) was sent to Lord Hardinge, who was told to inform the French that the Irak mandate would not be ready for submission to the council, but that this did not constitute any reason why the Syrian mandate should be held up by the French.

On the 4th June Lord Hardinge telegraphed (No. 302) to say that he had seen E. 5651. M. Peretti who had taken note of the delay in connection with the Syrian mandate and said that he saw no reason for postponing the Syrian mandate on that ground. He also added that the approval of the mandates need not await the conclusion of peace with Turkey.

On the 6th June the French Chargé d'Affaires submitted the text of the proposed E. 5769. modifications in the Syrian mandate and of the draft Franco-American Agreement, and asked for the corresponding papers in regard to the Palestine mandate.

On the 20th June we replied to the French Chargé d'Affaires and explained E. 5858. that the delay in connection with the Irak mandate was due to negotiations with the United States of America over the Turkish Petroleum Company. We also said that minor modifications in the mandate would be required in order to make it conform to the treaty with King Feisal. We expressed the hope that the Franco-American Agreement in regard to Syria would be expedited. At the same time the Italian, Japanese and American Ambassadors were informed of the modifications in the Palestine mandate, and our Ambassador at Brussels was instructed to bring them to the notice of the Belgian Government. Sir Auckland Geddes was sent the text of the draft Anglo-American Agreement in regard to Palestine and told to open negotiations with the United States Government.

A Foreign Office memorandum of the 19th July described the Italian opposition E. 7189. at the Council of the League of Nations on that day. On the 22nd July M. Viviani was sent a copy of the assurances which we had agreed to give to Italy in regard to Palestine.

E. 7343. On the 28th July we telegraphed to Sir R. Graham saying that the Italians were alleged to be asking more from the French in regard to Syria in the way of assurances than we had given them in regard to Palestine. Sir R. Graham was instructed to urge the Italians to limit their demands to the assurances we had conceded in Palestine and to expedite an agreement with the French.

E. 7459 contains the *procès-verbal* of the meeting of the Council of the League of Nations on the 24th July containing a declaration that the mandates for Syria and Palestine will come into force when France and Italy notify the President of the Council of the League of Nations that they have reached an agreement.

E. 7675. Sir R. Graham telegraphed (No. 242) on the 1st August that the Italian Government had explained that the French intended to consider their assurances to the Italian Government about Syria as only applicable if similar assurances were given to Italy by His Majesty's Government about Irak. We telegraphed (No. 257) to our Ambassador in Paris instructing him to protest to the French regarding their attitude.

E. 7796. On the 7th August he replied by telegram (No. 413) stating that the French held that the real similitude was between Syria and Irak and not between Syria and Palestine.

E. 8459. On the 24th August he telegraphed (No. 436) that M. Poincaré was now satisfied.

E. 8518. Lord Hardinge, in his despatch No. 1992 of the 27th August transmitted a note from M. Poincaré in which the latter claimed that His Majesty's Government must promise in precise terms not to accord to Italy in Irak a less favourable situation than that acquired by her in Syria through the Franco-Italian Agreement. It was subsequently explained that this note superseded Paris telegram No. 436 of the 24th August.

E. 12102. The Colonial Office on the 4th November transmitted suggestions by Sir P. Cox as to the assurances which the Italians should be given in regard to Irak, and we sent to the Colonial Office a draft memorandum for concurrence, setting forth these assurances for submission to the Italian Ambassador.

E. 13510. On the 14th December the above memorandum was transmitted privately to the Italian Ambassador.

E. 1646. On the 14th February, 1923, we wrote to the Italian Ambassador enquiring whether the memorandum had proved acceptable to the Italian Government. At the same time a despatch was sent to Sir R. Graham instructing him to approach the Italian Government with a view to obtaining, at an early date, an expression of their views on this subject.

J. MURRAY.

Foreign Office, March 22, 1923.

[E 3500/531/89]

No. 21.

Consul Smart to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received April 5.)

(No. 22.)

My Lord,

Aleppo, March 17, 1923.

I HAVE the honour to report that Subhi Bey Berakat, President of the Syrian Federation, left to-day for Damascus with all the staff of the Federal Administration. The Aleppo members of the Federal Council are to follow in a fortnight's time.

M. de Caix, Acting High Commissioner, paid a short visit to Aleppo last week to inspect the work of the various Federal Commissions on the eve of their transfer to Damascus. He was apparently rather dissatisfied with the progress of the commission's labours.

The decision of the Federal Council to transfer the seat of the Federation permanently from Aleppo to Damascus has caused discontent here. Aleppo was reluctant to enter the Federation, and would have preferred to remain a separate administrative entity directly under the High Commission. Its participation was secured under French pressure and on the understanding that the Federation would sit alternatively at Aleppo and Damascus. The first session of the Federal Council was accordingly opened at Aleppo last December. The council, however, after dealing with its main business, *i.e.*, the federalisation of certain departments (War, Justice, Survey, Education), proceeded to raise the question of the Federal capital, and decided that it should be permanently Damascus. The representatives of Damascus and the Alawites voted together against those of Aleppo.

Aleppo feels that it has been tricked and that its interests are being sacrificed. It maintains that economically it is far more important than Damascus, especially since the latter has been shorn of the Jebel Druse, and that it will have to provide the greater part of the Federal revenues. Aleppo's budget has been balanced, while that of Damascus is always in deficit, temporarily made good by French subsidies. Aleppo may find its revenues being used indirectly to replace these French subsidies. It is true that M. de Caix appears to have withstood attempts to secure undue assignments of Aleppo revenues to the Federal budget, but ultimately circumstances may be too strong for the French High Commission. Anyhow, between a Damascus with a budgetary deficit and the Alawites quite undeveloped economically, Aleppo, after having been the chief victim of the partition of Turkey in Asia and the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement with Angora, seems to be marked out for the rôle of the milch-cow of the Syrian Federation.

While Aleppo's feelings are quite comprehensible, it is certainly impracticable to have the Syrian capital within a few miles of the Turkish frontier, in a region subject to frequent raids by bands, often acting under Turkish instigation, and to continual Turkish propaganda. Moreover, Aleppo's face is turned towards regions outside of Syria. Its economic life is bound up with its lost Anatolian and Mesopotamian markets, which it must recover, if it is not to sink into insignificance. Damascus, both by its situation and its religious and historical prestige, is obviously the more appropriate capital of an Arabian Federation in Syria.

Unfortunately there is no such thing as a Syrian national unity. Aleppo has no sympathy with Damascus, and I presume that this indifference is reciprocated. The Alawites are still at a very primitive stage of development, and have little in common with either of the other States of the Federation. They took sides with Damascus in the matter of the Federal capital owing to French pressure. But they, too, would prefer to remain a separate administrative entity, and only entered the Federation under French pressure. If Damascus alone has been favourable to the Federation, this attitude is no doubt inspired by the hope that Damascus is going to profit financially by the subordination of the other two States.

Moreover, the French authorities obviously must make an effort to unify Syria, and all that can be hoped for is that gradually bonds of interest will be forged between the three States and reconcile them to co-operation. The lack of cohesion among Arabs, in Syria or elsewhere, now or at any other time of their history, justifies some scepticism as to any such consolidation in the immediate future.

I have, &c.

W. A. SMART.

[E 3616/408/89]

No. 22.

Consul Palmer to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received April 9.)

(No. 55. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Damascus, March 14, 1923.

I HAVE the honour to refer to my despatch No. 34, Confidential, of the 16th February concerning co-operation on the Transjordanian-Syrian frontier, and more particularly to the last sentence of paragraph 1 and to paragraph 3.

I also took the matter up once more here verbally.

The result of my letter No. L.A.O. 16 to the Haut-Commissaire has been very gratifying.

On the evening of the 1st March Commandant Arlebosse informed me that he had been authorised to interview the Emir Abdullah, that he and his wife were travelling to Amman on the 3rd March, and that he would like me to go with them, if possible.

I at once realised the importance of this action, as Commandant Arlebosse is the most hated man in Syria and Transjordan. His nomination for this voyage—he is head of the Political Section here—could only mean that the French were still somewhat suspicious, but had decided to give our offers a fair trial.

I accordingly decided to make my long-postponed visit to Amman with them, and we left on the 3rd March in a special carriage sent up from Amman by Mr. Philby. At Deraa we discussed details for a combined demonstration with the local French authorities.

On the 4th March Mr. Philby and Colonel Peake took us across from Amman to have lunch with Emir Abdullah at his camp at Shuna. Mazhar Bey, the Prime Minister, was present.

After lunch an agreement was arrived at on the basis of the French proposals already discussed at Deraa. Commandant Arlebosse left Amman on the 5th March, and told me he was completely satisfied. I stayed on for reasons given later.

As the result of this *entente*, Peake Pasha moved up 160 of his gendarmes to Mafrak on the 8th, and, after meeting Commandant Arnot at Deraa on the 9th, moved his force to Um Jemal (on the Transjordanian side of the frontier) on the 10th. Here he met Colonel Carron with a column consisting of 100 tirailleurs algériens, 25 cavalry and 75 Syrian and Druze gendarmes. Water was scarce, but Colonel Peake had taken his precautions, and was able to water and feed the French troops as well as his own. The troops returned to their respective zones on the 11th, but I met Peake Pasha and Colonel Carron (by arrangement) at Mafrak on the 12th, and travelled back to Damascus with the latter.

He was very satisfied with the result, as also was Commandant Arnot, the French conseiller administratif at Deraa, who told me that an enormous impression had already been created throughout his zone and the Jebel Druze, and who insisted upon celebrating the creation of this new frontier *entente* with champagne!

The Emir and Mazhar Bey, the Prime Minister, had given Peake Pasha *carte blanche*, and he asked me to ascertain whether the French were really as satisfied as they seemed to be. Colonel Carron and I discussed in the train a provisional frontier agreement already drawn up by him and Peake Pasha.

The main points were:—

- (a.) That every effort should be made to apprehend ordinary criminals and fugitives from justice, and that a rough-and-ready form of extradition should be introduced.
- (b.) That there should be a sort of neutral zone created for a short distance on either side of the frontier, and that the troops on one side should have the right to pursue any band or individual across the other's frontier up to the limits of this zone. (Note.—The French have already been allowed to exercise this right, as on the 10th they arrested a man, supposed to be one of Sultan Attrash's band, on our side of the frontier without any opposition on our part. In any case he had fired at their troops.)
- (c.) I took exception to the following point, and asked Colonel Carron to omit it from the final agreement: "That political refugees, outlaws, &c., should only be allowed to take the minimum necessary personal suite with them if they crossed into the neighbouring zone."

My objection was based upon the grounds that your Lordship had instructed me to oppose all admissions of Syrian political exiles to British mandated territory, that the Emir Abdullah had given orders to this effect on the 4th March, and that the insertion of any such clause would appear to stultify the main agreement, and was in any case quite superfluous. Colonel Carron saw the logic of my argument, and said he would probably omit this clause, more especially as I pointed out that, if he preferred practical arrangements to theory, he could always make a separate agreement on this point with Peake Pasha or alter the wording so as to overcome the present objection to it.

I arrived here on the evening of the 12th and interviewed the French délégué next morning. He appeared very satisfied with the results, now that his hand had been forced somewhat.

Before Commandant Arlebosse left Amman I seized the favourable opportunity to again point out to him the hardship inflicted on Transjordanians by the present regulations, which required them to send their passports to Jerusalem to be viséd, or sometimes even to go there in person.

This regulation had had some small justification at the time of the Damascus disturbances, but was now scarcely necessary.

Commandant Arlebosse now agreed, and the French délégué told me he has now written, on Arlebosse's recommendation, urging the removal of this restriction and that visas should once again be granted at Deraa during the three hours' wait there between trains.

The Emir himself spontaneously offered to accept a French liaison officer or consular officer at Amman, and Mr. Philby quite agreed.

I am happy to say I was also able to make certain arrangements which may result in a better understanding between the Emir and the Sultan of Nejd. This will form the subject of a separate despatch.

On my return here I found the annexed letter from the French delegation. It is dated the 6th March, i.e., three days after our departure for Amman, so that it would appear somewhat belated.

Mazhar Bey also asked me to tell the French that Transjordanians were tired of attempting to obtain a share of the customs dues taken at Beirut (30,000 napoleons is the sum claimed), and had therefore imposed a duty on all goods entering Transjordan from Syria. I considered it advisable to wait a few days before bringing this subject up.

I have, &c.

C. E. S. PALMER.

Enclosure in No. 22.

French Delegation to Consul Palmer.

M. le Consul,

Damas, le 6 mars 1923.

J'AI l'honneur de vous accuser réception de la copie de votre lettre No. 16 à son Excellence le Haut-Commissaire de la République française à Beyrouth. Je vous en remercie très sincèrement. Vous savez d'autre part que la question de coopération a déjà reçu une consécration et va avoir sous peu un commencement d'exécution.

Veuillez, &c.

[Ilisible.]

[E 3899/46/91]

No. 23.

*Exchange of Notes respecting the Anglo-Hashimite Treaty.**

(1.)

Sir W. Tyrrell to Dr. Naji-el-Assil.

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 16, 1923.

SEEING that the negotiations leading to the initialling, on the 16th April, of the treaty between His Britannic Majesty and His Hashimite Majesty have been conducted in English and on the basis of the English text, I am directed to inform you that it is agreed that the Arabic phrase [here follows quotation of Arabic phrase in article 2], which you regard as the nearest equivalent in Arabic to the English phrase "to enter into an association for customs or other purposes with a view to eventual confederation," shall have the exact significance of the English phrase, and shall be interpreted accordingly.

I am, &c.

W. TYRRELL.

(2.)

Dr. Naji-el-Assil to Sir W. Tyrrell.

Sir,

Hyde Park Hotel, London, April 16, 1923.

SEEING that the negotiations leading to the initialling, on the 16th April, of the treaty between His Britannic Majesty and His Hashimite Majesty have been conducted in English and on the basis of the English text, it is agreed that the Arabic phrase [here follows quotation of Arabic text of the words in article 2], which I regard as the nearest equivalent in Arabic to the English phrase "to enter into an association for customs or other purposes with a view to eventual confederation," shall have the exact significance of the English phrase, and shall be interpreted accordingly.

I am, &c.

NAJI-EL-ASSIL.

* For text of treaty, see Enclosure 1 in No. 25.

[E 3926/653/91]

No. 24.

Acting Consul Grafftey-Smith to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received April 17.)

(No. 27. Secret.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, March 31, 1923.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith the Jeddah report for the period of the 1st to 31st March, 1923.

Copies of this report and despatch are being sent to Cairo, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Aden, Delhi and Damascus.

I have, &c.

L. B. GRAFFTEY-SMITH, Vice-Consul.

Enclosure in No. 24.

Jeddah Report for the Period March 1 to March 31, 1923.

(Secret.)

THE period under review has been comparatively calm.

The ex-Sultan.

The ex-Sultan's sojourn in Ta'if was cut short after less than a fortnight by his own ennui. The amenities of life in Ta'if, which in Meccan eyes fringe the delights of Paradise, failed to impress the ex-Sultan. He returned on the 15th March to Mecca, and his departure from the Hedjaz is again mooted. He has telegraphed to Malta, asking that his family may be transported from Constantinople to Haifa, and that he may be sent 2,000*l.* from his own funds. In this message he makes no precise reference to his own intentions, but he declares that his health does not allow him to remain for long in the Hedjaz. In a message to his daughters, of slightly later date, he describes his health as perfect and makes no comment on their statement that the family's transport (? to the Hedjaz) has been arranged. He views with apprehension a Ramadan spent in the heat of the Holy City. Haifa appears to be his destination of predilection, though Cyprus and Switzerland are rumoured as alternatives. It is of course impossible to raise with him the question of his departure until he refers more definitely to it himself. His farewells to the Hedjaz, which will in any case be unpopular with King Hussein, will be doubly resented if the new residence selected lies in a non-Moslem country.

Turkish Refugees.

A problem already acute and likely to cause this agency very considerable embarrassment in the near future is presented by the Turkish refugees, about 100 in number, whose Anglophil or merely anti-Kemalist convictions led to their recent transport at the charge of His Majesty's Government from Constantinople to Greece, thence to Egypt and from Egypt to the Hedjaz. These persons find it impossible to earn their living in a country where the populace is pro-Kemalist from hatred of King Hussein, and the King and his Government are professedly pro-Arab and by implication anti-Turk. A large body of Turkish ex-officers, naval and military, and ex-officials, Government inspectors of bridges and schools, secret policemen, lawyers, &c., cannot hope to be absorbed into the life of the Hedjaz. They are not here by their own will; they are starving, out-at-elbows and demoralised, and they clamour to be allowed to go to Egypt, to Greece, to Bulgaria and elsewhere to seek their fortune. They are not here, on the other hand, by the will of King Hussein; his consent to their entry into the Hedjaz was never more than grudging, and he now offers to pay the passages of many of them back to Suez, whence they came, and demands that they should be granted a visa for the journey. The Egyptian Government's regulations prohibiting the entry of indigent Turks are categorical, but I confess that I have no pleasure in applying them in these cases. For it seems as unreasonable to condemn the Turkish refugees to starve in a country so peculiarly ill-fitted to refuge them, when funds are available for their passage to Egypt, as to expect King Hussein to support a number of his ex-enemies, whose departure from the Hedjaz is desired both by their unwilling host and his unwilling guests.

Pilgrimage.

The first pilgrim caravan of the season, consisting of 3,500 camels, left Mecca for Medina on the 22nd March. They took the Sulvania road to Rabegh, but their movements thence will depend upon the Ahamda tribesmen, who are reported to be in revolt against the central authority in Mecca on account of the cessation of their monthly subsidy. If their attitude is uncompromisingly hostile, the caravan will have to take the Bir Rudhwan-Bir Mashi route.

The camel hire charged in this caravan is 95 Turkish Mejidi dollars for the return journey. This was collected from the pilgrims at the rate of seven dollars to the gold pound: £13½ sterling gold and a few piastres. Of this the Government retains £6½ gold per camel, leaving the camel-men but small remuneration for the expenses of their month's work. The camel-men, naturally, take it out of the pilgrims.

Medina.

I learn that prices in Medina have risen by about 60 per cent. as a result of the tribesmen's prevention of transport from Yembo. No mails have reached Medina from Yembo (i.e., from Jeddah) for seven or eight weeks.

Shereef Shahat, the more or less rebellious Kaimakam of Medina, is now in Mecca; few expect to see him return to Medina alive. He has hitherto resisted all invitations to walk into the trap, but King Hussein is said to have summoned him to advise the ex-Sultan about the journey to Medina which His Majesty was alleged to have in contemplation. Shereef Shahat made the journey from Medina to Mecca in four days. His murder would remove from the Hedjaz stage a most picturesque character.

Slave Trade.

Individuals locally known to be slave-traders have been returning during the last months in twos and threes to Aden, en route for Abyssinia. Nothing is gained by refusing them a passport-endorsement; nor would it be possible to persuade the Hashimite Government to take action against them, even if evidence more precise than general knowledge could be obtained. Their names, ages and arrival in Aden are, however, regularly signalled to the Political Resident, Aden, for such black-list or other action as he may think fit to take.

Early in the month, the sheikh of the auctioneers boasted to a trustworthy informant that King Hussein had been pleased to grant him the right to charge a special extra brokerage of 10*s.* on each slave sold in Jeddah. I have heard of no new arrivals during the period under review.

General.

"Colonel" Chirokof, with a Russian mechanic and an Arab pupil, flew the Armstrong machine from Jeddah to Ta'if on the 23rd March. I know that he has every desire to resist orders for bombing expeditions towards Kleikh and Taraba, but it is difficult to see what non-aggressive object is served by the presence of the Armstrong in Ta'if.

Jeddah carpenters have obtained from King Hussein a promise that they alone will be allowed to hire out "shukdufs" (camel-litters) and that they may refuse to repair shukdufs which they do not control. This promise, which will mean higher prices for camel hire, does not, however, take effect until after the current season.

Members of the police force whose contracts expired from one to five years ago are not released from service unless they produce a substitute. As a result, many a poor devil has been led by the promise of long arrears of somebody else's back-pay to engage in the force and so to send a previous victim on his way rejoicing.

Press.

A summary of Nos. 666 to 673 of "Al Kibla" is annexed. The new style of "El-Hussein" and "El-A'zam" in references to the King is perhaps worth noting.

I have, &c.

L. B. GRAFFTEY-SMITH.

ANNEX.

Press: "Al Kibla."

No. 666 of March 1.

Joy in Ta'if.—Reports arrival of the ex-Sultan and his son from Mecca. The reason of the trip is said to be His Majesty's desire for a change of air.

No. 667 of March 5.

Caravan for Medina.—It is announced that the first "Rajab" caravan will be made up for Medina to start at the beginning of the month of Shaaban.

No. 668 of March 8.

The Arab Questions.—"Al Kibla" has hitherto refrained from joining in the confused and inconsistent polemics of journalism on the Arab question—(the editor must have a very short memory)—and has contented itself with publishing the Prophet's biography, but as some newspapers are talking so much about the Arab question, "Al Kibla" can no longer refrain from corrective speech. The Arab question is not a Tutankhamen-like mystery. The Arab policy is clear and unswerving. Read King Hussein's declarations: it is all there. Read what the Great Saviour said about "independence under any ruler and any capital." There is nothing strange in this. The Hedjaz was for centuries attached to Damascus and to Irak. Whatever agrees with those pronouncements—(the slogan of Arab unity and independence within the known boundaries is reproduced)—is of good report: whatever differs is subversive. God preserve us from those who seek to lead our steps astray.

No. 669 of March 12.

Decorations.—M. Neli, Jeddah agent of the "Marittima Italiana," receives the 4th Class of the Order of Al Iztiklal.

The ex-Sultan.—Left Ta'if this morning, returning to Mecca. His return is said to be due—"but God knows best," says the editor—to his having completed his survey of the geographical and climatic peculiarities of that district. What is most important is that the ex-Sultan has visited the tomb of Al Habr Al A'zam.

No. 670 of March 15.

Celebration of the "Leilat-el-Mi'raj" in Mecca.

No. 671 of March 19.

The ex-Sultan.—Arrival at Mecca from Ta'if. The Emir Ali accompanied him to Sulah, where he was handed over to the charge of Shereef Moheen-bin-Mansour for the rest of the journey.

"About King Hussein's journey to the Syrian frontiers": the paper "Al Carmel" (No. 858), under the heading "King of the Arabs," states that His Majesty "El Hussein, King of the Arabs," will visit "the Arab East" (? Trans-Jordania) shortly, and expresses the assurance that, if this is true, His Majesty—(who is redundantly belauded)—will receive a fine welcome, and that "our brothers of Northern and Southern Syria (Palestine) and Syrians in Egypt" will send deputations to salute "their glorious and great Monarch and to kiss his fingers." The journal trusts that the Executive Committee (? of the Syrian-Palestinian Congress) will verify this rumour by reference to reliable sources, so that all interested may be able to make their arrangements.

"Al Kibla" returns some of the bouquets of compliments and assures the world that King Hussein long ago decided, at the time of the armistice, to make this trip. Various transactions have delayed it, but it is a settled thing. The Emir Shakir, when returning recently to Trans-Jordania from Mecca, was instructed to travel via Akaba in order to arrange questions of administration and communications for the King's trip.

The Arab Federation.—Quotations from "Al Ahram," "Al Mokattam," "Al Watan," "Al Carmel" and "Lisan-ul-Arab," and approval of the principle of a Federation by "Al Kibla."

"What are they asking for?": report of Lord Sydenham's question in the House of Lords, pressing for publication and fulfilment of His Majesty's Government's pledge to the Arabs. "Al Kibla" thinks the Arab case is in good hands.

Telephone from Jeddah to Abu Saad: We learn that a telephone line has been laid to the Island of Abu Saad. This proves the Government's love for pilgrims, protection of pilgrims' rights, &c.

No. 672 of March 22.

Water.—Water (from the condenser) is to be sold at 1½ Turkish piastres per four-gallon tin or 26½ Turkish piastres per 60-gallon barrel, by order of a Committee of Jeddah notables. (A supplement is always charged for portage.)

Mr. Crane.—"Al Lewa-al-Masri" translates from the Turkish paper "Vakit" an interview with Mr. Crane, in which that gentleman states that King Hussein and he are old friends, that when in Jeddah he telephoned to Mecca, that he had a splendid time in the Hedjaz; coming to business, he announces that King Hussein had no political, but only humane intentions in inviting Sultan Wahid-ud-Din to the Hedjaz, to enable him "to end his days" in a Moslem country; that King Hussein had resisted the wiles of Colonel Lawrence, and had refused to sign any treaty until his 1915 promises were fulfilled; that relations were now strained between the King and His Majesty's Government, and that the King's one aim was Arab unity, with no ambitions for himself or his family. "Al Lewa" comments: "We hope Mr. Crane's good opinion of King Hussein's intentions is correct."

"Al Kibla" retorts that Mr. Crane (whose nearest common ancestor with the Arabs is Adam) came from the New World to find out the truth for himself, but that our neighbours the Egyptians, who speak the same language and are of the same creed as the Arabs, act foolishly and selfishly.

"Why all this fuss about Britain's promises to the Arabs": A (doubtless royal) correspondent who elects the *nom-de-plume* of "Ta'abata sharran" discusses the debate on Lord Sydenham's recent question. He thinks that it is farcical, when both sides know the truth, if only from their reading of the "Daily Mail," to affect ignorance of those promises. As for publication hurting the public interest, see how the Arab Government has protected the public interest for years past. The loyalty of the Arab Government to its pledged word disproves all the reports by hot-headed young British officials, and misguided old ones, who cannot appreciate facts.

Pilgrim Caravan.—The first pilgrim caravan for Medina, consisting of 3,500 camels, left Mecca to-day.

The Rukab Caravans.—Have returned safely to Mecca.

Supplement to "Al Kibla" of March 24.

Publishing a statement said to have been made by Mr. Lloyd George in the House, urging the Government to keep its pledged word to the Arabs, and Mr. Bonar Law's reply, promising his attention to the matter.

"Al Kibla" comments that this is published to justify Great Britain and the Arabs, and to clear them from the accusations made against them.

No. 673 of March 26.

Anniversary of the Arab Revolt.—Official programme of celebrations for the ninth Shaaban.

Decorations.—These include a youth who has qualified as an aeroplane engineer. "Al Kibla" greets, in the name of the country, this the first Hashimite flying-man.

"It is a duty to return to the right": the Shereefs and their Wakf allowances. Quotation from a Turkish paper favouring these payments, followed by a reproduction of the article which appeared in No. 650 of "Al Kibla."

Pilgrim Caravans.—A second caravan of Gulf pilgrims for Medina will leave very shortly.

APPENDIX.

Shipping Intelligence to March 28, 1923.

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Pilgrims Dis-embarked.	Cargo Discharged.
				1923	1923		Packages.
Kangean	Dutch	..	Amsterdam	..	Mar. 1
Jason	British	..	Port Soudan	..	" 1
Massaua	Italian	Massaua	Suez	Mar. 1	" 1	..	1,072
Naderi	British	Calcutta	Aden	" 2	" 9	..	43,507
Lombok	Dutch	Batavia	Amsterdam	" 3	" 4	837	2
Mansourah	British	Suakin	Suez	" 3	" 4	..	904
Asmara	Italian	Suez	Massaua	" 3	" 3	..	102
Tangistan	British	Singapore	Port Soudan	" 3	" 3	102	..
Borulos	"	Suez	Aden	" 5	" 6	..	88
Haresfield	"	" 6
Telemachus	"	Singapore	London	" 8	" 8	663	..
Englestan	"	Batavia	Port Soudan	" 8	" 9	455	..
Ajax	"	..	Amsterdam	" 9	" 9	190	..
Keneh	"	Aden	Suez	" 11	" 12	..	3,083
Radja	Dutch	Batavia	Amsterdam	" 11	" 11	542	..
Delhi	"	..	Rotterdam	" 11	" 11	763	..
Troilus	British	Singapore	London	" 14	" 14	458	300 tons timber.
Mansourah	"	Suez	Port Soudan	" 15	" 15	..	1,898
Massaua	Italian	Massaua	Suez	" 15	" 15	..	378
Krakatau	Dutch	Batavia	Amsterdam	" 16	" 16	1,088	..
Asmara	Italian	Suez	Massaua	" 17	" 17	..	441
Laertes	Dutch	Batavia	New York	" 18	" 18	877	..
Enggano	"	Cardiff	Batavia	" 18	" 24	..	1,000 tons coal.
Sitcebono	"	Batavia	Rotterdam	" 20	" 21	1,311	..
Accra	British	Busra	Bombay	" 20	" 26	64	37,716
Mansourah	"	Port Soudan	Suez	" 21	" 22	103	2,350
Laomedon	"	Singapore	Port Said	" 22	" 22	205	..
Arabestan	"	Batavia	Port Soudan	" 22	" 22	771	..
Peleus	"	Singapore	Port Said	" 24	" 24	627	100 tons
Keneh	"	Suez	Aden	" 25	" 26	..	17
Antener	Dutch	Batavia	Port Said	" 27	" 27	861	..

[E 3897/46/91]

No. 25.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Acting Consul Grafftey Smith (Jeddah).

(No. 50.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 19, 1923.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 11 of to-day's date, I transmit to you the accompanying copy of the draft treaty of peace between His Majesty's Government and King Hussein, as initialled by me and Dr. Naji-el-Assil, who left London for Mecca on the 17th April taking with him the initialled texts. He hopes to be able to obtain King Hussein's authority to return to London for the formal signature of the treaty at an early date. Dr. Naji is confident that if King Hussein authorises him to sign the treaty, he will ratify the treaty so signed.

2. The text of the treaty differs, as you will see, in some respects from that signed by Colonel Laurence and the Emir Abdullah in December 1921, notably as regards the insertion of an important new article 2 (which partly reproduces article 17 of the unratified Laurence-Abdullah treaty) and also as regards articles 3, 4 and 5, which provide for the question of the disputed land frontiers of the Hedjaz. The bulk of the articles, however, are identical with those of the latter treaty.

3. As it has been essential, owing to King Hussein's ignorance of English and his general attitude, to omit the clause usually inserted in such treaties, wherein the English is declared to be the authoritative text, it has been necessary to exchange notes with Dr. Naji, copies of which are enclosed, strictly defining the Arab translation of an important passage in article 2 of the treaty. It was also agreed that the Arabic text should be initialled subject to final scrutiny by an impartial English expert in Arabic, and copies of a note addressed to Dr. Naji in this sense and of his acknowledgment are transmitted herewith. If this expert advises an amended version of the

Arabic text as the result of the scrutiny, it will be telegraphed to you to communicate direct to Dr. Naji.

4. Dr. Naji intends to use his best endeavours to persuade King Hussein to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, which will automatically make the Hedjaz a member of the League of Nations.

5. You will of course keep me informed by telegram as far as possible of King Hussein's reception of the treaty.

6. Dr. Naji raised the question of King Hussein being invited to visit Great Britain if he accepted the treaty. In spite of the failure of this inducement during the negotiations in 1921, he believes that it may materially help on this occasion. I am considering the advisability of such an invitation and the conditions upon which it should be extended, and Dr. Naji was informed before his departure that I would telegraph my decision to you for communication to him.

7. As you will also remember, it was tacitly understood between both parties in the previous negotiations in 1921 that, on their successful conclusion, a subsidy would be paid to King Hussein of 5,000*l.* a month. His Majesty's Government have now decided that the policy of paying annual subsidies to certain rulers in the Arabian peninsula shall be discontinued. Ibn Saud is therefore to be paid a final sum of 50,000*l.* and the ruler of Asir 20,000*l.** It is intended likewise to pay King Hussein 50,000*l.* as an inclusive and final instalment if and when the treaty is concluded. It is feared that King Hussein may be under the impression that, largely as a set-off to the continued payments to Ibn Saud during the period while King Hussein was receiving nothing, he is to receive not only some payment representing what he considers to be the arrears of those past subsidies which, in his opinion, he ought to have received, but also a continuing subsidy for the future. Dr. Naji-el-Assil, however, has been informed of the decision of His Majesty's Government, and will be left to explain matters to the King in his own way. He believes it possible that King Hussein may be better prepared to accept a disappointment in this matter when he learns that Ibn Saud's subsidy is also to be discontinued, and if the humiliating aspect of his remaining in some sense a stipendiary of His Majesty's Government, although an independent monarch, is emphasised to him.

8. Copies of this despatch are being sent to His Majesty's representatives at Cairo and Constantinople.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 25.

English Text of the Anglo-Hashimite Treaty, initialled by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and by Dr. Naji-el-Assil, April 16, 1923.

In the Name of God the Merciful, the Compassionate.

HIS Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Hashimite Majesty King Hussein, Leader of the Arab Revolt, Founder of the Arab Hashimite State and its King, Warden of the Inviolable Precinct of the Sanctuary of God, and of the City of His Ancestor, Lord of the Divine Messengers, on behalf of themselves, theirs heirs and successors, being inspired with the sincere desire of confirming and strengthening the good faith and friendly relations established between their respective countries during the war together waged against the Germanic Powers and Turkey, and with the further desire of consolidating their respective interests and ensuring permanent peace and harmony among the Arab peoples,

Have determined to conclude a treaty for these purposes, and have named and appointed as their plenipotentiaries:—

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India: The Right Honourable Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, K.G., His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; and

His Hashimite Majesty King Hussein, Leader of the Arab Revolt, Founder of the Arab Hashimite State and its King, Warden of the Inviolable Precinct of the Sanctuary of God, and of the City of His Ancestor, Lord of the Divine Messengers: Dr. El Seyyid Naji-el-Assil,

* Not 30,000*l.*, as previously printed.

Who, after having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:—

ARTICLE 1.

There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between His Britannic Majesty and His Hashimite Majesty King Hussein, their heirs and successors. Each of the high contracting parties agrees and promises to use all the means which his laws provide to prevent his territory being used as a base for activities directed against the present or future interests of the other.

ARTICLE 2.

His Britannic Majesty hereby undertakes to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs in Irak and Trans-Jordan and in the Arab States of the Arabian Peninsula (exclusive of Aden). As regards Palestine, His Britannic Majesty has already undertaken that nothing will be done in that country which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the Arab community. In the event of the Governments of any or all of these territories expressing a desire to enter into an association for customs or other purposes with a view to eventual confederation, His Britannic Majesty will, if requested to do so by the parties concerned, readily use his good offices to further their desire.

His Hashimite Majesty hereby recognises the special position of His Britannic Majesty in Irak, Trans-Jordan and Palestine, and undertakes that in such matters as come within the influence of His Hashimite Majesty concerning these countries, he will do his best to co-operate with His Britannic Majesty in the fulfilment of his obligations.

ARTICLE 3.

His Hashimite Majesty undertakes to maintain the friendly relations which existed between himself and the ruler of Asir and between himself and the ruler of Nejd before the Arab revolt; to observe the pacts formerly existing between himself and those two rulers, provided that there is nothing in those pacts which is contrary to the spirit of the treaties existing between His Britannic Majesty and those rulers, and to do all in his power to forbid in his own territories and in all parts over which he has authority anything harmful to the material or moral interests of those States or their rulers.

ARTICLE 4.

His Hashimite Majesty undertakes to use his best endeavours to settle by friendly negotiation any disputes relating to the frontiers between his territories and those over which the two rulers referred to in article 3 have authority.

His Britannic Majesty, for his part, undertakes that he will use his good offices when it is desired in promoting and assisting the settlement of any such dispute, more especially in any case where a change has taken place since the date of the Arab revolt.

ARTICLE 5.

His Britannic Majesty undertakes to restrain by all peaceful and practical means in his power any aggression upon the territories of His Hashimite Majesty, within such frontiers as may ultimately be determined under article 4 of this treaty or otherwise, by neighbouring States which are in treaty relations with His Britannic Majesty.

ARTICLE 6.

Each high contracting party agrees and promises to receive and recognise the agent of the other. His Hashimite Majesty may appoint an agent in London. His Britannic Majesty may appoint an agent to reside at Jeddah or other seaport town of His Hashimite Majesty. Out of respect for the special character of Mecca and Medina, His Britannic Majesty will not appoint an agent there.

His Hashimite Majesty shall also be entitled, if he so desires, to appoint consular agents in England and India, and His Britannic Majesty shall be entitled to appoint a consular agent at Jeddah and such additional seaports of His Hashimite Majesty as His Britannic Majesty may from time to time deem expedient.

These agents and consular agents shall respectively enjoy the usual diplomatic and consular privileges.

ARTICLE 7.

His Hashimite Majesty hereby recognises the provisional quarantine arrangements set up by His Britannic Majesty in Kamaran to fulfil the medical provisions of the International Sanitary Convention of 1912, or of any other sanitary convention which is binding upon his Britannic Majesty.

On his part, His Britannic Majesty agrees to recognise such complementary measures as, in conformity with the medical provisions of the said convention or conventions, are to be taken at Jeddah and other ports of the territories of His Hashimite Majesty, in accordance with regulations to be published by His Hashimite Majesty.

ARTICLE 8.

Subject to the provisions of article 10, His Britannic Majesty undertakes not to interfere in any way with the measures adopted by His Hashimite Majesty within the territories of His Hashimite Majesty for the care and comfort of pilgrims.

On his part, His Hashimite Majesty undertakes to assist any efforts made by Moslem British subjects, or persons or institutions enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty, to contribute towards the welfare, health and food supply of pilgrims in the Hedjaz, as His Hashimite Majesty is doing in the case of Ain Zobeida.

ARTICLE 9.

The high contracting parties agree to fix a definite sum per pilgrim by way of dues, and to publish the amount thereof by the first day of the First-Jamada in each year, for sanitary services respectively performed by them. These dues shall cover the cost of the total sanitary services up to the time of the landing of the pilgrims, and shall be included in the price of the tickets issued by the various shipping companies.

His Hashimite Majesty shall retain dues charged for measures at his ports, and His Britannic Majesty shall similarly retain dues charged for measures at Kamaran.

ARTICLE 10.

His Britannic Majesty agrees to recognise the Hashimite status of all subjects of His Hashimite Majesty who may at any time be within the territories of His Britannic Majesty, or within British-protected territory or territory under a British mandate, provided such Hashimite subjects are possessed of papers issued by His Hashimite Majesty showing the Hashimite status of the bearer.

On his part, His Hashimite Majesty agrees to recognise the British status of all British subjects or persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty, who may be at any time within the territories of His Hashimite Majesty, provided such British subjects or British-protected persons are registered at a British consulate in the Hashimite territories. Further, in order to obviate complications, such persons must have in their own possession documentary proof of their nationality, as is laid down in the case of Hashimite subjects above.

The provisions of this article are, however, not to apply to British subjects or persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty who are habitually resident in the territories of His Hashimite Majesty outside Jeddah and other seaports at which His Britannic Majesty may appoint consular agents.

ARTICLE 11.

His Hashimite Majesty agrees that the property of British subjects or persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty, who may die in the territories of His Hashimite Majesty, shall be handed over to the British representative in the said territories, or to such authority as he may appoint for the purpose, to be disposed of in accordance with the law applicable to the case. The British representative in the said territories will see that any dues or taxes which are payable on such property under Hashimite laws are duly paid.

ARTICLE 12.

His Hashimite Majesty agrees that in all cases which arise in Hashimite territories and in which a British subject or person enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty is plaintiff or defendant, a British consular representative shall attend the

Hashimite courts during the hearing of the case, and where the British agent wishes to make diplomatic representations on grounds of equity to His Hashimite Majesty concerning any such case, judgment shall be adjourned and shall not be executed while such representations are being made, and in no case shall the execution of judgment proceed except after permission of His Hashimite Majesty.

The provisions of this article are, however, not to apply in the case of British subjects or persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty, who are habitually resident in Hashimite territories outside Jeddah and other seaports at which His Britannic Majesty may appoint consular agents.

ARTICLE 13.

His Hashimite Majesty agrees that he will cause to be delivered over to the British consular authority British subjects or persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty who have been arrested by the Hashimite authorities, if the British consular authority gives security for their appearance when required by the Hashimite authorities.

The provisions of this article are, however, not to apply in the case of British subjects or persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty, who are habitually resident in Hashimite territories outside Jeddah and other seaports at which His Britannic Majesty may appoint consular agents.

ARTICLE 14.

His Hashimite Majesty agrees that cases between British subjects or persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty in which the interests of Hashimite subjects are not involved shall be tried by the British consular authority.

The provisions of this article shall not apply when both parties to the case desire that it should be tried by the Hashimite court, as provided in article 12, nor in the case of British subjects or persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty, who are habitually resident in Hashimite territories outside Jeddah and other seaports at which His Britannic Majesty may appoint consular agents.

ARTICLE 15.

His Britannic Majesty agrees to surrender within the territories of His Hashimite Majesty all privileges and immunities, otherwise than as provided for in this treaty, hitherto enjoyed by British subjects and persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty, in virtue of the Capitulations between Great Britain and Turkey.

ARTICLE 16.

His Hashimite Majesty agrees to notify the British agent in all cases where he requires the deportation from the territories of His Hashimite Majesty of a British subject or person enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty; and the British agent shall be responsible for the deportation of the person indicated within a reasonable time.

ARTICLE 17.

His Britannic Majesty hereby confirms his recognition of the flag of His Hashimite Majesty, provided that when such flag is flown by vessels other than public ships of His Hashimite Majesty the vessel flying it shall be registered at Jeddah or Yembo, or at one or other clearly-specified seaport lying within the territories of His Hashimite Majesty, and shall be possessed of papers issued by His Hashimite Majesty in general conformity with the certificates and documents customarily issued to their vessels by the principal maritime States.

On his part, His Hashimite Majesty hereby confirms his recognition of the flags flown by merchant ships belonging to any parts of his Britannic Majesty's dominions or to British-protected territory, or to territories under a British mandate, provided that vessels flying such flags shall be possessed of the certificates and documents customarily issued to their vessels by the principal maritime States.

ARTICLE 18.

Each of the high contracting parties hereby declares that he will not, during the continuance of this treaty, enter into any treaty, agreement or understanding with a third party, directed against the interests of the other high contracting party.

ARTICLE 19.

No clause contained in this treaty shall override any obligations which may have been incurred, or may in the future be incurred, by either of the high contracting parties under the Covenant of the League of Nations, or under any convention which may be adopted by the League of Nations and entered into by either of the two parties.

ARTICLE 20.

The present treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at London as soon as possible. It shall come into force immediately upon ratification, and shall be binding during seven years from the date of its coming into force. In case neither of the high contracting parties shall have given notice to the other six months before the expiration of the said period of seven years of his intention to terminate the treaty it shall remain in force until the expiration of six months from the day on which either of the high contracting parties shall have given such notice.

The present treaty has been drawn up in English and Arabic. One copy of each text will remain deposited in the archives of the Government of His Hashimite Majesty, and one copy of each text in those of the Government of His Britannic Majesty.

In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty and have affixed their seals thereto.

Done in duplicate at London, the _____, corresponding to the _____, of the Mahommedan era.

Enclosure 2 in No. 25.

Sir W. Tyrrell to Dr. Naji-el-Assil.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April 16, 1923.*
IN transmitting to you herewith the English and Arabic texts of the treaty between His Britannic Majesty and His Hashimite Majesty,* initialled by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I am directed by the Secretary of State to inform you that, in order to meet your desire to return at once to Mecca to submit the result of the negotiations to His Majesty King Hussein, he has initialled the Arabic text on the understanding that it shall be subject to a final scrutiny by an impartial English expert in Arabic. Should this expert advise the Secretary of State that in any important respect the English text has not been sufficiently closely translated, an amended version will be submitted for your consideration by telegraph through the acting British agent at Jeddah.

I am, &c.
W. TYRRELL.

Enclosure 3 in No. 25.

Dr. Naji-el-Assil to Foreign Office.

Sir, *Hyde Park Hotel, London, April 16, 1923.*
I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 16th April regarding a final scrutiny of the Arabic text of the treaty between His Hashimite Majesty and His Britannic Majesty, the contents of which I have carefully noted.
I am, &c.
NAJI-EL-ASSIL.

* See Enclosure 1.

[E 4025/4025/91]

No. 26.

Memorandum on the Arab Bureau, its Purposes and Services.

THE Arab Bureau was an outcome of the critical situation which arose for Great Britain when, by the entry of Turkey into the war, it became possible for Germany, by means of Turkey, to threaten the vital British line of communication which passes through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea.

The danger was much greater and much more insidious than ever became generally known in England. It was not confined to the certainty of having to meet military operations directed against the Canal and Egypt. There was the further and lesser-known project to be countered—a project in the execution of which the Germans and Turks went far—of establishing German submarine bases and wireless stations in Turkish territory flanking the whole length of the Red Sea. But perhaps the chief danger lay in the influence which Turkish hostilities with Great Britain might have upon the Moslem population of British India, Egypt and the Soudan. It is well known that the Germans attached enormous importance to the possibilities opened for them against Great Britain by the German alliance with Turkey and the influence upon Islam which they hoped the Turkish Caliph could exert.

In combating these strategical and Islamic influences exerted by the German-Turkish alliance, Great Britain sought to secure the Islamic and the military assistance of the Shereef of Mecca and the Arabs of the eastern coast line of the Red Sea. Great Britain succeeded in obtaining the assistance of the Shereef and the Arabs as allies—assistance loyally rendered to the end, and far more decisive in character than is recognised except by a few with inner knowledge. The delicate and peculiar needs attending the execution of British policy towards the Arabs during this period led to the formation of the Arab Bureau.

German-Turkish efforts directed against the British line of communication through the Canal failed; so also did German-Turkish efforts to secure even the partial support of Islam outside of Turkey. To the British Arabian policy of the period is due much of British success; and to the part played by the Arab Bureau in assisting to execute this policy must be attributed a due measure of credit. In fact, the monetary cost of the bureau from first to last is an absurdly disproportionate sum compared with the outlay which would have been incurred by Great Britain had the Arabs thrown in their lot with the Turks.

The brief history of the bureau and its purposes is as follows:—

During 1915 and at the beginning of 1916 British policy in Arabia was directed by His Majesty's Government through the Foreign Office rather than through the India Office; and the High Commissioner in Egypt was the local authority under the Foreign Office. Three military commanders, namely, the General Officers Commanding in Egypt, Mesopotamia and Aden, were involved, as well as the Naval Commander-in-chief in the East Indies and Egyptian waters and the Governor-General of the Soudan.

Amid so many authorities, all directly interested in events in Arabia, it became necessary to find a central organisation for the exchange of information and advice. This focal agency was at first provided by the Cairo Intelligence Office, directed by Lieutenant-Colonel Clayton, who was the channel of communication between the High Commissioner and both the Sirdar and the General Officer Commanding, Egypt.

Early in 1916 His Majesty's Government decided to strengthen this system of co-ordination by the establishment of the Arab Bureau. The original constitution of the bureau was drawn up by an inter-Departmental conference held in London on the 17th January, 1916, by order of the Prime Minister. The Foreign Office, War Office and India Office were represented at this conference.

The first function of the bureau was decided to be the harmonising of British political activity in the Near East, and to keep the Foreign Office, the India Office, the Committee of Imperial Defence, War Office, the Admiralty and the Government of India simultaneously informed of the general tendency of German-Turkish policy.

The second function was to co-ordinate propaganda in favour of Great Britain and the *Entente* among non-Indian Moslems without clashing with the susceptibilities of Indian Moslems and the *Entente* Powers.

The bureau was formally constituted as a Foreign Office institution on the 17th February, 1916, and was closed towards the end of 1920.

It was staffed by men with special knowledge of the Near East. Among those who served on it, with Brigadier-General Clayton as director, were Lieutenant-Commander D. G. Hogarth, Colonel T. E. Lawrence, Colonel H. F. Jacob, Major K. Cornwallis and others well known for their Arabian and Eastern qualifications.

Subsequently a branch of the bureau was established at Jerusalem, and another branch, under the India Office, at Bagdad.

It should be mentioned that one of the lesser activities of the Arab Bureau was the issue, weekly or bi-monthly, of a remarkable intelligence journal, the "Arab Bulletin." This journal was so strictly secret in its matter that only some thirty copies of each issue were struck off, and officers and officials to whom the journal was circulated were forbidden to allow anyone but themselves to see their copy. Nor might the journal be quoted from, even in secret communications.

Such, in brief, were the nature and duties of the bureau. For the purposes it was intended to serve, for the duties it carried out, the name by which the organisation was known was—perhaps intentionally—inadequate and misleading. The bureau, in fact, was no mere collecting and distributing agency for general intelligence matter. It advised with authority upon the highest and most delicate questions affecting British policy in the Arab countries; it gathered, collated and sent out political and military intelligence of the greatest moment, and members of its staff were from time to time sent on missions to Arab rulers and conducted negotiations.

W. J. CHILDS.

Foreign Office, April 19, 1923.

[E 4032/4032/89]

No. 27.

Mr. Phipps to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received April 21.)

[By Bag.]

(No. 418.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, April 20, 1923.

APPOINTMENT of General Weygand to succeed General Gouraud in Syria is greeted with satisfaction, although some regret is expressed that so eminent a soldier is leaving the West. There is a tendency to attribute the appointment to a fear of Turkish threats on the Syrian frontier. One newspaper speaks of concentration of Turkish troops in that quarter, and there is a general idea that his appointment is due to nervousness as to Turkish designs and to uncertain state of affairs in the Near East generally.

[E 4330/46/91]

No. 28.

Acting Consul Grafftey-Smith to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received April 30.)

(No. 33.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, April 10, 1923.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 165 of the 29th December last, covering copies of correspondence regarding the proposed treaty between His Majesty's Government and King Hussein, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that when Major Marshall, before leaving the Hedjaz, addressed to King Hussein a statement of the amendments which His Majesty's Government desire to see introduced into the version of this treaty which has been signed by King Hussein and presented to your Lordship by Dr. Naji-el-Assil, this communication provoked correspondence from King Hussein of a tone so embittered and so hostile to those of the proposed alterations which concern the Sultan of Nejd and the special position of His Britannic Majesty in Palestine and in Mesopotamia, that I have thought it expedient to refrain from attempting to continue negotiations, a favourable issue to which appears to be, in present circumstances, impossible of attainment.

I gather that Dr. Naji-el-Assil is inclined to take some credit to himself for the treaty which he considers himself to have negotiated in Mecca, but I do not doubt that King Hussein's signature to a treaty differing from that signed at Amman in respect of those material particulars which render the document communicated by Dr. Naji-el-Assil objectionable to His Majesty's Government could, without difficulty,

[10594]

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have been obtained at any stage of the 1921-1922 negotiations. It is because the efforts then directed towards securing King Hussein's ratifications of the Amman Treaty failed to gain acceptance for the articles relative to the Sultan of Nejd and to the position of the mandatory in Mesopotamia and Palestine, that they were, if only temporarily, abandoned. Any expectation that King Hussein would prove amenable, when confronted with a revival of the old objections in the form of amendments to a version expressly devised to exclude them, must, by neglecting to allow for the spirit of intransigence which has not ceased to inform His Majesty's attitude towards these questions, fail of realisation.

I am not aware what importance His Majesty's Government attach to the conclusion of a treaty with King Hussein. It is, perhaps, doubtful whether a black-and-white definition of mutual obligations may not tend to check rather than to foster that impulse towards friendship with Great Britain which now comes at times with the vague yet real strength of a tradition to inspire the Shereef's relations with His Majesty's Government. The loose bond of "mutual confidence" to which King Hussein so often in his letters refers, however lightly it weighs upon him, may link him more closely to us than a treaty which, by defining his obligations, restricts them and which, since King Hussein is a signatory, has hardly the value of the paper on which it is written. For King Hussein is indifferent to European opinion; to Moslem opinion he is abnormally sensitive. Were he to find, after signing away his boasted freedom from European attachments, that he could enlist the sympathies of any large section of Moslem opinion by flouting a treaty with His Majesty's Government, I believe that no thought of the loss or gain of a monthly subsidy of 5,000*l.* would have power to deter him. Such a sum, which offends King Hussein by not exceeding many fold that paid to Ibn Saud, is but a fraction of the monthly receipts of Jeddah customs and is quite inadequate as an instrument of restraint.

If, however, the conclusion of a treaty with King Hussein is considered urgently necessary for the maintenance of friendly relations between the various Arab leaders and for ensuring that the signature of a treaty of peace with Turkey shall not find His Majesty's Government unprovided with treaty-authority to intervene on behalf of British subjects in Jeddah, though not elsewhere in the Hedjaz, I venture to submit that the document communicated by Dr. Naji-el-Assil represents the limit of what experience suggests King Hussein as being likely to sign. On the subject of the deletion of the word "Egypt" in article 4 and the prevalence of the English text in case of doubt, King Hussein has not expressed himself; these are, however, matters as to which no serious difficulty need eventually be anticipated.

Of the other amendments to his version, the proposed omission in article 2 of the phrase: "and in particular by the suspension of all manner of subsidy," and the proposed omission from article 3 of the phrase: "as they existed under the suzerainty of Turkey," have, more than anything else, alarmed the King. The former phrase occurred in the document signed by Emir Abdullah and Colonel Lawrence at Amman, and it is not easy to explain to King Hussein why it should now be omitted, when copied from that document into his own version. The latter phrase may be intentionally insidious, but is it impossible as a basis for arbitration? In view of Ibn Saud's contention that there existed in Turkish times no frontier between the Hedjaz, Nejd and Asir other than the shifting tide line of individual authority, it might be presumed that the Sultan of Nejd has little to fear from a reference to Ottoman precedent. King Hussein's "offer" to Ibn Saud has always been that things should be between them as they were in the times of their respective grandfathers, not necessarily as they were on the date of the outbreak of the war.

As regards the recognition by King Hussein of the special position of the mandatory in Palestine and in Mesopotamia, while I am convinced that no consideration will avail to induce His Majesty to admit such recognition in so many words in a public document, it is not impossible that he considers himself already to have made this concession in article 17 of his draft treaty.

I am not aware what, if any, progress has been made in negotiations with Dr. Naji-el-Assil, whose potentially large financial interests in the Hedjaz make him an unusually eloquent advocate, and with whose proximate return to this country local rumour is now busy. I doubt, however, whether his most persuasive arguments will avail to win from King Hussein assent to points on which the King's sons and others have hitherto found steady opposition.

It is only on the assumption that His Majesty's Government consider the conclusion of a treaty with King Hussein to be a matter of vital importance and urgency, and in the strong belief that some of the proposed amendments have no chance of acceptance

by King Hussein, that I have ventured to suggest their reconsideration. If, however, time is not a factor of importance, such a concession appears to be neither necessary nor desirable. Your Lordship may, indeed, consider that the present unsatisfactory relations between the King and His Majesty's Government will not necessarily be bettered by the conclusion of a treaty during the life-time of the present ruler of the Hedjaz, and that 60,000*l.* per annum is, in the circumstances, a heavy price to pay for the signature of King Hussein.

I have, &c.
L. B. GRAFFTEY-SMITH.

No. 29.

Acting Consul, Jeddah, to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 23.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, May 1, 1923.

DR. NAJI-EL-ASSIL discussed treaty with King this afternoon, and he reports an excellent reception. King's alterations in my immediately following telegram probably as much due to his wish to assert himself as to any serious dissatisfaction with present text. Dr. Naji-el-Assil deprecated any changes in text, but he fears that opposition on immaterial points may render Hussein suspicious and more hostile to whole document. Dr. Naji-el-Assil considers alterations harmless.

He thinks he has managed effectively to discredit Sheikh Muzaffer Hussein and to counter opposition from that [? omitted: quarter].

Regarding Palestine, King suggested following procedure: that he should send a representative to Jerusalem to discuss matters with High Commissioner, and that Sir H. Samuel should then declare to leaders of Arab movement that His Majesty's Government have fulfilled all their promises to Arabs so that Palestine Arabs should work with Government of Palestine to achieve their ideals. King's representative would make a similar declaration and would add that King Hussein will give no support to recalcitrants.

Please telegraph for the information of Dr. Naji-el-Assil whether suggested alterations are acceptable. Also whether proposal respecting Palestine commends itself and whether representative of King Hussein would be assured of a friendly reception by High Commissioner. Please reply as soon as possible. The sooner Dr. Naji-el-Assil can get away the better.

No. 30.

Acting Consul, Jeddah, to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 24.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jeddah, May 1, 1923.

FOLLOWING are alterations in text referred to in Jeddah telegram No. 23:—

1. Article 2: After "territories" insert "Palestine included."
2. Article 3: Substitute Al Idrisi and Ibn Saud for titular reference. "Ruler of Asir" before war Turkish mutessarif.
3. Article 4: After "change" insert "of frontiers and authority."

No. 31.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Acting Consul Grafftey-Smith (Jeddah).

(No. 13.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, May 1, 1923.

MY telegram No. 11 of 19th April: Hedjaz Treaty.

You should inform Dr. Naji-el-Assil on arrival that, after final scrutiny, only substantial change in the Arabic text desired by His Majesty's Government is the translation of the words "in the event of any or all . . . eventual confederation" in article 2. Amended Arabic version of this phrase was sent to you by bag in my despatch No. 50A of 19th April.

There are a few slight corrections in grammar and spelling of Arabic text, which are explained in a further despatch, now on its way to you. These corrections do not affect the meaning of text, though they should be embodied in it before final signature by King Hussein.

You should therefore act on my despatch No. 50A as soon as you receive it. Dr. Naji will doubtless wish to stay at Jeddah until it reaches you.

[E 4412/408/89]

No. 32.

Consul Palmer to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 71.)

My Lord,

Damascus, April 16, 1923.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 55 of the 14th March, I now have the honour to report that Sultan Atrash made his submission to the French on the 5th April.

2. When returning from Bagdad I met, at Palmyra, Commandant Arnaud, the French representative at Deraa, with whom Commandant Arlebosse and I had discussed the preliminaries as to the combined action of Colonel Peake's forces and the French troops. Commandant Arnaud was extremely gratified at the result; he considered this submission could only have the most beneficial results for general tranquillity, added that it was an immediate result of the recent *entente*, and that he had now ventured to take a few days' "local leave" to visit Palmyra.

3. He pointed out, however, that the French had expected another meeting with Colonel Peake's forces on the 10th April, but that the latter had not appeared.

I promised to refer to this in my next despatch, but pointed out that there must have been some misunderstanding, as Colonel Peake was enthusiastic for such combined "sweeps" at regular intervals.

I suggested that Commandant Arnaud should always keep in direct touch with Colonel Peake by means of the Deraa-Amman railway telephone.

4. Under the above circumstances, I need scarcely add that my reception by the French camel corps at Palmyra was of the most genuinely cordial type.

I have, &c.

C. E. S. PALMER.

[E 4516/987/65]

No. 33.

Note referring to the Draft Memorandum containing Definite Assurances in connection with the British Mandate for Irak communicated by Sir Eyre Crowe in his Letter of the 14th December last.—(Communicated by Italian Ambassador; Received May 4.)

(Translation.)

THE Italian Government have closely examined this draft and have made the following observations and emendations with regard thereto:—

Article 2 of the British draft, which relates to the possibility of concessions of public works to Italian enterprises and to the promise of a special agreement to regulate and protect any Italian work in Irak, is satisfactory and in conformity with article 2 of the Anglo-Italian Agreement respecting Palestine.

The article relating to the judicial protection of Italians in Irak differs from the analogous article 3 for Palestine, inasmuch as the latter lays down that there shall always be a majority of British judges on the tribunals which are called upon to try an Italian subject, whereas the article proposed for Irak confines itself, when the judicial bench is composed of more than one judge to the stipulation that the single president must be British. With regard to this point, the Italian Government must insist on obtaining a provision analogous to that contained in the agreement for Palestine, the more so because, in the event of Italy agreeing to the formula suggested by the British Government, the French Government might claim to introduce a similar provision in the agreement which is to be negotiated in respect of Syria. It is trusted, therefore, that the British Government will accede to this request and modify the article so as to provide that Italian subjects in Irak shall always be tried by tribunals composed of a majority of British judges as has already been fixed in regard to Palestine.

Article 4 reproduces in entirety articles 4 and 5 of the Palestine Agreement. It is true that in the agreement for Irak nothing is mentioned in respect of the reciprocity of economic treatment contained in article 6 of the agreement for Palestine, but that may be explained by the fact that this article refers only to maritime transport, and accordingly cannot be applied to Irak.

Finally, article 5, respecting the exemption from customs duties for Italian religious and benevolent institutions in Irak, lacks precision, whereas the corresponding article 7 of the agreement for Palestine is very clear. This article, indeed, plainly grants customs exemptions to the aforesaid institutions, whilst the draft for Irak confines itself merely to placing on a parity, as regards privileges, Italian and foreign institutions of a similar character existing in Irak.

In this case also it is hoped that the British Government will comply with the desire of the Italian Government to obtain privileges in Irak similar to those agreed to as regards Palestine.

Italian Embassy, London, May 2, 1923.

[E 4518/1165/65]

No. 34.

The Duke of Devonshire to Sir H. Samuel (Jerusalem).—(Communicated to Foreign Office, May 4.)*

(No. 142. Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.)

Downing Street, May 2, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 128 of 14th April: Sultan Atrash.

Please convey to His Highness the Emir Abdullah expression of satisfaction of His Majesty's Government at successful issue of trans-Jordan Syria co-operation which they regard as happy augury for the future. You are authorised to communicate the following assurance to the Emir Abdullah, and to consult with him as to the best means of making it public:—

"Subject to the approval of the Council of the League of Nations His Britannic Majesty's Government will recognise the existence of an independent Government in trans-Jordan under the rule of His Highness the Emir Abdullah-bin-Hussein, provided that such Government is constitutional and places His Britannic Majesty's Government in a position to fulfil their international obligations in respect of that territory by means of an agreement to be concluded between the two Governments."

No. 35.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Acting Consul Grafftey-Smith (Jeddah).

(No. 15.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 8, 1923.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 23 and 24 of 1st May: Anglo-Hashimite Treaty.

King Hussein's amendments to articles 3 and 4 are accepted.

As regards article 2, His Majesty's Government see no grounds for singling out one of the several territories referred to in first sentence of the article for special mention in third sentence, as the meaning of the article is already clear.

If the King is obdurate, however, there is no objection to the adoption for third sentence of article 2 of wording given in my immediately following telegram, though it would be preferable not to have to do so.

The foregoing should be communicated to Naji.

Regarding proposal of King to send a representative to Jerusalem, Sir H. Samuel has been asked for his views, which have not yet been received. You should therefore await a further telegram from me on the subject.

* Also to Bagdad (No. 216).

No. 36.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Acting Consul Grafftey-Smith (Jeddah).

(No. 16.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, May 8, 1923.

FOLLOWING is wording referred to in third paragraph of my telegram No. 15 of 8th May: Anglo-Hashimite Treaty:—

"In the event of the Government of any or all of the above territories, namely, Irak, Palestine, Transjordan and the Arab States of the Arabian peninsula, "expressing a desire," &c.

[N 4385/312/97]

No. 37.

Memorandum by Sir P. Loraine.—(Received May 15.)

(Secret.)

I HAVE read with great interest the memorandum of the 26th January, 1923, on the co-operation of Moslem countries and Russia.

This paper refers to two projects, viz.:—

The formation of a Confederation of Moslem States—

(a.) On the initiative and under the ægis of Russia.

(b.) On the initiative of the Angora Government, under the ægis of the Ottoman Caliph, and to the exclusion of Russia.

I do not think there is any prospect in present circumstances of Persia joining combination (a), and I regard her adhesion to combination (b) as unlikely.

As regards (a), few things would be more repugnant to the ruling and intelligent classes in Persia than a political association with Communist Russia, or indeed, with any other Russia that the Persians can visualise. They would regard such an association as a prelude to political absorption, a prospect which terrifies them from any quarter whatsoever, and most especially from Russia. Turkish disinclination to enter the combination would even remove Persian fears of the consequences of a blank refusal.

Combination (b) might appeal to the Persians on paper, and would be consonant with the constant pratings about the need for Islamic unity to resist the "colonising" policy of the Western Powers, and of Great Britain in particular. It would not, however, suit Persian policy or ideas for two reasons:—

1. The Shia sect has never recognised the Ottoman Caliphate, and never can recognise it, because it strikes at the very foundation of the Shia faith. This fact would render the proposed confederation, if made, practically inoperative in action so far as concerns Persia.
2. Persia is scarcely less afraid of Turkey than of Russia. There is a considerable population of Turkish origin and Turkish speech in Persia, especially in the north-western provinces. Persia is well aware that Turkey has designs on these areas, that she only awaits a favourable opportunity to declare them a *Turchia irredenta*, that Turkish pan-Islamism is a mere cloak for pan-Turanism, and that to join a confederation in which Turkey was the preponderant partner would weaken her hold over the Turkish-speaking provinces, and might even lead to their loss. Russia no doubt realises this also: if, for example, Persian Azerbaijan were absorbed by Turkey, the whole position of Russia in the Caucasus, which for her is the key to the Middle East, would be turned. If, therefore, Russia is unable to dominate and control the confederation movement, she will, if only for this reason, oppose its development to the utmost of her power.

It is possible that Persia, with her irresolute and vacillating policy, may flirt with the idea of a Turco-Perso-Afghan Confederation, even that she may profess academic sympathy with the idea: but I think she is unlikely to enter into one. Should she do so under the threat of an anti-Persian Turco-Afghan combination, her position would in some ways resemble that of Italy in the Triple Alliance before

1914, and perhaps with not unsimilar results. She is much more likely to do her best to keep out of it.

The reappearance, with Muhieddin Pasha, of Turkish diplomacy on the Tehran stage may have one of two results:—

1. A Bolshevik-Kemalist anti-British combination.
2. Turkish and Russian policies to diverge and set each other off: this would be to the advantage of Great Britain.

The latter is the least improbable: by careful handling it might even be facilitated.

PERCY LORAINÉ.

Tehran, April 6, 1923.

[E 4940/1165/65]

No. 38.

Sir H. Samuel to the Duke of Devonshire.—(Communicated by Colonial Office; Received at Foreign Office, May 15.)

(1.)

(No. 159.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Jerusalem, May 12, 1923.

ON 9th and 10th May Chief Secretary saw Emir Abdullah.

Conditions on which grant-in-aid depends were agreed to by Abdullah, and he will give them to chief British representative in writing. He agrees further that reserve force should be increased to 1,200 or 1,300. Economies will be effected in Transjordan budget by disbandment of gendarmerie and reduction of police. Transjordan defence forces will thus be entirely under Peake. Transjordan budget, which has been submitted, will be examined here.

Abdullah was much pleased with contents of your telegram No. 142 of 2nd May, which were communicated to him. He expresses his sincere gratitude to His Majesty's Government. Local press are to be given announcement this afternoon. Chief Secretary is reporting by next mail.

(2.)

(No. 160.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Jerusalem, May 13, 1923.

CONDITIONS on which grant-in-aid depends have been signed by Transjordan Government and handed to chief British representative.

This is in continuation of my telegram No. 159.

[E 5175/653/91]

No. 39.

Acting Consul Grafftey-Smith to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 22.)

(No. 39.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, April 30, 1923.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith the Jeddah report for the period the 1st–30th April, 1923.

Copies of this report and despatch are being sent to Cairo, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Aden, Simla and Damascus.

I have, &c.

L. B. GRAFFTEY-SMITH.

Enclosure in No. 39.

Jeddah Report, April 1–30, 1923.

(Secret.)

KING HUSSEIN, accompanied by Sheikh Fuad-al-Khatib, arrived in Jeddah on the 18th April with the ex-Sultan and suite.

The Sultan's decision to send his aide-de-camp to explore the residential quarter of Haifa clashed with His Majesty's Government's expression of regret that adequate arrangements could not be made for His Majesty's residence in Palestine,

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L.

and their suggestion that he might well consider the possibilities of Switzerland as a place of abode. On receipt of this message, the Sultan declared to King Hussein his intention of leaving Mecca at once for Jeddah, and of proceeding (he did not specify whither) by the first available boat, after consultation with this agency. King Hussein made some demur; but a flood of press propaganda which has reached the Sultan, attributing to King Hussein designs on the latter's title of Caliph, makes it as difficult for the King to press his guest to stay as it would be indelicate to urge him to depart. After prayers on the first day of Ramadan, therefore, the two old men started to jolt over some 50 miles of desert in a shared barouche. They rested for less than three hours on the way and arrived on the following morning more or less broken. King Hussein received visitors that same evening; the Sultan remained invisible until the afternoon of the 19th, when I called upon him at his request.

He began by complaining that his health left much to be desired, a statement which his frail appearance indeed confirmed, without need of the assurance of his physician, Reshad Pasha, that His Majesty had lost over 30 lb. in weight since arriving in the Hedjaz. The frustration of his hopes of residence in Haifa had much distressed him. His wish was to elect a residence in some British-protected Moslem country; he had suggested Haifa rather than Cyprus, because of the somewhat suspect proximity of Cyprus to the Cilician coast. It was perhaps not understood, and he wished strongly to emphasise, that he asked for no free accommodation or maintenance. Much to my embarrassment, he quoted Mr. Jack Jones on the subject of "15s. a week unemployment dole for the ex-Sultan and 1s. a week for each wife"; he seemed to consider this as a pronouncement by His Majesty's Government. He intended to live at his own charge. It was essential that he should leave the Hedjaz; his health demanded it. It was, moreover, essential that he and his "family" should be reunited. Switzerland, as a non-Moslem country, was an unsuitable residence for himself and his "family"; it was, incidentally, too expensive for his convenience. If it were really of no avail again to request permission to proceed to Haifa, he desired me to ascertain whether any objection existed to his settling in Cyprus. If that wish, also, were not to be realised, he would simply have to think what to do next. I gathered from his suite later that a refusal in respect of Cyprus would probably send the ex-Sultan to Switzerland for at least a few months' visit without his family.

I ventured to assure His Majesty that the difficulty in the way of his residence in Haifa was much less one of any material expense of hospitality than of the very real responsibility which his presence could not but entail to the local authorities responsible for the maintenance of public security; the possibility of the authorities in Cyprus feeling unable to accept this responsibility was mooted.

At the moment of writing, no reply has been received from His Majesty's Government on the subject, and the ex-Sultan's future movements, which have inspired the wildest local rumours, remain nebulous. He did not attend Friday prayers on the 27th April.

King Hussein, in conversation with me, made no effort to disguise his contempt for an ex-Caliph who runs away from Mecca on the first day of Ramadan, and who deserts the admirable field for discreet propaganda offered by the pilgrimage in favour of reunion with his somewhat euphemistically-styled "family." It is, I think, the fact that the Sultan would have been well advised to bear with the barren boredom of Taif, the climate of which is as pleasant as any he will find elsewhere, until the pilgrimage, and to defer his departure from the Hedjaz until after he had been able to show himself in Mecca to tens of thousands of the faithful, whom he claims still to command.

I have seen what I believe to be the only copy in Jeddah of a document printed in Mecca, in Arabic and Turkish, which purports to be Sultan Mohammed Wahid-ud-Din's first manifesto since leaving Constantinople. This document is variously reported to have been compiled by the ex-Sultan and disapproved by King Hussein, and to have been compiled by King Hussein in collaboration with Mustafa Sabry Effendi (the ex-Sheikh-ul-Islam of Turkey) and presented to the ex-Sultan for his signature, which he refused to give. Whatever its origin and authorship (and I cannot conceive the Meccan printers printing anything without King Hussein's approval), the manifesto was, almost immediately after publication, withdrawn from general circulation. It is in the nature of an *apologia* for the Sultan's policy from the date of his accession. It attacks the Kemalists, reiterates the Sultan's refusal to recognise their right to tinker with the Caliphate and ends with effusive gratitude to King Hussein and prayers for the Arab cause, hardly in place in such a manifesto.

King Hussein himself has been in very gracious mood since his arrival in

Jeddah, the source of this rare benevolence being his expectation of a miracle at the hand of Dr. Naji-el-Assil, who arrived in Jeddah on the 30th April. With no knowledge of the trend of recent negotiations between His Majesty's Government and Dr. Naji-el-Assil, this agency can do nothing either to endorse or to discourage King Hussein's semi-certitude that the day of his deliverance from Moslem reproach is at hand. Briefly, His Majesty believes that he is to be recognised forthwith as the head of a State comprising Palestine, Transjordan, Iraq and the Hedjaz, and he counts on the attraction which this nucleus of Arab unity must, with discreet British assistance, exercise to ensure the speedy formation of the United States of Arabia, within which each ruler is to keep his present territories and titles and to send a representative to the seat of Central Government (not necessarily Mecca) to represent local interests in the common Arabian Ministry for Foreign Affairs. King Hussein would appear to reserve for himself only the "papal States" of Mecca and Medina and, presumably, general suzerainty over the peninsula, since he sees himself paying Ibn Saud an even larger subsidy than that ruler at present receives. After a year of such suzerainty, an Arab Caliphate would, it is thought, be irresistible. That achieved, the King's entourage ask no more from him than that he should intone the "Nunc dimittis."

King Hussein has not himself confided to me his hopes, but I understand from Sheikh Fuad-al-Khatib that the King firmly believes Dr. Naji-el-Assil to have laid the foundations for this edifice of Hashimite glorification. It will be a bad day for the little Bagdadi concessionaire if he cannot show to the King some very definite accomplishment to justify his cabled assurances of all that His Majesty's Government are prepared to concede to secure a strong anti-Turkish *bloc*; and a bad day for us, as well.

King Hussein has informed Sheikh-al-Khatib that he may possibly visit his son Abdullah in Transjordan after the pilgrimage. The Egyptian press foresees a subsequent meeting between King Hussein and Ibn Saud at Jaufr, with a view to an *entente*.

Asir.

The will to an understanding with Riyadh has not yet been allowed practical manifestation. Hashimite troops occupied Ebha in mid-April at the instance of Hassan-bin-Aidh.

Mecca.

Besides strictly limiting the quantity of all commodities which Bedouin are permitted to purchase in Mecca without special permission from himself, the King has now set octroi-guards at the entrance to the Mu'abda and Sheikh Mahmoud (Jerwal) quarters of the town (which are mainly inhabited by Arabs), and no single bag of foodstuffs is allowed into these quarters without Royal licence. These measures, which are intended to bring his less amenable subjects to heel and to enhance King Hussein's influence among the tribes, have caused curses and discontent among Arabs and townspeople alike. Trade, indeed, in Mecca, is a thing dead. Royal monopolies, Royal manipulation of exchanges and the system of Royal licences for petty purchases have brought merchants to the edge of despair.

It is estimated that over 600 "Hedjazi" Arabs (Mecca-Taif and district) were conscribed in Mecca during the early days of the month. The sheikh of these Arabs in Jeddah was instructed on the 2nd April to prepare a list of those resident in the town, presumably with a view to their eventual conscription.

The bazaar between Saffa and Merwa has been roofed in, much to the comfort of pilgrims whom religion obliges to run seven times between these hills. Arab soldiers and police were employed on this work; it is said that their long arrears of pay have been retained as a donation towards the cost of this municipal improvement.

Medina.

A section (the pilgrims of three mutawwifin only) of the first pilgrim caravan arrived back at Mecca from Medina on the 24th April. The caravan took the Darb-el-Fur'a, whose leading sheikh has made peace with the King after looting a merchant caravan last year, when going, and it returned by the Darb-el-Ghar. Those who have reached Mecca paid in all 18 or 19 Mejdidi dollars per "shukduf" (camel-litter) by way of tolls to tribesmen, *i.e.*, about 2*l.* 10*s.* They suffered no loss of life by attack on the road. This rate of toll is less high than that which many caravans have paid in former years, but it is stiff for the first caravan of the season.

A party of some fifty Billi and Juheina sheikhs under Sherif Ma'ala, Emir of Yambo, visited the King in Mecca at his request for the anniversary of the Arab revolt, and presented to him the two standards recently captured from Wahhabi raiders. They told a fellow-passenger on the "Tawil" that these Aneiza raiders caused them continual trouble, but that with financial assistance from King Hussein they would be able to hold their own against aggression. Their hopes of such assistance were dashed by the King. He refused the deputation subsidy, either direct or indirect. They were a froward people and should have neither gold to spend nor pilgrims to loot. Aiming to crush the Bedouin into servile dependence on his favours, he spreads hatred of himself like a fire among the tribes.

From information supplied by a party of Indians who arrived from Medina early in the month, grave disorder appears to reign both in and around the town. The Mecca "Rukab" was held up, despite the protection of a "Khawi," and probably for the first time in history, on the road, and had to pay 16*l.* (10 Turkish piastres per head) to the highwaymen. The "Rukab" was also attacked by Bedouin (who in many cases occupy the forts built by the Turkish Government for road protection) just outside the city gate. Only with great difficulty was Ahmed-bin-Mansour, the acting Governor, able sufficiently to compose the feud between Medina townfolk and Bedouin, arising out of a quarrel and bloodshed in the town in the early days of Rajab and resulting in the closing of the city gates for many days on end, to enable the populace to attend the Rajabieh ceremonies of Syedna Hamza. Blood-money was paid to the tribesmen for their wounded and a six months' "ani" (or respite from blood-vengeance) granted by them for their killed; at the expiration of this period they reserve the right to kill four inhabitants of Medina. Ladies of the family of Omar Kurdi, Kazi of Mecca, travelling to Rabegh, only escaped kidnapping by the fortunate intervention of two influential sheikhs of their aggressors' tribe. The Indians above referred to were set upon and robbed of goods to the value of 120*l.* at Bir Irwa, the last stage before Medina. Complaints to Ahmed-bin-Mansour failed to recover for them even the stolen head-gear and garments in which their robbers swaggered through the Medina bazaars. The Governor admitted, indeed, to one Indian complainant that a stolen head-dress belonged to the Indian and not to the Arab wearer, but he pleaded that the latter must have time to purchase a new one before giving up the old. There is no strong hand to deal with this anarchy.

For seven months, it is said, no caravan from the east has reached Medina. Postal and other communications with Yambo are chaotic, and Bedouin raid and loot the "uyun" or gardens 5 miles from the city wall. The eulogy of Hashimite public security arrangements in and around Medina, which appears in No. 676 of "Al Kibla," and the Government's official notice of the reign of peace throughout its dominions, will carry conviction to those only of "Al Kibla's" readers who have not yet realised that this journal is inspired by the same unprejudiced spirit of impartiality when discussing the affairs of the House of Hashim as is such a periodical as "Bubbles" when dealing with the interests of the House of Pears.

General: Commercial.

Mr. Peter Graham, a British subject and manager for Palestine and Arabia of the Singer Manufacturing Company, New York, has been in Jeddah for the last two months vainly endeavouring to wrest, if not justice, at least a decision from the local courts in claims against native agents. I am addressing a separate despatch on the subject of his experiences, which are illuminating, to the Department of Overseas Trade.

One of his claims is against his Jeddah agent, an Egyptian subject, who has in the past enjoyed, *quâ* Egyptian, the good offices of this agency as against Hashimite methods of justice. It is anomalous that in present circumstances an Egyptian is not liable to the jurisdiction of this consular court, and in order to prosecute him it is to Hashimite methods of justice that Mr. Graham has had to appeal.

Turkish Refugees.

King Hussein is still, and not unreasonably, resentful of the Egyptian Government's refusal to accept in Egypt the destitute Turkish refugees sent from Egypt to the Hedjaz during January and February last. For those who have elected to stay in the Hedjaz he is making some provision. The others, some thirty, whose passages to Suez he is prepared to pay, are in process of starving while their right to return whence they came is debated at a telegraphic cost sufficient to pay the onward passages of many from Egypt to their desired destinations. Four who are in Jeddah

lie sick of fever on the bare floor of an unfurnished room. When Dr. Munir-ud-din last visited them they had neither bread nor water. Local charity dare not give where King Hussein withholds. It is strange to recall that the odyssey of these unfortunates began with their Anglophile sentiments, but not strange that these sentiments should vary with the adequacy of their reward.

Aviation.

M. Chirokof has flown the Armstrong safely back from Taif. While in Taif he made many flights for the edification of the Bedouin; he flew also over Kleikh and Taraba, but did not attempt bombing. He reports that the Emir Ali wants to purchase a Handley-Page machine with Rolls-Royce engines, but that there is constant propaganda by Constantin Yanni and Rushdi Bey in favour of Italian machines. It seems a pity, since aeroplanes will probably be imported into the Hedjaz, Arms Convention or no Arms Convention, that orders should not go to a British firm.

"Maulai Mustafa."

A man of this name who is, I believe, wanted for hotel bills in Cairo, arrived on the steamship "Mansourah" on the 6th April. He informed the King that he was a member of the "Royal Family of Morocco," and that he had suffered much at French hands and needed money. The King gave him 700*l.*, and discovered, shortly after the man's departure, that he had been swindled. Stories of French wickedness are a sure way to the King's heart and purse.

Khedivial Mail Company.

The terms on which the Khedivial Mail Company should carry Hashimite mails have recently been under consideration. At present the company perform this service in exchange for free telegraphic facilities between their agencies in the Hedjaz. The company have asked, in addition, for exemption from all Hedjaz telegraph charges in respect of messages between the Alexandria-Suez and Hedjaz agencies. As it did not seem right to suggest that the Hashimite Government should exempt the company from Suakin-Jeddah cable charges, the Hashimite Government's right to dispose of which is still disputable, I felt compelled to refuse to forward these proposals to Mecca, and the company have been asked to suggest other terms.

No success has attended our efforts to induce the Government to recognise its obligation to pay a 40 per cent. general average contribution in respect of a shipment of £E. 500 specie by the Khedivial Mail Steamship "Borulos." The Government's communications on the subject have been characterised by complete absence of dignity.

Quarantine.

The welcome decision of the international Quarantine Board at Alexandria to impose quarantine at Tor on southward-bound pilgrims has evoked protests from King Hussein as to its implication that detention on the island of Abu Saad becomes, by international convention, unnecessary. The King reserves full right to apply such local measures as he thinks fit. It is regrettable that his invitation to Jeddah telegraphed to the commission appointed by the League of Nations to examine quarantine affairs should have been ignored; he would have been much flattered by such a visit. For any revision of the 1912 Convention, based not on personal inspection at Jeddah, but on material supplied by the president of the Quarantine Board at Alexandria, he has no respect.

In default of very clear proof that King Hussein and his Government are indeed internationally bound to act in accordance with the procedure followed by quarantine authorities elsewhere, I would recommend that the detention of Egyptian and other pilgrims for twenty-four hours at Abu Saad should not be made the subject of a row from which no good to the pilgrims can possibly result. Experience, not mere cowardice, suggests that it is foolish to begin a heated argument unless the right cause is certain to prevail.

Post Scriptum.

Mention should have been made above of the arrival on the 28th April, by Italian steamer from Suez, of Sheikh Abdul Kader Muzaffer, the Syrian extremist. It is to be regretted that he should have been permitted to leave Palestine for the

Hedjaz at this particular moment. From him, as from the Lotfallah crowd and from Sheikh Abdul Malik, Arab agent in Cairo, tooth-and-nail opposition to any scheme Dr. Naji may have brought must, I fear, be anticipated. Sheikh Abdul Kader's arrival was timed to precede Dr. Naji's by a few days; it remains to be seen whether his counsels will avail to stiffen the King's resistance to Dr. Naji's arguments.

Arabic Press.

A summary of Nos. 674 to 682 of "Al Kibla" is annexed.

L. B. GRAFFTEY-SMITH.

PRESS SUMMARY.

("Al Kibla.")

No. 674 of March 29.

Decorations: Sheikh Fuad-al-Khatib and Sayed Ahmed (King Hussein's private secretary) have been given the second-class of the Egyptian Order of the Nile; the Grand Kadi has received the same Order with brilliants.

Official notice: The Government announces to all intending visitors the reign of complete public security and order within the Hedjaz. The country flings its doors wide for the reception of Moslems of every race and devotes every endeavour to ensure the comfort of visitors, in particular of pilgrims, the guests of the House of God.

Anniversary of the Arab revolt: Festivities, speeches and appropriate verse.

Juheina and Billi sheikhs in Mecca: Arrival of a delegation of some fifty sheikhs of these tribes under the Emir Sherif Maala, to kiss the Hashimite Threshold after fighting and beating back a party of Wahhabi raiders. The two captured Wahhabi flags they have presented to the King bring the total of such trophies in His Majesty's possession up to eleven.

Medina caravans: A pilgrim caravan of 500 camels left for Medina to-day.

Turkish refugees: We learn that the Government has taken the Turkish refugees on charge, providing for those who wish to stay in Mecca (39) accommodation, food and service, and paying the passages of those who wish to leave for various destinations (29). This is the true humanity of Moslem to Moslem brother.

No. 675 of April 2.

France and the Kemalists: An article from "Al Siyaseh" of Cairo (No. 108), reproducing the pessimistic views of a writer in the "Débats" as to the weakness of French policy towards the Kemalists before and during the Lausanne Conference.

Ali Riza Rikabi: Has accused the Emir Abdulla of lavish expenditure, which is absurd, because the Emir has been living under canvas in the ice and snow at Amman since arriving there. As for other charges made by Rikabi, he would not be the son of his father if he neglected to make them.

Land-split in Nejd: Further details.

No. 676 of April 5.

Glad tidings for our brethren the pilgrims: Five columns of admiration of the perfection of public security obtaining between Yambo, Medina, Rabegh, Jeddah and Mecca, contributed by an anonymous Egyptian. From internal evidence the writer would appear to be both blind and deaf.

No. 677 of April 9.

Quarantine: Official communiqué.

The Hashimite Government has observed that great publicity is being given in the press to the employment of Tor as a quarantine station instead of the Island of Abu Saad. How can this be reconciled with the provisions of article 124 of "their convention," that ships carrying Egyptians should be inspected at Jeddah?

The Tor proposal is alleged to be based on desire for pilgrim's comfort; the Hashimite Government yields to none in devotion to this blessed object: witness the 1,600 packages lying in Jeddah customs waiting to be claimed by pilgrims. But how reconcile a desire for pilgrims' comfort with Article 125 of the convention, which ordains that if, on inspection at Jeddah, cases of suspects are found, the vessel must be sent back for detention at Tor? This is definitely to the discomfort of pilgrims,

especially just before the day of Arafat, when time is everything. It looks as if Tor in the north was to be a copy of Kamaran in the south!

Remember how the Egyptian pilgrims complained of their detention at Tor on the return from last year's Haj. This proposal is a clear infringement of the sovereign rights of the Hashimite Government. But if the International Board of Health sends its inspectors to visit our islands and to make recommendations, we will carry these out gladly and readily, provided their intention is not to encroach upon our rights.

Criticism levelled against the Government quarantine dues we ignore as unworthy of our attention. But what about the 300 Egyptian pilgrims whom the Hashimite Government transported gratis last year to Suez from Yambo, where they had been left like so much rubbish simply because they had chosen to visit the Prophet's tomb at Medina.

The International Board of Health choose to overlook the fact that pilgrims are sent here packed in boats like sacks of beans.

Arab unity: Press comments from Egypt and Syria on recent debates in Parliament regarding the evacuation of Irak and on the general question of pan-Arab ideals and an Arab federation. The great benefit that would result from friendly co-operation between the Idrisi and the Imam, and between King Hussein and Ibn Saud (whose intention to foregather at Jauf during King Hussein's rumoured visit to Amman is mooted) finds universal encouragement and recognition. "Al Kibla" reproduces part of the leading article of its 645th number, and publishes the following telegrams which have passed between King Hussein and "one of his representatives in one of the capitals of Europe:—

To Mecca: "The British Government do not deny their promises, but state that they are still striving to make them effective, and that they are ready to recognise the unity of the Arab peoples and that this unity is achievable by the Arabs themselves."

From Mecca: "Present my heartfelt, unselfish thanks to the British Government for this confirmation of their recognition of Arab unity by Arab effort. Inform them that in accordance with their original communication to me in the name of the Arabs, I made the known communication to the Arabs, and the requirements of these fundamental principles constrain me to issue an official notification guaranteeing that I and Great Britain have been true to our promises, with especial view to declaring to them my own fidelity to my promises. I invite them to a conference of delegates of Irak, Palestine and of all other sections of the peninsula whose co-operation in the war was real to explore the bases of this unity and to select their centre and branches to their own satisfaction and choice."

Distinguished arrivals: Emir Maulai Mustafa, member of the Royal family of Morocco. (Recognised after his departure to have been an imposter.)

Abdullah Effendi Deri Zadeh, ex-Sheikh-ul-Islam of Turkey.

Sheikh Mirza Wasfi Pasha—on Hedjaz Railway business from Transjordan.

Obituary: Sheikh Mohammed Ma'sum-al-Mujaddedi, a leading domiciled Indian, formerly of Medina.

No. 678 of April 12.

Decorations: Order of Al Istiklal for M. Nikolai Nadionof, the Russian aviator, and his first successful Arab pupil, Abdul Salam Sirhan.

Official notice: In view of the approach of Ramadan and the continuance of high prices, Government stores will reopen for the sale of rice, flour, sugar, &c., at Government prices.

Arab airmen: Letter from Rushdy Bey, Commandant of Jeddah, announcing the successful flight of Lieut. Abdul Salam after only ninety-two lessons, and attributing this achievement to the gracious virtues of King Hussein, with promise of news of further successes next week.

(The next week's efforts were successful in reducing an aeroplane to smithereens.)

Quarantine: An open letter: After laying down the principle that no decision of any Quarantine Board can be allowed to affect the rights of the Hashimite Government to do what they like with their own property, the (barely) anonymous writer proceeds to make a number of violent and lying charges against the Administrations responsible for the Egyptian pilgrimage and for the quarantine arrangements at Kamaran and Tor. Allegations of the failure of the Egyptian Government to provide accommodation, water, &c., for its pilgrims as required by convention come well from a writer whose other charges show complete ignorance

of any quarantine convention whatever. The proposed distinction between pilgrims and non-pilgrims proceeding to Egypt after the coming pilgrimage is ridiculed as absurd and as probably having some political purpose. Egyptian pilgrims not returning by Egyptian pilgrim ships through delay by illness or a visit to Medina are said to lose not only the price of their Egyptian Government return tickets but their deposits as well, &c.

Steamship "Tawil" has been fitted with wireless.

No. 679 of April 16.

The Chester Concession: Details of its provisions.

The ex-Sultan: Will shortly proceed to Jeddah for reasons of health.

Medina caravan: We learn that the caravan, having accomplished its blessed purpose, is returning from Medina.

Arrivals: Sheikh Abdurrahman-ez-Zayani of Bahrein.

Quarantine: Distressing experience of a member of "Al Kibla" staff quarantined last year at Moses' Wells (Suez). Comparative excellence of Abu Saad arrangements.

No. 680 of April 19.

The ex-Sultan: His arrival with King Hussein at Jeddah.

Occupation of Ebha: The Hashimite troops in Asir have occupied Ebha, in response to the appeal by Hassan-bin-Aidh and other leaders for the righting of their wrongs and for the termination of an evil situation.

This, says "Al Kibla," is clear proof that King Hussein has no ambitions of supremacy, for his troops could have taken Ebha easily at any time. In doing so now they are inspired by Arab readiness to succour a friend in need.

Nos. 681 and 682.

Nothing of importance, the most influential contributor being away from Mecca.

SHIPPING INTELLIGENCE.

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Pilgrims disembarked.	Cargo discharged.
				1923.	1923.		Packages.
Asmara	.. Italian	Massaua	Suez	Mar. 29	Mar. 29	..	473
Borulos	.. British	Aden	Suez	" 29	" 30	95	1,203
Helenus	.. British	Singapore	Port Said	" 31	" 31	1,016	20 tons
Soerakarta	.. Dutch	Batavia	Port Said	April 1	April 2	1,643	..
Sembilan	.. Dutch	Batavia	Port Said	" 1	" 1	824	..
Banda	.. Dutch	Mombasa	Port Said	" 1	" 1	49	5 tons
Hejaz	.. British	Calcutta	Aden	" 4	" 11	..	45,456
Madien	.. Dutch	Batavia	Port Said	" 4	" 4	1,491	..
Massaua	.. Italian	Massaua	Suez	" 5	" 5	..	140
Mansourah	.. British	Suez	Port Soudan	" 6	" 6	..	3,873
Tydeus	.. British	Batavia	Port Said	" 7	" 7	400	..
Jeddah	.. British	Karachi	Bombay	" 7	" 11	976	16,023
Asmara	.. Italian	Suez	Massaua	" 7	" 7	..	363
Rhexenor	.. British	Singapore	Port Said	" 9	" 10	251	100 tons
Mansourah	.. British	Port Soudan	Suez	" 11	" 12	69	1,876
Celebes	.. Dutch	Batavia	Port Said	" 12	" 12	795	..
Billiton	.. Dutch	Batavia	Port Said	" 13	" 13	935	..
Titan	.. British	Singapore	Port Said	" 14	" 14	683	50 tons timber
Scalda	.. British	Singapore	Port Soudan	" 15	" 16	1,015	..
Borulos	.. British	Suez	Aden	" 15	" 16	..	854
Kenah	.. British	Aden	Suez	" 18	" 19	83	2,445
Talhybuis	.. British	Singapore	Port Said	" 20	" 20	1,011	..
Alwaki	.. Dutch	Zanzibar and Mombasa	Port Said	" 23	" 23	27	517 planks
Frangistan	.. British	Batavia	Port Soudan	" 23	" 25	1,893	..
Medan	.. Dutch	Batavia	Port Said	" 24	" 24	558	..
Mansourah	.. British	Suez	Port Soudan	" 25	" 25	30	2,985
Massaua	.. Italian	Massaua	Suez	" 26	" 26
Asmara	.. Italian	Suez	Massaua	" 28	" 28
Akbar	.. British	Bombay	..	" 30	" ..	1,202	14,891

H.M.S. "Cornflower" arrived on the 30th April.

[E 6081/4032/89]

No. 40.

Consul Smart to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received June 11.)

(No. 42.)

My Lord,

Aleppo, May 30, 1923.

I HAVE the honour to report that the new French High Commissioner, General Weygand, paid his first visit to Aleppo on the 17th instant. He arrived by road from Alexandretta, and was welcomed ceremoniously at a garden just outside the town, whence he rode into the city and reviewed the troops.

In the morning of the 18th May the general held an official reception, in the course of which he requested the members of the Consular Corps to be his interpreters, towards their respective Governments, of the spirit of concord in which he was assuming his duties.

In the afternoon the general went to the Serai, where the Governor-General, Mustafa Barmada, read an address of welcome, in the course of which he expressed the confidence of his fellow-citizens in France and the new High Commissioner on whose assistance they counted for the administrative and economic welfare of the State.

In the evening the Governor-General and the municipality gave a banquet in honour of the High Commissioner, to which were invited all the local notables and the Consular Corps. The Governor-General read a very colourless speech of welcome, without any reference to the rôle of France and the High Commissioner in Syria or the attitude of the people towards the mandatory Power. It might have been a complimentary speech to any unofficial guest of some distinction. The French were naturally vexed at this non-committal attitude of the Governor-General they had appointed.

General Weygand made a sensible and sober reply. He said that France, in sending him to Syria, had not changed her intentions towards the country. She was determined to execute the mandate with which she had been charged by the League of Nations. According to the latest news from Lausanne, it seemed likely that Syria's external security would shortly be guaranteed. But, not seeking to avoid the burdens of the mandate, he had caused troops to be lined up along the whole frontier. As regards internal security, essential to the economic development of the country, the French would do their duty energetically. Most of the difficulties ahead were general and common to the whole world. They could not be removed by a single person or a single country. But the French were prepared to do their best to help in the solution of certain local problems, such as the reduction of railway rates, the bringing of water to the town, the installation of electricity and tramways. A general plan must be traced for gradual execution in the course of several years. France, he concluded, is decided to execute its mandate completely and in a more and more liberal manner.

On the 19th May the High Commissioner gave a luncheon to which were again invited the local notables and the Consular Corps. After the luncheon Mgr. Raphael, the Greek Orthodox Archbishop, made a very inappropriate speech in Arabic. He said that he had eschewed public speaking for three years because he thought that truth had been buried in Syria. The people had to complain of French officials, who had behaved as though they were in Morocco or Algeria, and had not respected the nation's sentiments of independence. But this did not mean that the people did not love France, whom they distinguished from her officials. Syrians knew that they could not govern themselves at present, and welcomed the assistance of France.

While the speech and its expurgated French translation were in progress, a hurried consultation took place between General Weygand, General Billotte and M. Reclus, the délégué adjoint. Finally, they decided to disregard the prelate's inopportune remarks, and, after a further address of welcome from the doyen of the French colony, General Weygand made a colourless speech of thanks. He left the table immediately afterwards, as he had to reach Alexandretta the same evening to go on board the "Lorraine," which was to convey him back to Beirut.

The French were much irritated by the speech of Mgr. Raphael, who was already in their bad books for his ardent support of the Emir Feisal at the time of the Shereefian régime. M. Reclus, who has done most of his service in Tunis, apparently interpreted the reference to French officials in North Africa as aimed at himself.

To the onlooker, one of the most striking features of the various ceremonies was the prominence of the Christian clerical elements and the effacement of the Arab.

especially the Bedouin, elements. A number of important tribal chiefs happened to be in the town, including the Anezeh chiefs Hachim and Muchim, the Roalla chief Noori Shalan, &c. These chiefs were at all the ceremonies, but were always in the background and never taken notice of by anyone, while the general was continually surrounded by the black cassocks of the innumerable episcopal dignitaries. Both Hachim and Noori Shalan made friendly advances to Mr. Pro-Consul Akras and to my cavass, but I thought it advisable to avoid conversation with them. There is no doubt that these chiefs would like to get into touch with the British consulate. Some time ago Hachim sent me a message to the effect that he was sick of the French, and if we liked would raise all the tribes against them. I replied that we desired no such thing, and that the French were our Allies. He seemed to think that my answer was due to doubts as to his capacity to give effect to his undertaking. In view, therefore, of the difficulty of convincing these Bedouins of our sincerity, and in view of the suspiciousness of the French regarding our intentions, I took care to keep out of the way of these chiefs, who were left entirely to their own devices.

Possibly the British, while at Aleppo, went to the other extreme and paid the Arabs more attention than the Christians. But I cannot help thinking that the French are inclined to flatter unduly the Christian elements, who have little real power and are not at all grateful for the courtesies shown them, witness Mgr. Raphael's speech. It is doubtful even whether the ultimate interests of the Christians are served by this partiality. They are the minority, and if they are to live in peace here, the Mussulman majority must be humoured. Moreover, however much the French may flatter the Christian element, they are in practice compelled to work with the Moslems. The result is that the Christians, seeing that all this ceremonial attention is not followed by their undue association in the political management of affairs, are almost as discontented as the Moslems.

General Weygand conveyed the impression of a simple resolute worker, refreshingly averse from any indulgence in the sterile eloquence generally affected by officials on ceremonial occasions.

I have, &c.
W. A. SMART.

[E 6111/1165/65]

No. 41.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 12.)

Sir,

Downing Street, June 11, 1923.

I AM directed by the Duke of Devonshire to refer to this Department's letter dated the 4th May, 1923, transmitting a copy of a telegram addressed to the High Commissioner for Palestine regarding the assurance given by His Majesty's Government to the Emir Abdullah of Transjordan, and to forward herewith, to be laid before the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, a copy of a telegram which has been received from Sir Herbert Samuel regarding the completion of the agreement referred to in the terms of that assurance. A copy of the proposed draft agreement was forwarded to you in our letter of the 19th December, 1922.

2. I am to say that his Grace proposes for the present to confine his instructions to the High Commissioner to the subject of an extradition agreement between Transjordan and Syria, the conclusion of which is provided for by article 11 of the draft agreement referred to above. His Grace proposes to authorise the High Commissioner to discuss this matter directly with the local French authorities in Syria, as suggested in the concluding paragraph of the telegram under reference, and I should be glad to learn whether his Lordship sees any objection to this course.

I am, &c.
H. YOUNG.

Enclosure in No. 41.

Sir H. Samuel to the Duke of Devonshire.

(No. 189.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Jerusalem, June 4, 1923.

I PRESUME that it is necessary, now that declaration of independence of Transjordan has been publicly announced, to complete the agreement referred to herein. Transjordan authorities have copy of the result of the discussions in London,

and will transmit their observations shortly. It has been indicated to them that it is undesirable that substantial alterations should be made. Conclusion of special extradition agreement is provided for in article 11 of provisional draft. This has now become matter of urgency. A number of cases for extradition cannot be dealt with in its absence. Further delay is highly undesirable as French authorities are pressing for extradition of criminals who have taken refuge in Transjordan.

It is suggested that the French authorities be asked if they would be willing to discuss the terms of an agreement direct with authorities in Transjordan in the same way as in the case of recent agreement on subject of customs. Agreement to be subject to ratification of the two High Commissioners on behalf of Governments of their respective countries.

[E 6294/653/91]

No. 42.

Acting Consul Grafftey-Smith to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received June 18.)

(No. 42. Secret.)

Jeddah, May 29, 1923.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith the Jeddah report for the period 1st-29th May, 1923.

Copies of this report and despatch are being sent to Cairo, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Aden, Simla and Damascus.

I have, &c.
L. B. GRAFFTEY-SMITH.

Enclosure in No. 42.

Jeddah Report, May 1-29, 1923.

(Secret.)

THE ex-Sultan of Turkey, having failed to receive a reply from His Majesty's Government to his request for permission to proceed to Cyprus, suddenly decided to leave for Switzerland. He sailed on the 2nd May in the steamship "Mansourah" for Suez with his son and suite. Before leaving he gave to King Hussein a signed statement certifying that Fakhry Pasha's removal of the treasures from the Prophet's Tomb at Medina to Constantinople was in accordance with no order or irade of his own, either as Sultan or as Caliph. The document may serve to refute the claim of the Turkish delegates at Lausanne that the disposal of these treasures is a matter touching the rights and prerogatives of the Caliph. The ex-Sultan appeared much gratified by the arrangements promised for his comfort and hospitality while in transit through Egypt.

On the evening of the 30th April King Hussein gave a nineteen-course banquet at the barracks in honour of the commander and officers of His Majesty's sloop "Cornflower," in which Dr. Naji-el-Assil had travelled from Suez. On the following day His Majesty visited the "Cornflower" and bestowed Bedouin robes and Orders of the Nahda on the officers. He is, from experience, well aware of the regulations governing the acceptance by British officers of foreign orders, but he resisted all our attempts to dissuade him from decorating those who had made effective the British Government's compliment to the Arab envoy.

During the afternoon of the 1st May Dr. Naji explained to the King the initialled treaty which he had brought from London for approval. It had a favourable first reception, the three slight alterations requested by King Hussein being so innocuous as to suggest a mere desire for self-assertion rather than any genuine dissatisfaction with the text. These amendments were referred to London the same evening. The King waited three days for a reply, and then returned to Mecca, taking Dr. Naji with him.

On the 9th May a telegram was received from His Majesty's Government accepting the proposed alterations. By this time press criticisms from Palestine and Egypt and the usual mail-bag of anonymous letters had so worked upon the King that his suspicions found expression in a "counter-draft treaty," which Dr. Naji had some difficulty in inducing him to withdraw. On the morning of the 17th May, however, the notables of Mecca and Jeddah were informed in a Royal proclamation that that day's festival (the Id-ul-Fitr) was to be doubly a holiday because of the satisfactory purport

[10594]

of the Anglo-Arab Treaty, the second article of which was summarised for their benefit (see press supplement). This proclamation, which was Dr. Naji's idea, was, at the same time, cabled to Irak, Transjordan, Palestine and Egypt, with the idea, presumably, of silencing ill-informed criticism in those countries. The King's approval of the treaty terms having been thus broadcast over the Arab world, it was something of a shock to this agency, which had naturally taken no part in Dr. Naji's negotiations with his royal master, to find, when Dr. Naji returned on the 18th May to Jeddah, that King Hussein had inserted in the Arabic text, signed by him, various highly controversial expressions. As Arab, and not British, delegate, Dr. Naji was never in a position to oppose very vigorously King Hussein's efforts to edit the Arabic text. He has tact and a certain Levantine suppleness, but he cannot afford to appear to maintain always the British, never the Arab, cause. I discussed with him certain obvious objections to King Hussein's interpolations, and he used my expression of opinion as a final argument to induce the King to withdraw them. His Majesty has not done so, but he has given Dr. Naji a letter disclaiming for his proposals the more sinister of the developments which they appear to me inevitably to imply.

Dr. Naji left for Suez and London on the 24th May.

Sheikh Abdul Kadir Muzaffer left Jeddah with the King for Mecca on the 5th May, but, having been caught speechifying in fervent eulogy of Mustafa Kemal, he was allowed to hear the jingle of dungeon keys, and he left in considerable disgrace on the 12th May for Palestine. It is certain that he came here not only to find out what exactly Dr. Naji had in his pocket, but also to make definite proposals to King Hussein on behalf of Angora. King Hussein resented both his unannounced arrival and his barely veiled effort of supervision.

Pilgrimage.

The main body of the first Medina caravan returned to Mecca early in the month after great hardships. I have not been able yet to obtain definite details, but I hope soon to do so. Pilgrims appear to have been robbed, kidnapped and murdered. Government declarations of public security appear in every number of "Al Kibla."

One hundred and twenty-six Egyptian pilgrims left Suez for Yambo on the steamship "Borulos" on the 21st May, but they were forbidden to land at Yambo, whence they wished to proceed to Medina, and they had to be brought by the company to Jeddah. No pilgrim is allowed to proceed to Medina except from Mecca; the Government accept no responsibility for public security on routes other than those prescribed by themselves for each caravan. The King does not wish to lose his "koshan" of 6½l. gold per camel-litter to Medina.

This Royal share in the profits of pilgrimage has been, by discreet blackmail, extended. The King announced to mutawwifin that the second and subsequent caravans to Medina would go by sea to Yambo. This arrangement, which can hardly have been seriously intended, provoked a loud outcry among those whose interests would suffer from a discontinuance of the land caravan service, and, in return for his concession in withdrawing his proposal, His Majesty declared that to every four camels an extra baggage-camel must be reckoned. The Royal "koshan" on this fictional beast of burden, spread over four real camels, costs each of the "shukdufs" something just under 2l. extra charge. Such threats and such fictions are the delight and the favourite source of the private revenue of the King. He is continually threatening mutawwifin with a revival of the "tagrir" system, by which certain mutawwifin are given the monopoly—against heavy payments to the King—of touting for pilgrims from particular regions of the globe. Last year he laid it down that only those mutawwifin might leave the Hedjaz for Java and Malaya who promised to pay to himself a special tax of 2l. per head per pilgrim. None left. This year he declared that, as some mutawwifin have relatives who act as their agents in Java and Malaya, they may practically be considered to have visited these places in person and therefore to have become liable for the 2l. contribution. Since, however, he cannot establish who has and who has not agents in the Far East, he consented to levy a slight extra charge on all pilgrims from those parts without discrimination: 1½l. instead of 2l. This is, in fact, the first sum which the mutawwifin of Javanese and Malay pilgrims hasten to extort from their victims on landing, and their desperation when confronted with penniless stowaways is ludicrous. The mutawwifin milk the unfortunate pilgrims, but King Hussein skims the cream. The proceeds of "koshan," &c., go, of course, to the King's money bags, not to the Hashimite Treasury. By popular estimate, his private hoard is now enormous. Half the sum which he pockets from the Medina caravans, if judiciously expended among the tribes, would ensure safe roads everywhere. But King Hussein is

too near of kin to the camel-men, zenzemis, and others who prey upon "the guests of God." It is doubtful, indeed, whether anyone of Shereefian stock has it in him to order the pilgrimage as it should be ordered; despite King Hussein's protestations, it is with him instinctive to see the pilgrims through Arab rather than through Moslem eyes.

One innovation, by whatever motives prompted, is likely, while giving offence to individuals, to reduce the totality of "incidents" on the Medina road. It has been ordained that none may make the pilgrimage to Medina on foot. Guards have been posted at various points between Mecca and Rabegh to turn foot-pilgrims back to Mecca, and I learn that a second attempt means prison. Large numbers of the very poor, Somalis, Nigerians, &c., have in past years trekked on foot with or behind the regular caravans to Medina, and their destitute and helpless state has exposed them more than any other pilgrims to kidnapping and enslavement by the Bedouin. I had to invoke the help of the local authorities during March to recover a young woman and a boy, both of Sokoto, who had been carried off from their little party a few days' march from Rabegh. The presence of crowds of starving beggars accompanying the caravans is, no doubt, something of a nuisance to other pilgrims, but it remains to be seen whether public opinion will endorse this latest measure of restriction in the "Bilad-ul-Muslimin." Foot-pilgrims, by not hiring camels, avoid making any contribution to the King's privy purse.

The second Medina caravan (the first to include Indian pilgrims) left Mecca on the 28th May. It is said that they are to travel by the Sultanania road.

Medina.

The Yambo-Medina road has been closed to mercantile and other traffic during the greater part of the month by the hostile attitude of the tribes. Goods shipped to Yambo by steamer and passengers (other than pilgrims) for Medina have had to go to Rabegh by dhow. I hear that the appeal of the Beni Salem camel-men to their Ahanda fellows has, however, at last been successful, and that a merchant-caravan of 3,000 camels has been permitted by the Bedouin, who draw a share of the camel-hire, to leave Yambo for Medina.

Jamil Pasha has been appointed commandant of Medina. He left Taif for Medina with Shereef Shahat and the mounted troops of Emir Ali's forces, who have been detailed to patrol the Hedjaz railway line above Medina. A body of infantry, sent by sea from Jeddah to Yambo, has been ordered to proceed through Juheina country to El Ula to protect the operations of railway repairs. A certain Sheikh Zahid, preacher in the mosque at Medina, having delivered a speech in Bombay against King Hussein, the King has for the last few months refused permission to any inhabitant of Medina to leave the Hedjaz. Moreover, residents of Medina returning from India, Java, &c., were for a long period forbidden to penetrate further than Jeddah, and they had to find surety that they would not leave Jeddah for Mecca or Medina. One victim of this measure was Mohammed Arusi, an Arab of Medina in the service of the Nizam of Hyderabad, whom his Highness had selected to lead the Hyderabad Government caravan. This man was so terrified of reprisals from Mecca if he should appear to have complained through British channels that he refused to invoke the aid of this agency and dissuaded the Indian pilgrims in his charge, who were much inconvenienced by the delay, from visiting me. Finally, the veto was removed, and all except four of the Medina people were permitted to proceed to their homes. These four, after a painful interview with King Hussein, were given their liberty on the intervention of Emir Ali.

Turkish Refugees.

All Turkish refugees, who declared themselves unwilling to wait in Mecca until after the pilgrimage, were sent down from Mecca on the 10th May for me to dispose of. King Hussein cut off all supplies and withdrew his offer of free passages to Suez. They were fed from charitable funds supplied by this agency until arrangements could be made to despatch them to Cyprus. There remain about seventy in Mecca whose disposal will be a problem after the pilgrimage.

General.

A Jeddah merchant named Mohammed Hamed has been fined 200l. for posting a telegram to Port Soudan for despatch from there.

King Hussein has asked all consulates to arrange that no foreign ships should use wireless while in Jeddah harbour, "in accordance with international usage." He has, of course, adhered to no convention, postal or radio-telegraphic.

I note with regret that Egyptian pilgrims are not to be quarantined at Tor on the southward journey, as the Quarantine Board are unwilling to employ Tor unless the Hashimite Government cease to employ Abu Saad. The position being apparently that the Quarantine Board are bound by International Convention and that the Hashimite Government are not, it is not clear how the action of the latter can release the former from compliance with article 128 of the Convention. King Hussein's insistence on his right to use Abu Saad is admittedly foolish, but, as the measures of quarantine there applied are completely ineffective, it is hoped that consideration for the comfort of Egyptian pilgrims will not be allowed to outweigh the fact that they constitute, unless the strictest measures are applied before they reach Jeddah, a real danger to the health of the pilgrimage as a whole.

L. B. GRAFFTEY-SMITH.

Press Supplement ("Al Kibla").

No. 683 of April 30.

The Hedjaz Railway: Repairs have now nearly reached Medain Saleh. The Government are sending troops, mounted and foot, from Taif to patrol the railway line near El Ula. Sherif Shahat is in command.

Quarantine: The Quarantine Board of Egypt have decided to send pilgrims straight from Suez to Abu Saad Island, without a visit to Tor. This is the result of the Arab Government's protests against the former decision to employ Tor. We owe the Quarantine Board thanks for eschewing evil and following righteousness.

No. 684 of May 3.

The ex-Sultan: His departure for Switzerland, whence he intends soon to return to a Moslem country.

Arab Independence: Arrival of Dr. Naji-el-Assil, who is understood to have established Arab independence and union. Welcome!

Promotion: Thabet Bey, Director-General of Quarantine, becomes Thabet Pasha.

No. 685 of May 7.

Démenti: Dr. Naji-el-Assil stigmatises as lying and false "Al Ahram's" version of his declarations in Cairo.

Obituary: Abdullah Effendi Deri Zadeh, Sheikh-ul-Islam.

No. 686 of May 10.

Ebha: To avoid multiplying the causes of disturbance in present circumstances, the Hashimite forces which recently occupied Ebha have retired to their former positions.

Medina folk are double-faced. We hear with distress of speeches made against the Hashimite Government by Medina residents in Bombay.

No. 687 of May 14.

Regrets: We are by now accustomed to photographs of the wife of Mustafa Kemal, "whom they call the leader of Islam," taking part in public life. Now we see photographs of Mme. Zaghlul, with a crowd of Egyptian and other men. "Are ye for part of the Book believers, and for part infidels?"

No. 688 of May 21.

Decorations: Two columns full.

The Id-ul-Fitr: Celebrations in Mecca.

Declaration of Arab independence and unity: Speech by King Hussein, in which he declares the day to be doubly a holiday "for it happens that the competent authorities have accepted all Arab demands." His Majesty ordered the following declaration to be read:—

"In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

"On the occasion of this blessed festival, we announce the purport of the Arab-British Treaty, based upon what we fundamentally established, by which His Majesty the British King recognises in our favour the independence of the Arabs in their peninsula and in their other lands, and promises us practical assistance in the establishment of a confederation embracing all these countries, including Irak and Palestine and Transjordan, and other Arab countries in the Arabian peninsula (excluding Aden), and we ordain that this blessed day shall be regarded as the

festival of the recognition of the independence of the Arab nation; and God is the Lord of help."

Speech by Dr. Naji-el-Assil in compliment to King Hussein.

Distinguished arrival: Ramadan-al-Shilash (*vide* Damascus reports *passim*). He has been promoted to the rank of lewa, and decorated with the Second Class of the Nahda.

Departures: Dr. Naji-el-Assil has left Mecca to conclude discussions in London about certain articles of the treaty.

Mustafa Sabry Effendi, ex Sheikh-ul-Islam of Turkey, is leaving for a change of climate.

No. 689 of May 24.

Nothing of interest.

APPENDIX.

SHIPPING INTELLIGENCE.

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Pilgrims Disembarked.	Cargo Discharged.
						Packages.	
Prometheus	British	Batavia	Port Said	May 1 ..	May 1 ..	302	..
Mansourah	British	Port Soudan	Suez	" 1 ..	" 2 ..	499	810
Zayani	British	Bombay	Bombay	" 2 ..	" 3 ..	1,042	2
Akbar	British	Bombay	Bombay	" ..	" 3
Keneh	British	Suez	Aden	" 6 ..	" 7 ..	19	959
Prm	British	Singapore	Port Soudan	" 6 ..	" 7 ..	786	100 tons timber
Homayun	British	Bombay	Bombay	" 8 ..	" 10 ..	941	5,496
Sarvistan	British	Batavia	Bombay	" 8 ..	" 9 ..	1,012	..
Borulos	British	Aden	Suez	" 9 ..	" 10 ..	206	2835
Palamed	Dutch	Batavia	Port Said	" 10 ..	" 11 ..	54	..
Asmara	Italian	Suez	Massaua	" 12 ..	" 12	547
Koweit	British	Bombay	Suez	" 13 ..	" 14 ..	859	3,072
Ambon	Dutch	Batavia	Port Said	" 14 ..	" 14 ..	55	..
Heemskerk	Dutch	Zanzibar	Port Said	" 14 ..	" 14 ..	20	..
Mansourah	British	Suez	Port Soudan	" 15 ..	" 15 ..	29	555
Saltania	British	Basra	Bombay	" 21 ..	" 23 ..	785	45,385
Agapenor	British	Singapore	Port Said	" 21 ..	" 21 ..	407	50 tons timber
Mansourah	British	Port Soudan	Suez	" 21 ..	" 22 ..	113	178
Hejaz	British	Bombay	Bombay	" 22 ..	" 23 ..	874	2,831
Asmara	Italian	Massaua	Suez	" 24 ..	" 24	1,166
Borulos	British	Suez	Aden	" 25 ..	" 26 ..	126	5,827
Massaua	Italian	Suez	Massaua	" 26 ..	" 26	976

H.M.S. "Cornflower" left on May 1, 1923.

[E 6332/867/89]

No. 43.

Consul Smart to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received June 18.)

(No. 45.)

My Lord,

Aleppo, May 31, 1923.

I HAVE the honour to report that, from conversations I have had with French officers, it would appear that the French are now becoming more alarmed by the Pan-Arabian than the Turkish menace.

There have been recently various signs of recrudescence of Moslem reaction and fanaticism. An anti-alcoholic league, under the cover of a propaganda based nominally on grounds of religion, morality and physical well-being, has, it is said, been subterraneously working against the French. There has been a movement against the wearing of European clothes and in favour of native products. This

movement began to take the aggressive form of throwing of ink and sulphuric acid at persons, mainly women, wearing obviously luxurious European clothes. These demonstrations have, for the moment at any rate, been suppressed by the police. This recrudescence of reaction and fanaticism is attributed by my French acquaintances to Arabian rather than Turkish influences.

The continual reports in the press regarding negotiations between Great Britain and King Hussein and other Arab rulers with a view to the formation of an Arab federation under British auspices has excited natural anxiety among the French and premature hopes among the Arabs of Aleppo. Arabs have frequently asked me whether Syria was to be included in the forthcoming Arab federation.

At the same time, the reports appearing in the press of an Anglo-Turkish rapprochement have led pro-Turkish elements and Arab nationalists to imagine that the French might be turned out of Syria by the Turks acting with British support. These Arab nationalists doubtless think that the essential thing is to get rid of the French somehow or other, and that the Turks can be squared once their assistance has resulted in the liberation of Syria from the French mandate. The Oriental is guided by sentiment more than reason, and the Arab, in his desire to get rid of the French, is too irrational to anticipate clearly the obvious results of Turkish interference here.

I have the honour to enclose herewith a translation of a letter addressed to me by a body calling itself the National Revolutionary party. The Arabic of the text is poor and would seem to betray Turkish drafting. The proclamation enclosed in this letter was posted up in various places in the Arab quarters of the town just before General Weygand's arrival at Aleppo and at once torn down by the police. Needless to say, I have taken no notice of this irresponsible communication.

In the Alexandretta and Antioch regions there is undoubtedly a large Turkish minority whose racial sentiments naturally impel them to desire the reabsorption of those parts into the Turkish Empire. But at Aleppo the Turkish element is negligible, and there are not very many Arabs who have any sentimental yearning for reabsorption into Turkey. Pro-Turkish feeling here is either the reflex of anti-French feeling or it is due to economic uneasiness. Aleppo realises that it is doomed to decline if it is to be permanently separated from its Anatolian and Mesopotamian markets. The reconstitution of the old Turkey in Asia, or at least the reinclusion in Turkey of Syria and Mesopotamia, would restore to Aleppo its old commercial pre-eminence. A comparison between the economic stagnation of to-day and the prosperity prevailing under the Ottoman régime naturally inclines many Moslems and Christians, without any pro-Turkish sentimentality, to toy agreeably with the idea of a refound economic unity under the Turkish ægis.

All this confused ferment is not serious as long as the Anglo-French *Entente* subsists and the Allied occupation of Constantinople and the Straits acts as a restraining influence on Turkey. The fighting value of the Arab is inconsiderable, and he would only rise against the French if he saw that there was little need of heroic sacrifice. Once, however, peace has been signed and Constantinople and the Dardanelles evacuated, an effective restraint on Turkey will have been removed. Unless the French can use the Greeks as a scarecrow to keep the Turks in order it is difficult to believe that the latter will respect their treaty obligations and refrain from creating difficulties for the French in Northern Syria. Moreover, if we were to evacuate Mesopotamia, France here would remain isolated and surrounded by hostile Turkish and Arabian conglomerations. It is not to be wondered that many Frenchmen contemplate the future with misgiving.

In the interest of, at any rate, local Anglo-French negotiations, it would seem desirable to reassure the French that our Arabian policies are not directed against their position in Syria.

I have &c.
W. A. SMART.

Enclosure 1 in No. 43.

"National Revolutionary Party" to Consul Smart.

(Translation.)

WE have the honour to inform you that, according to a letter which we received from Aintab, an agreement has been arrived at between your Government and our Turkish Government; in consequence our Aleppo Nationalist party, which depends directly from the Grand Assembly of Augora, begs to present its respects and thanks

for this friendly union. History will revive the former alliance and mutual insurance of both Governments.

We have to bring to your consideration that our Revolutionary National party has been ordered to explain to the people of Aleppo the mission of General Weygand. We have, then, published incentive proclamations in accordance with the orders received by us from the Turkish Defence party, and we presume that you have heard of these proclamations.

But, to let you have an exact idea of the real situation, we beg to enclose herewith a copy of a proclamation, that you may know that the mission of Great Britain and that of the Turks are the same in presence of the Moslem world which looks with a discerning eye on us.

Our Revolutionary party begs from your Excellency the moral protection of certain persons. If you agree, it will be possible for you to understand our conditions from the delegate whom we will present to you. You will do better to summon him officially so as to avoid suspicion falling on him.

Our party begs to ask your Excellency's support as well as a moral and material help in the event of your Government's consent.

As our object is to remove the French and to start a revolution, we beg to tell you that all the Aleppo inhabitants have united round our party, and our internal movements are based on those of the Turkish army and the Defence party.

Under these circumstances we may communicate with you a second time with a view to discussions, and we will send you the delegate with a special signal of introduction, or we will send you his name and family's name so that you may summon him.

All our party presents its respects to you.

The Head of the National Revolutionary Party in Aleppo. Section 2.
(Four Initials.)

May 27, 1923.

Enclosure 2 in No. 43.

Proclamation.

IN THE NAME OF GOD WHO ENJOINS THE PROTECTION OF THE FATHERLAND,
JUSTICE AND INDEPENDENCE!

ARISE FROM YOUR SLEEP, O NOBLE ARAB!

(Translation.)

HOW long this calm when the time for action has arrived? Here is this dog of a Frenchman (Weygand), who arrives with his armies and munitions to represent the second scene of the comedy begun by his colleague (Gouraud). He is determined to oppress you by killing your freedom, your independence and your economic life, and the first thing which he has done is to proclaim martial law, according to their own newspapers.

The Kemalist army, which has undertaken to expel the foreigners from these countries and to deliver them to their own inhabitants that they may enjoy their independence as they like, is now on the point of marching on this country, and we have had correspondence with its leaders who only ask from us the support of an internal revolution, so that the treacherous enemy should remain between two fires: the fire of the "Moujahidin" and that of the national revolution.

To work, O generous of soul! Do not lose this precious occasion accorded by Heaven. Undoubtedly God is with us. Many of the retired officers of the Turkish army have joined the Kemalist army since the beginning of this week, and they have sworn not to re-enter Aleppo but with the holy flag hoisted over their heads. Go to meet them with your goods. Life is cheap in comparison with honour. . . . Enough humiliation, each of you knows that the colonisers have humiliated us and have made us foreigners in our own country. You do not ignore their "tergiversations." Yesterday, they were helping the Turks, but, seeing that the American (Chester) has made agreement with the Turks for the restoration of their country, they (the French) have changed and become hostile to them (the Turks), while the British Government, who was the enemy of the Turks and the friend of the Greeks yesterday, seeing the demands of former were justified, have come to reason, throwing aside every selfish interest, promising not to touch their noble principles and their independence. And Great Britain will accord complete independence to both Irak and Palestine if we will

expel the French, who claim to be protectors of the Moslems as their newspapers pretend.

Consequently, let us rise up as one man to expel the superfluous colonisator.

God has said: "If you help God, God will help you." Get to work and do not lose this very precious occasion. This movement will be general in all Syria. Salam!

The Revolutionary National Party. Section 2.
(No Signature.)

[E 6457/987/65]

No. 44.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to the Marquis della Torretta.

My dear Ambassador,

Foreign Office, June 28, 1923.

CAREFUL consideration has been given to your memorandum of the 2nd May, in which your Excellency communicated the observations of your Government on the draft memorandum containing certain assurances which His Majesty's Government are prepared to give to the Italian Government in connection with the British mandate for Irak.

Although the reasons which have led the Italian Government to suggest certain modifications in the terms of article 2 of the draft assurances are fully appreciated, His Majesty's Government feel that no close analogy can be drawn between Irak on the one hand and Palestine and Syria on the other. Apart from those of the mandatory Power, the interests and nationals of other European Powers in Irak are relatively few, and if His Majesty's Government, who are chiefly concerned, regard the judicial system established under the mandate as adequate to protect British subjects from injustice, the Italian Government should have no ground for apprehension.

So far as is known, there are no Italian institutions which would benefit from the suggested modification in article 5 of the draft assurances, and His Majesty's Government would find it impossible to justify to the Irak Government a request for the grant in favour of Italy of a customs exemption which could not be withheld from other Powers.

In the light of these arguments, I feel certain that your Excellency will have little difficulty in convincing the Italian Government that they need have no hesitation in accepting the assurances in the form originally proposed by His Majesty's Government. I must, however, avail myself of this opportunity of expressing to your Excellency the surprise occasioned to His Majesty's Government by the apparent desire of the Italian Government to make the satisfactory settlement of this question a condition precedent to the opening of negotiations with the French Government in regard to the mandate for Syria. Unlike the draft mandate for Irak, the mandate for Syria, together with that for Palestine, has been considered and approved in principle by the Council of the League of Nations. The council agreed to deal with these two mandates together, and to postpone the question of the mandate for Irak for later consideration. The draft mandate for Palestine was approved without qualification, but, as it was considered desirable that it should be brought into force simultaneously with the mandate for Syria, it was decided that it should not actually become operative until certain differences between France and Italy relative to the mandate for Syria had been resolved by further discussion between the two Governments concerned. The decision of the Council of the League to the above effect was recorded as long ago as the 24th July, 1922. No suggestion was made at the time that the Italian Government would require to be satisfied in regard to their position in Irak before proceeding to discuss with the French Government the points still outstanding in respect of the mandate for Syria, and, in the view of His Majesty's Government, it is not reasonable that a condition of this kind should now be introduced, ten months later, without any adequate cause.

I trust that your Excellency will be so good as to bring the above considerations to the notice of your Government, in the hope that an early solution of the various points under discussion may be reached.

Believe me,

Yours sincerely,

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.